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l)ORGANIZING SYSTEMIC INNOVATION
Systemic innovation refers to product development activities that involve the change
of multiple interdependent components. Unlike autonomous innovation, which refers to
components that change independently, systemic innovation is for many firms the norm
rather than the exception. This is for instance the result of increased efforts to develop
products from multiple (new) technologies, such as mobile phones. The systemic nature of
innovation, combined with its inherent uncertainty, makes it a challenging task to organize
and manage this process as well as possible. This is why this thesis develops and tests
several theories to explain the performance of new product development (NPD) projects.
Of main concern are the performance implications of a project’s organizational form. 
This thesis, for instance, proposes and refines a configurational theory about the
integration of component development projects by systems integrators. These firms are
responsible for the coherent design and development of (complex) product systems, i.e.
systems integration. The theory predicts that systems integrators carefully combine project
ownership, supplier involvement, knowledge management, and coordination intensity to
improve their products. This thesis also tests to what extent the organization of NPD
projects contributes to the capability of NPD teams to solve technical problems. The results
indicate that systemic problems require differently organized teams than autonomous
problems. For instance, systemic problems are solved relatively fast in the presence of a
powerful project manager. In addition, we find that search for external information helps
to generate high-quality solutions for systemic problems, but only to a certain degree.
After that, this effect turns negative.
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Preface 
 
 
 
On the cover of this thesis you find a wonderful specimen of a barite crystal. It has 
emerged on top of a landscape of goethite, which is clearly visible inside the transparent 
crystal. The crystal and the goethite landscape are tightly coupled, which means that the 
crystal cannot be easily removed or modified without affecting its platform. Similarly, 
tightly-coupled product components cannot be improved without changes to other 
components. This change of interdependent components is labelled systemic innovation.    
 
Whereas mineral crystals emerge from naturally evolving processes, firms require a wide 
range of organizational capabilities to successfully develop new products. These 
capabilities for instance involve resolving technical problems, collaborating with other 
firms, learning new technologies, and coordinating systemic changes. More specifically, I 
argue in this thesis that firms require specific configurations of these capabilities. In other 
words, the performance of new product development is determined jointly by the firm’s 
capabilities. Similarly, the beauty of the barite crystal is the result of a unique arrangement 
of molecules that are themselves a specific configuration of different atoms, i.e. barium 
sulfate (BaSO4). Furthermore, the crystal’s goethite intrusion is a perfect metaphor for my 
conviction that organizational configurations need to fit the rough and the multifaceted 
characteristics of innovations, such as their uncertainty and their systemic nature.  
 
In this thesis I report the results of my research on the organization of systemic innovation. 
I started working on this thesis in February 2004. Next to my interest in the subject of this 
thesis, a main personal driver was to become better trained as an academic researcher. I 
certainly feel that I have achieved that aim, and I look forward to further develop the 
necessary skills in the future. Many people in my personal and in my professional life have 
supported me over the years. It’s impossible to thank you all, but I do want to express 
some special words of thanks. 
 
First of all, I would like to thank Jan van den Ende for giving me the opportunity to start a 
PhD project, and for supporting and guiding me throughout this intensive, but enjoyable 
process. I also would like to thank all my (former) colleagues from the department 
Management of Technology and Innovation, where I spent almost six unforgettable years. 
To name just a few pleasant memories: the IMP conference, the yearly retreat, the case 
study book, the countless soccer trophies, travelling abroad with many of you to attend 
conferences, chatting and joking with Carmen (mind you, I am still in the building!), 
carpooling with Wendy, chatting about the kids with my roommate Geerten, etc. I look 
forward to fruitful and pleasant partnerships in the future! 
 
On the private side, I first of all would like to thank Fred for his warm friendship. You are 
sorely missed. Special thanks go to my parents, who have supported me greatly in so many 
ways. Finally, lieve Liesbeth, thank you for being such a great partner in life and for being 
such a wonderful mother to Vera and Seline, our two little sunshines.    
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Systemic Innovation  
In 2007 the largest passenger airplane ever built, the Airbus A380, made its first 
commercial flight. The development of this superjumbo was delayed by several years 
however. A major source of delay involved problems with the cabin wiring. After test-
flights revealed the need to adapt several parts of the airplane, many wire bundles had to be 
modified or had to be replaced altogether. This was a very costly and an extremely time-
consuming process, since the cabin contains more than 100,000 wires with a total length of 
500 kilometers. In 2008, the parent company of Airbus, EADS (the European Aeronautic 
Defence and Space Company), had to announce for the fourth time a delay in the delivery 
schedule of the A380. Estimations are that the delays will cost EADS an additional five 
billion Euros. This example perfectly illustrates a fundamental characteristic of many new 
product development efforts, namely that different parts of a product are highly 
interdependent, and that a change in one part of a product therefore demands changes to 
one or more other parts. In the literature this is referred to as systemic innovation (Teece, 
1984; De Laat, 1999; Maula et al., 2006).  
 
Systemic innovation is the norm rather than the exception for many firms developing new 
products and services. This is especially true for complex product systems, such as 
airplanes, Formula 1 cars, oil refineries, etc. These products consist of a large number of 
components that are based on a wide variety of technologies. For these products it is 
critical that all of its components combine into a coherent whole. As illustrated by the 
example of the Airbus A380, products can simply fail if two of its components are 
misaligned and it can result in huge delays and extra costs. Besides complex products, 
systemic innovation and the need for a coherent product design is characteristic just as well 
for most ‘plain’ products and services, including software, automobiles, drugs, and mobile 
phones. Furthermore, systemic innovations have become more prominent in recent times 
as a result of rapid technological progress and the combination of multiple technologies in 
new products. The integration of Internet technology and mobile telecommunications, for 
instance, has resulted in more complex mobile networks and applications, e.g. mobile 
payment services and location-based multi-player games.  
 
Given its prevalence, the management and organization of systemic innovation involves a 
critical capability for innovating firms. This capability can be referred to as systems 
integration (Brusoni et al., 2001; Prencipe et al., 2003; Hobday et al., 2005). Systems 
integration involves a firm’s capability to design and develop a coherent product and to 
align the efforts of those responsible for the development of individual components, such 
as internal units or divisions, joint ventures, outside suppliers. Effective systems 
integration is difficult to realize however, as it builds upon a multitude of interrelated 
organizational capabilities.  
 
For instance, innovating firms require a detailed understanding of their products. This not 
just involves knowledge about the individual technologies that are embedded in their 
12
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products, but also knowledge about how technologies and components interrelate, i.e. how 
they operate together and how they depend on each other. This knowledge is needed to 
develop a coherent product and to understand the systemic implications of changes. 
Furthermore, to improve the understanding of component interrelationships and also to 
align activities effectively, intense coordination is needed between those responsible for 
the development of interdependent components. Hence, learning and coordination are 
important elements of a firm’s systems integration capability. 
 
Especially for complex and entirely new products it will be very difficult however to fully 
understand the details of individual components, let alone how they interrelate. 
Consequently, such development efforts are likely to be confronted with technical 
problems, for instance as result of difficulties with component interfaces. The management 
of systemic innovation therefore also pertains to the capability of firms to generate and 
implement solutions for problems affecting multiple parts of the product, such as problems 
with the design of the Airbus A380. 
 
A complicating factor in the management of systemic innovation is that processes of 
learning, coordination, and problem-solving are likely to span the boundary of the 
innovating firm. Few firms are able to design and develop new products completely 
internally. In order to succeed they have no choice but to exploit as much as possible the 
capabilities of external actors, such as suppliers, users, alliance partners, and universities. 
This practice of Open Innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) makes it more difficult however to 
divide and monitor tasks, to align interests, and to coordinate changes, thus increasing the 
complexity of systems integration. 
 
In sum, systemic innovation is a fundamental characteristic of new product development. 
In order to successfully initiate, respond to, and complete systemic innovation processes 
firms need a wide range of organizational capabilities that together can be labelled 
‘systems integration’. Prior studies have generated substantial knowledge in this area, but 
opportunities exist to further improve our understanding of this important organizational 
capability. This thesis takes several steps to seize some of these opportunities. Before we 
discuss in greater detail the objective of this thesis and its contributions, the next section 
first of all positions this thesis in the innovation literature and delimits its scope. 
 
1.2 Defining innovation 
In today’s society change is ubiquitous and pervasive, be it social, economic, political, or 
technological. Innovation is both a major driver of change and an important means to adapt 
to changes. Innovation has to do with ‘something new,’ such as new ideas, new 
technologies, new products, new processes, or new ways of organizing. Innovation is an 
important driver of economic growth and has a strong influence on social welfare. Because 
of the important role that innovation plays in many parts of society, innovation is being 
studied by different scientific disciplines, such as economics, psychology, marketing, 
engineering, and sociology. Each discipline has its own perspective and assumptions, 
which makes innovation difficult to define (Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 1997). To 
identify different areas of innovation research and to define innovation, Gopalakrishnan 
and Damanpour (1997) distinguish three primary dimensions to conceptualize innovation: 
13
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(1) the type of innovation; (2) the stage of the innovation process; (3) and the level of 
analysis. These dimensions are very useful to position this thesis. 
 
Types of innovation 
First of all, innovations can be categorized into several contrasting types. Two common 
dichotomies of types of innovation are product versus process innovation and radical 
versus incremental innovation (Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 1997). Product 
innovations involve new products or services that are introduced in the market for the 
benefit of customers, whereas process innovations pertain to new ways of producing these 
products and services, for instance by transforming inputs using new tools and devices. 
This thesis only considers product innovation.  
 
Products are typically product systems that are structured as ‘nested hierarchies’ (Simon, 
1962), i.e. as systems of subsystems that are themselves also composed of subsystems, etc. 
The mobile phone is for instance composed of a display, an antenna, a battery, and a 
computer chip, but the mobile phone is itself also a subsystem of the larger mobile 
telecommunications system, which also consists of base stations, switches, user databases, 
billing systems, etc. Hence, what to consider a system, a subsystem, or a component is a 
matter of definition. Unlike many studies, this thesis provides clear definitions of our unit 
of analysis. The failure to provide such definitions hampers the accumulation of 
knowledge in the field of innovation management, because it complicates the comparison 
of findings (Gatignon et al., 2002). The development of a product system is for instance a 
different task than the development of a new component. 
 
Besides components and subsystems, product systems also comprise linkage or interface 
technologies that enable components to interoperate. Examples are telecommunication 
protocols and other communication standards, but also physical interfaces, such as those 
determined by the size and shape of components, determine the joint performance of 
components. New products, new components, and new interfaces each have their own 
technological trajectory and can vary considerably in terms of their novelty (Tushman and 
Nelson, 1990; Brusoni et al., 2001; Van den Ende, 2003). Incremental innovations involve 
only minor adjustments and changes and/or result in only limited performance 
improvements. In contrast, radical innovations are completely new, possibly even new-to-
the-world (e.g. Ehrnberg, 1995; Levinthal, 1998; Gatignon et al., 2002). 
 
In the context of product systems, a further distinction can be made between autonomous 
innovations and systemic innovations (Teece, 1984; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). 
Autonomous innovations are stand-alone innovations of individual components or 
subsystems that have no implications for other parts of the system. In this case the 
interfaces that specify how components interrelate are reinforced. A fine example of 
autonomous innovation is provided by modular products, such as PCs. In this context 
existing modules, e.g. hard disk drives, chips, monitors, and peripheral devices, can often 
be replaced by new modules without fundamentally affecting the many other parts of the 
system (e.g. Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Schilling, 2000).  
 
Unlike autonomous innovations, systemic innovations have an effect on multiple parts of a 
system or even on the entire system (Teece, 1984; De Laat, 1999; Maula et al., 2006). 
14
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Most new products start as integral products with highly interdependent components. This 
means that the change of one single component demands substantial changes to a large 
number of other components, i.e. more than one component changes as part of this 
innovation. The design and development of a new product is therefore typically a systemic 
innovation process. Whereas products tend to become more modular over time, few 
products become perfectly modular. As a result, the improvement of existing products is 
likely to be a systemic innovation process too.  
 
Furthermore, even in a perfectly modular product system, a component change can 
demand changes to other components even if interfaces are unaffected. The development 
of a new and advanced software application may for instance require the development and 
implementation of a new computer chip to make sure that the application performs as 
intended. In this example the product’s technical interfaces remain intact in spite of the 
systemic ‘imbalance’ (Rosenberg, 1976; Brusoni et al., 2001) that results from the 
component change. In specific cases, systemic innovations reinforce the technological 
underpinnings of a product’s components, but change the interfaces between these 
components. A classic example of such an ‘architectural innovation’ involves the 
reconfiguration of a ceiling-mounted room fan into a portable fan (Henderson and Clark, 
1990). Here, the size and the shape of components change, as well as their positioning in 
the product system, but their technological foundations are unaffected. In this thesis we 
explicitly consider the novelty and the systemic nature of product innovations. 
 
Stages of the innovation process 
Secondly, the innovation process consists of several stages, most notably that of generation 
and adoption (Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 1997). Innovations are first of all 
generated, i.e. an idea has to be generated and then turned into a new product. Next, this 
innovation has to be brought to the market and needs to be adopted and implemented by its 
prospective users. This thesis is primarily concerned with the development process to turn 
an idea into a new product.  
 
Gerwin (2006, p.2) describes the new product development process as follows: “[it] is a 
process that usually starts with knowledge of technological or market opportunities. 
Strategic choices defining what is to be developed are made in the upstream phase of the 
process, while the downstream phase, which absorbs the bulk of committed resources, 
involves detailed design and testing. The process ends with a new product, service, or 
some combination, ready for full scale operations and distribution. It may be used as part 
of a higher level system such as an aircraft, it may be sold to customers, or it may serve 
both purposes”. In a systemic context, the development of a new component may not only 
involve the design and development of the component itself, but also the change of 
interrelated components. 
 
Levels of analysis   
Finally, innovation is studied at different levels of analysis, such as the industry level, the 
organization level, and the organization subunit level (Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 
1997; Gupta et al., 2007). Research at the industry level for instance focuses on differences 
between industries, e.g. in terms of R&D expenditures or technology and product life-
cycles. At the organizational level of analysis, research typically focuses on the 
15
 5 
innovativeness of organizations either as an independent variable, e.g. innovativeness as a 
predictor of organizational effectiveness, or as a dependent variable, e.g. innovativeness as 
a result of competitive intensity or organizational structure.  
 
Research on innovation within firms, i.e. the subunit level of analysis, studies topics like 
the innovation process in new product development (NPD) projects, or the innovation 
process within and between different departments, such as marketing, research & 
development, and manufacturing. The innovation process might also occur between firms, 
e.g. in alliances and networks. This thesis operates at this subunit level of analysis as it 
focuses on NPD projects within or between firms. Hence, in light of the three 
abovementioned dimensions, this thesis defines innovation as the development of products 
within or between firms. In this definition ‘product’ can refer to product systems, product 
subsystems, or product components, depending on the adopted level of analysis. 
Furthermore, product development will more often than not pertain to systemic innovation.  
 
1.3 Research objective  
Any new product development effort faces inherent commercial and technical risks and it 
can therefore be no surprise that NPD is plagued by high failure rates (Tidd and Bodley, 
2002). This seems especially true for the development of complex product systems, which 
involves many different components and technologies that are highly interrelated. In spite 
of its inherent risks, the development of new products and services can lead to superior 
financial performance when a firm is consistently more successful at NPD than its 
competitors (Dougherty, 1992; Tidd, 2000; Danneels, 2002). A wealth of research 
therefore exists on success factors for NPD (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Montoya-
Weiss and Calantone, 1995; Henard and Szymanski, 2001; Van der Panne et al., 2003). In 
trying to explain the performance of new products, these studies distinguish between 
different groups of success factors, such as product characteristics, market characteristics, 
firm characteristics, and organizational characteristics of the NPD process. This latter 
aspect of NPD - broadly defined - is the focus of this thesis, i.e. this thesis fits into the field 
of research that investigates how firms organize and manage NPD projects.  
 
Tidd and Bodley (2002, p.128) state the following about this field of research: “Much 
research on the management of innovation attempts to identify some “best-practice”… 
However, there is unlikely to be “one best way” to manage and organize product 
development as industries differ in terms of sources of innovation and the technological 
and market opportunity, and organization-specific characteristics are likely to undermine 
the notion of universal formula for successful innovation.” In line with this view prior 
literature has reached no consensus about any particular organizational form as a universal 
success factor for NPD (Van der Panne et al., 2003). Since different types of innovation 
present different challenges, it can be expected that different approaches are demanded to 
organize NPD projects (e.g. Langerak et al., 2000).  
 
Based on the above discussion, the objective of this thesis can be formulated as follows: 
the objective of this thesis is to increase our understanding of the organization of systemic 
innovation, i.e. systems integration, by building and testing theory about how the 
performance of new product development projects can be explained by their 
organizational forms and how this depends on the characteristics of the innovation. Figure 
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1.1 illustrates the general conceptual model that is implied by this objective. In this section 
we discuss this objective and its various parts in some greater detail. This provides the 
foundations for a more detailed discussion in the next section of the specific contributions 
that we aim to make.  
 
Figure 1.1 General conceptual model 
 
 
First of all, it becomes clear from Figure 1.1 that the performance of NPD projects is the 
dependent concept in this thesis, i.e. this is ultimately what we aim to explain. The 
performance of NPD projects has multiple dimensions (e.g. Tatikonda and Montoya-
Weiss, 2001; Kessler and Bierly, 2002; Sheremata, 2000). Most notably, NPD is assessed 
in terms of project speed (the time it takes from idea generation to product launch), project 
cost efficiency (the financial resources required to develop a new product), and the quality 
of the new product (the extent that the innovation is technologically advanced or the extent 
that it meets user needs).  
 
Strong trade-offs may exist between speed, quality, and cost efficiency (e.g. Sheremata, 
2000; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Bayus et al., 1997). An increased emphasis on for 
instance new product quality might substantially increase the time and resources needed to 
complete projects. From the perspective of the firm, direct project outcomes may not be 
all-important though. Instead, a project might be especially valuable to the firm in terms of 
its long-term benefits. Projects can for instance result in valuable relationships with other 
actors, such as suppliers, users, or universities, and – regardless of the immediate product 
quality – a project may generate new technology or skills that increases the firm’s 
innovativeness and competitiveness in the future (e.g. Danneels, 2002; Sobrero and 
Roberts, 2002). Furthermore, in the context of product systems, project performance may 
also refer to the coherence of the product system as a whole or to the extent that a new 
component fits in the larger product. 
 
Secondly, Figure 1.1 demonstrates that a project’s organizational form is our main 
independent concept, i.e. we are interested in its role as a determinant of project 
performance. As indicated in the previous section, innovation is essentially a multi-level 
phenomenon (e.g. Gupta et al., 2007). Reflecting this characteristic this thesis considers a 
project’s organizational form at two levels of analysis. The first approach considers the 
organizational form of NPD projects or their ‘governance modes’ (Van den Ende, 2003). In 
The organizational form of a 
NPD project 
 
Both firm-level organizational 
factors (i.e. governance modes) 
and project-level factors 
NPD project performance 
 
 
Project speed, project cost 
efficiency, new product quality, 
and long-term project benefits 
 
Contingency factors 
 
e.g. technological novelty and 
the degree of interface change 
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this approach we adopt the perspective of systems integrators - firms responsible for the 
development and the integration of product systems - and we consider their involvement in 
product and component development projects. At one extreme, a systems integrator can 
completely integrate a development project (internal projects). At the other extreme, this 
firm can rely entirely on external actors (external projects). In between these extremes, the 
firm may share risks and divide tasks with other actors, such as universities, suppliers, or 
even competitors. In other words, this perspective deals with the boundary of the firm for 
NPD projects. The organizational form of a development project therefore considers a 
project’s organizational form at the level of the firm. 
 
The second approach focuses on the organizational form within projects, i.e. it investigates 
the structuring and the organization of the development processes that are executed within 
NPD projects. This project-level approach is closely related to the literature about NPD 
success factors (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1995; 
Henard and Szymanski, 2001; Van der Panne et al., 2003). This literature for instance 
investigates the extent that project team members exchange information, the extent that 
they have authority over the way they perform their tasks, and the seniority of the manager 
in charge of the project.  
 
Finally, as shown by Figure 1.1, we expect that the effects of a project’s (firm-level and 
project-level) organizational form on project performance are contingent upon specific 
project characteristics. Previous studies have for instance pointed to the technological 
novelty of innovations and the degree of interface change as important contingency factors 
(e.g. Tidd, 2001). As pointed out in the previous section, both factors have a strong 
influence on the systemic nature of innovations. Now we have defined innovation and 
outlined the basic objective of this thesis, we will explain in the next section the specific 
contributions of this thesis.  
 
1.4 Contributions  
How do we aim to contribute to what we already know about the relationships outlined in 
Figure 1.1? What specific ‘gaps’ do we identify and address? Below we address these 
questions as we indicate the main contributions of this thesis. 
 
Multiple firm boundaries … 
First of all, this thesis aims to improve our understanding of the organization of innovation 
by conceptualizing the organizational form of NPD projects more accurately and more 
comprehensively than in prior studies. Inspired by transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985), the dominant approach to conceptualize the (firm-level) 
organizational form of NPD projects is by means of only one concept: the degree of 
vertical integration. This concept refers to the boundary of the firm, i.e. make, buy, or ally, 
for the development of a new product (e.g. Pisano, 1990). However, the relationship 
between a firm and its environment is more complex than a legal demarcation in terms of 
ownership or a set of contractual specifications (Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2005; Araujo et al., 2002). One way to further this field of research is therefore 
to forsake the simplicity of prior studies in favor of theories that conceptualize more 
accurately the multidimensional nature of the boundary of the firm. In this regard, an 
important first contribution of this thesis involves the conceptualization of the 
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organizational form of NPD projects in terms of four ‘dimensions of integration’: 
ownership integration, coordination integration, task integration, and knowledge 
integration (see also Jaspers and Van den Ende, 2006). Although these four dimensions 
have been investigated - under different labels - in prior studies, to date they have not been 
considered in a single study. Below we briefly outline the four dimensions and position 
them in existing literature. We point out that these four dimensions are especially relevant 
in the context of systemic innovation.  
 
First of all, we build on the distinction made by Robertson and Langlois (1995) between 
coordination integration and ownership integration as two distinct dimensions of vertical 
integration. The literature about vertical integration typically assumes that the organization 
of an activity, such as a NPD project, within the hierarchy and the legal boundary of the 
firm aligns interests as well as facilitates information exchange (e.g. Teece, 1984). 
Robertson and Langlois (1995), however, linked the alignment of interests and the 
exchange of information to two conceptually distinct, but related dimensions of vertical 
integration. Ownership integration reflects the firm’s formal control over activities based 
on legal ownership. This dimension primarily serves to align interests and to alleviate 
appropriation concerns. Robertson and Langlois (1995) refer to coordination integration as 
the dimension of vertical integration that serves to resolve interdependencies and to 
achieve unity of effort by means of information exchange. Irrespective of their extent of 
ownership integration, Robertson and Langlois point out that different units, such as 
project teams, departments, and divisions, can be integrated in different degrees in terms of 
the extent of information exchange between them.  
 
The distinction between ownership integration and coordination integration resonates with 
Richardson (1972), who proposed inter-firm cooperation (low ownership integration and 
high coordination integration) as an alternative for market-based coordination (low 
ownership integration and low coordination integration) and intra-firm coordination (high 
ownership integration and high coordination integration). Likewise, Gulati and Singh 
(1998) made a distinction between control mechanisms and coordination mechanisms for 
different types of strategic alliances. Furthermore, in the context of buyer-supplier 
relationships in NPD, Sobrero and Roberts (2002) made a similar distinction between the 
contractual characteristics of relationships and the extent of information transfer. Put 
differently, the boundary of the firm is not only about what is inside and what is outside 
the firm, it is also very much how the relationship between different actors is organized 
(Araujo et al., 2003), such as in terms of coordination (Takeishi, 2001). 
 
The third and the fourth dimensions are inspired by the literature on systems integration. 
Focusing on systems integrators, Brusoni et al. (2001) made a distinction between the 
firm’s production boundary and the firm’s knowledge boundary (see also Fine and 
Whitney, 1996; Takeishi, 2002). The production boundary of the firm refers to the 
activities that the systems integrator performs internally. This is what we label the degree 
of task integration. With the increased involvement of for instance suppliers in NPD 
projects, ownership integration can be high, but task integration can at the same time be 
very low. A systems integrator might for instance fully finance a component development 
project, but the majority of the project tasks (e.g. the basic design of the new product or 
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component, its detailed design, the actual development work, assembly activities, and 
product testing) might well be performed by suppliers.  
 
As a fourth dimension, the knowledge boundary of the firm refers to the extent that a firm 
possesses a detailed understanding of a certain activity. This is what we label knowledge 
integration. In terms of a component development project, this for instance refers to the 
component’s technological basis and to its interrelationships with other components. 
Whereas a systems integrator may outsource large parts of a component development 
project, they can still possess or develop deep knowledge about these outsourced activities 
(Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2001). The degree of knowledge integration can therefore 
exceed the degree of task integration. Or put differently, firms might ‘know more than they 
make’ (Brusoni et al., 2001).  
 
Because of the complexity of many products, systems integrators cannot develop every 
component internally (Hobday et al., 2005). By knowing more than they make, systems 
integrators are able to coordinate the network of specialized component and technology 
developers (Brusoni et al., 2001). In a narrow definition of the term, Brusoni et al. (2001) 
label this coordination mechanism ‘systems integration’. They position it as a coordination 
mechanism in between the extremes of the market and the hierarchy. On the one hand, 
coordination by means of systems integration allows systems integrators to benefit from 
the incentives and the specialized capabilities of external component and technology 
developers, i.e. differentiation, which is typically associated with the market. On the other 
hand, based on their understanding of component technologies and component 
interrelationships, systems integrators are able to coordinate external actors, i.e. 
integration, which is typically associated with the hierarchy (Brusoni et al., 2001).  
 
This definition of systems integration as a coordination mechanism in terms of 
differentiation and integration means that this concept goes to the heart of organization 
theory. The division of tasks, their allocation to different (specialized) units, and the 
activities to achieve unity of effort among them are central topics in organization theory. A 
key principle involves the reduction of task interdependence between units to delimit any 
systemic consequences of change (e.g. Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). 
This principle also holds for the partitioning of tasks in the innovation process (Von 
Hippel, 1990). Furthermore, integration and differentiation are not only relevant with 
respect to interdependence, they are also important determinants of a firm’s capability to 
reduce uncertainty and to solve problems in the innovation process (e.g. Burns and Stalker, 
1961; Sheremata, 2000). While originally studied within firms, issues of differentiation 
and integration are also key in an inter-firm context, such as for the design of strategic 
alliances (e.g. Gulati et al., 2005) and - of course - for the management of component 
developers by systems integrators (Brusoni et al., 2001). In sum, by disentangling these 
four dimensions of integration we are able to pinpoint more accurately and more 
comprehensively the fundamentals of the wide range of possible organizational forms.  
 
… and a configurational approach 
The second contribution of this thesis is that we use the abovementioned dimensions of 
integration as building blocks in the development of a configurational theory. Whereas 
most studies in management research consider the direct or the moderating effect of 
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individual concepts, configurational theories consider the interplay of multiple explanatory 
concepts. In our case, this means that we conceptualize the organizational form of NPD 
projects as a configuration of the four dimensions of integration. More specifically, we 
propose that so-called ‘ideal-typical configurations’ of these dimensions contribute to the 
performance of NPD projects. Whereas configurational theories might be more accurate 
than the traditional ‘variance theories’ (Mohr, 1978) - in the sense that they come closer to 
the reality faced by practitioners (George and Bennett) - there is an inherent trade-off with 
another desirable feature of theories, namely their simplicity (Weick, 1979). 
Configurational theories are more complex, because they require the development of 
middle-range theories that explain for each ideal type how and why the internal 
consistency of this organizational form contributes to performance (e.g. Doty and Glick, 
1994). Furthermore, the configurational approach recognizes the possibility of equifinality, 
which means that different configurations can result in the same outcome (von Bertalanffy, 
1952; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Gresov and Drazin, 1997). 
 
For three reasons we are of the opinion that the configurational approach offers a fruitful 
way forward for the field of innovation management. First, in the fields of organization 
theory and strategic management configurational theories have proven to result in insights 
that are highly complementary to the findings from studies that are primarily interested in 
the strength of individual direct effects (Short et al., 2008). The configurational approach 
has hardly been applied in the innovation management literature, but it holds great promise 
to develop more fine-grained theories and to provide more precise advice for managers 
(Tidd, 2001). Our study takes steps to fill this gap.  
 
Secondly, empirical findings for the traditional type of theory have been inconsistent. 
Existing literature points to many factors that influence a firm’s boundary with respect to 
NPD projects, such as the specificity of project investments, the interdependence of 
activities, the tacitness of the knowledge involved, the trust between firms, and the extent 
that the innovation destroys existing competences and routines (Tidd et al., 1997). These 
determinants come from a wide range of theories, including transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985), information-processing theory (e.g. Tushman and Nadler, 1978), the 
knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996), and the literature about product 
modularity (e.g. Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000).  
 
Although it is widely recognized that multiple theories have to be considered to develop an 
understanding of the organization of innovation (e.g. Robertson and Langlois, 1995; 
Sobrero and Roberts, 2002; Takeishi, 2002; Gulati et al., 2005; Hoetker, 2005), many 
contrasting empirical findings exist regarding the extent that they explain the degree of 
vertical integration (Wolter and Veloso, 2008). Hence, what is needed is a model that takes 
into account the multidimensional nature of the boundary of the firm and that relates this to 
its many different determinants. The configurational approach offers a way to achieve this.  
 
Third, prior studies do occasionally adopt a configurational approach, albeit implicitly. For 
instance, as indicated above, Brusoni et al. (2001) conceptualize a systems integrator’s 
organizational form in terms of a combination (read: configuration) of integration and 
differentiation. In this thesis we aim to build upon this study by distinguishing four instead 
of two dimensions and by adopting very explicitly a configurational approach. This latter 
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for instance means that we aim to develop detailed middle-range theories and that we take 
into account equifinality. To be more precise, and based on the principle that each 
organizational dimension has its own antecedents and brings with it its own organizational 
capabilities (Cray, 1984), we argue that different configurations of the four dimensions of 
integration represent different organizational forms that are capable of dealing with the 
characteristics and the challenges of different types of innovation.  
 
Unlike for instance the alliance literature, we include in our analysis the full spectrum of 
possible organizational forms. At one extreme, projects are fully internalized, e.g. firms 
finance and own these projects (legal boundary), perform all of their tasks (production/task 
boundary) and integrate all the relevant knowledge (knowledge boundary). At the other 
extreme, projects are organized completely external to the firm, i.e. no investments, no task 
execution, and no automatic learning about the innovation. In between, we find many 
different organizational configurations, including different combinations of integration and 
differentiation in alliances (e.g. Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2005).  
 
Furthermore, we are able to conceptualize different types of buyer-supplier relationships 
(e.g. Takeishi, 2001; Sobrero and Roberts, 1998). Internally financed projects (full 
ownership) can for instance be performed in various degrees by suppliers (based on the 
degree of task integration) and firms can maintain more or less detailed knowledge about 
these outsourced activities (the degree of knowledge integration). As far as we know, no 
other studies have explicitly adopted a configurational approach to the study of firm 
boundaries (for the organization of NPD projects). In sum, this approach contributes to and 
extends the systems integration and the innovation management literature, but it also 
contributes to the literature that investigates the multiple boundaries of the firm (e.g. 
Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005; Araujo et al., 2002; Brusoni et al., 2001).  
 
Multiple levels of analysis 
In section 1.3 we already outlined that the organization of innovation is a multi-level 
phenomenon. However, very few studies exist that explicitly take this into account (Gupta 
et al., 2007). Above, we also outlined that this thesis considers two levels of analysis: the 
project’s firm-level organizational form and its project-level organizational form. Chapter 
9 of this thesis explores how organizational choices at these two levels of analysis interact 
in their effect on project outcomes. This is a clear contribution to the scarce multi-level 
innovation management literature. For instance, a recent special issue of Organization 
Science did not address these two levels of analysis (see Gupta et al., 2007), even though 
plenty of research exists for each level of analysis individually. Good opportunities 
therefore exist to complement and improve the research at these two levels of analysis. 
Below we indicate in more detail how this thesis addresses this gap, but before that it is 
helpful to outline very briefly what we mean with the two levels of analysis. 
 
First of all, the four dimensions of integration as discussed for the previous two 
contributions pertain to the firm-level organizational form of development projects. 
Configurations of these four dimensions indicate how and to what extent the focal systems 
integrator is involved in a specific project. Secondly, the project-level organizational form 
operates at a lower level of analysis, as it deals with the specific ways in which projects - 
that can vary in terms of their firm-level organizational form - are structured, organized, 
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and managed. The existing project-level literature suggests that the systemic nature and the 
technological uncertainty of projects have a strong influence on the way that projects are 
structured and organized (Shenhar, 2001; Sosa et al., 2004). For instance, higher 
technological uncertainty affects the intensity of communication within projects, and 
projects of greater complexity tend to be organized with greater centralization and 
formalization (Shenhar and Dvir, 1996; Shenhar, 2001). In this way, the project-level 
organizational form - just like the firm-level organizational form - influences the project’s 
integration and differentiation capabilities (e.g. Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-Gima, 2003; 
Takeishi, 2001) and therefore influences the project’s overall systems integration 
capability. It is largely unknown however, how firm-level dimensions and project-level 
dimensions interact in their effect on project outcomes. 
 
This thesis addresses the abovementioned gap by investigating (in Chapter 9) the 
interaction of a project’s type of ownership integration, i.e. single-firm projects or alliance 
projects, and several elements of a project’s project-level organizational form. This 
strongly resonates with the call in prior studies for the consideration of organizational 
boundaries in the field of project management (Shenhar and Dvir, 1996). Typically, the 
project-level organizational form of NPD projects is studied for projects that keep the 
degree of ownership integration constant. For instance, the literature on NPD success 
factors (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Henard and Szymanski, 2001) generally 
investigates projects that are performed within a single firm, i.e. internal projects (high 
ownership integration). Relatively few studies investigate a project’s project-level 
organizational form in other firm-level organizational forms, such as contractual alliances 
(Gerwin and Ferris, 2004) or buyer-supplier relationships (Takeishi, 2001). In Chapter 9 
we explicitly investigate how (strongly) the two levels of analysis interact in their effect on 
project performance.   
 
Specific contingencies 
Next to the project’s organizational form, another key element in the general conceptual 
model of this thesis (Figure 1.1) is formed by the contingencies that influence the 
performance effects of a project’s organizational form. In this thesis we investigate several 
contingency factors that have received little attention thus far, but that can be considered to 
play an important role in the innovation process. These contingency factors involve various 
characteristics of the product or the component that is being developed in the project.   
 
First of all, in Chapter 4 we consider the novelty of the innovation. This is a classic 
contingency factor, but we aim to improve our understanding of its impact on the 
organization of innovation by studying it in a very specific context, namely that of 
complementary products. Whereas regular components are incorporated in a product 
system during assembly, complementary products have a market of their own. Video 
games, for instance, are sold independently of video game consoles, such as the 
PlayStation 3 and the Xbox 360. In this context, we can make a distinction between the 
novelty of the complementary product and the novelty of the product system that it 
complements. In this chapter we investigate how both types of novelty influence the 
appropriateness of different organizational forms for the development of complementary 
products. 
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We examine this topic in the context of mobile telecommunications. More specifically, we 
adopt the perspective of mobile network operators to investigate the extent that these firms 
integrate the development of individual value-added mobile applications, such as mobile 
games, mobile office applications, and mobile messaging applications. Although a product 
platform and its complementary products can have separate development and 
commercialization processes, this does not mean that they are unrelated. On the contrary, 
the development of complementary products requires coordination to achieve technical 
interoperability, and the commercialization of complementary products is argued to be 
critical to attract and retain users for the product system (Van den Ende, 2003). Because 
this interrelatedness can be argued to depend on the novelty of both the system and the 
complementary product, it seems relevant to investigate how these contingencies influence 
the appropriateness of different organizational forms.  
 
Secondly, in Chapter 6 we consider the development of a special type of architectural 
innovation, i.e. architectural innovations that combine existing technologies from different 
industries into new product systems. An example of such a technology fusion (Kodama, 
1992) or such an ‘inter-industry architectural innovation’ is the integration of mobile 
telecommunications and financial services to create mobile payment and mobile banking 
applications. This type of innovation is truly systemic in nature, because it has to be 
explored how the new product configuration impacts each of the different subsystems. No 
prior knowledge exists about subsystem interrelationships, and as a result the product’s 
design and coordination has to be performed without the leadership of a knowledgeable 
systems integrator. In other words, this study explores how firms organize new product 
development within the context of the specific contingencies of this particular type of 
systemic innovation.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 we consider the effect of a project’s project-level 
organizational form on project performance. To be more precise, we consider whether this 
effect is mediated by the team’s proficiency to solve technical problems. Little empirical 
insights exist about this mediating effect (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Sheremata, 2000; 
Atuahene-Gima, 2003). We add to this literature by investigating two potential moderators. 
First of all, we consider as a moderator the extent that a project’s problems are systemic 
rather than autonomous. In the development of product systems problems might involve 
individual components (autonomous problems) or might be related to multiple of the 
product’s components (systemic problems). In Chapter 7 we investigate how the type of 
problem moderates the effects of a project’s organizational differentiation and integration 
mechanisms on the proficiency of the team to solve problems proficiently, i.e. fast, cost-
efficiently, and with high-quality solutions. Secondly, in Chapter 8 we investigate whether 
and how the effect of problem-solving proficiency on project outcomes is moderated by 
the number of problems in the project, i.e. problem frequency. 
 
1.5 Thesis structure and research questions 
Including this introduction, this thesis consists of ten chapters. Below we briefly introduce 
each chapter. We outline the underlying research questions and we also briefly indicate 
how we aimed to answer these questions. The chapters are grouped in three parts. Part 1 
(Chapters 2 and 3) are introductory in nature as they provide a theoretical foundation for 
the other chapters in this thesis. Chapter 2 introduces configurational theory and 
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contingency theory. Chapter 3 introduces in greater detail the concept of systems 
integration. Part 2 (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) adopts a configurational approach to study the 
firm-level organizational form for different types of development projects. Part 3 (Chapters 
7, 8, and 9) investigates how the organizational form within NPD projects influences 
project performance and how this depends on several contingency factors. Chapter 10 
summarizes and concludes the thesis.  
 
 
PART 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Chapter 2. Contingency theory and configurational theory 
As an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 describes what is known as ‘contingency theory’ and 
‘configurational theory’. As indicated above, an important principle in this thesis is that 
different innovations require different organizational forms (see also Figure 1.1). 
Contingency theory is an overall ‘metatheory’ (Schoonhoven, 1981) which states that a 
certain value of the dependent concept (e.g. the success of a NPD project) is determined by 
‘the degree of fit’ between the independent concept (e.g. the extent that the system firm 
performs project tasks itself) and the contingency concept (e.g. the novelty of the 
innovation). Chapter 2 provides an overview of different ways in which this principle can 
be incorporated in theories and how these can be operationalized.  
 
Contingency theories consider the interplay of only two concepts, i.e. the independent 
concept and the contingency concept, in the explanation of the dependent concept. In this 
respect contingency theories are ‘bivariate theories of fit’ (Meilich, 2006). Configurational 
theories consider a larger number of concepts and they focus on how these concepts 
contribute to a certain outcome jointly rather than individually. Chapter 2 introduces 
configurational theory in greater detail and discusses its differences and similarities with 
contingency theory. Finally, Chapter 2 outlines how subsequent chapters make use of both 
types of theory.  
 
Chapter 3. Systems integration: how and why firms know more than they make 
Whereas Brusoni et al. (2001) have stressed why systems integrators should know more 
than they make, i.e. for reasons of coordination by means of systems integration, they were 
less concerned with the mechanisms that firms can apply to access and absorb external 
knowledge to increase their knowledge boundary. This chapter aims to increase our 
understanding about how firms develop systems integration capabilities. The research 
question that underlies this chapter reads as follows: 
 
How can firms increase their knowledge boundary beyond their production boundary? 
 
To answer this question and to generate several options that can assist in the creation of a 
systems integration capability we performed a conceptual analysis that integrates the 
systems integration literature and the Open Innovation literature. This latter literature (e.g. 
Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough et al., 2006) is very relevant in this respect, because of its 
concern with the potential of externally residing knowledge and capabilities to assist a 
firm’s innovation process. Finally, this chapter also serves as an introductory chapter for 
the rest of the thesis as it provides an introduction to the systems integration literature.  
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PART 2. SYSTEMS INTEGRATION: A CONFIGURATIONAL APPROACH 
 
Chapter 4. How to organize the development of complementary products? 
As indicated in section 1.4, Chapter 4 investigates how systems integrators organize the 
development of complementary products. This chapter makes a first step to a more detailed 
conceptualization of a project’s organizational form by making a distinction between the 
system firm’s ownership of the project (ownership integration) and its active involvement 
in the project (coordination and task integration). In this way it becomes possible to 
conceptualize the involvement of system firms in a development project, although they are 
not the owner of the project and its outcome, i.e. systems integration. More specifically, 
this chapter investigates how the organizational form of the project depends not only on 
the novelty of the complementary product itself, but also on the novelty of the larger 
product system. This is reflected in the following research question: 
 
Taking into account the novelty of the system and the novelty of the complementary 
product, what are appropriate organizational forms for systems integrators to organize 
development projects of complementary products? 
 
To address this question we analyzed the involvement of mobile network operators in the 
development of mobile telecommunications applications. Based on existing literature we 
propose a contingency model that suggests appropriate organizational forms for the 
development of value-added mobile applications for different combinations of network 
novelty and application novelty. Quantitative analysis provides a first indication of the 
validity of this framework. 
 
Chapter 5. Organizational configurations for component development projects 
Chapter 5 distinguishes between the four abovementioned ‘dimensions of integration’ to 
reflect different relationships between the firm and its environment. In this way it extends 
Chapter 4, which only considers two firm-level organizational dimensions. Chapter 5 
explores how the four dimensions can be combined to form different configurations that 
are suitable to address the specific characteristics of different types of component 
development projects. The research question for this chapter reads as follows: 
 
What are appropriate organizational configurations for systems integrators to organize 
component development projects? 
 
Based on existing literature and on case studies of development projects of mobile 
telecommunications applications, Chapter 5 proposes a tentative configurational theory. 
For six different types of component innovation this theory suggests organizational 
configurations that seem appropriate for the development of these innovations. Whereas 
Chapter 4 explicitly focused on complementary products, which can be considered a very 
specific type of part or component of a larger product system, this chapter focuses on 
components in general. Normally, components are directly integrated in the product and 
have no market of their own in which users make decisions to buy the component or not.  
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Chapter 6. Inter-industry architectural innovations 
Chapter 6 considers systems integration for a special type of systemic innovation, i.e. inter-
industry architectural innovation. These innovations are new product systems - rather than 
components or complementary products - that are created as a result of the first-time 
combination of technologies from different industries. Given the existence of technology 
specialists, given the absence of prior ties among these specialist firms, given their 
different structures and cultures, and given the lack of architectural knowledge about how 
to design and develop the new product system, this chapter poses the research question: 
 
How can development projects of inter-industry architectural innovations best be 
organized? 
 
This research question is explored by means of an inductive analysis of three in-depth case 
studies. These cases involve a mobile payment start-up, a mobile banking alliance, and an 
informal alliance for the development of a mobile television application. Hence, these 
three projects each integrated mobile telecommunications technology with technology 
from another industry, i.e. the financial services industry and the broadcasting industry. 
The organizational form as investigated in these three projects considers elements both at 
the level of the firm (e.g. internal within the start-up or in different types of alliances) and 
at the level of the project (e.g. different types of project management and information 
exchange). 
 
 
PART 3. SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING 
 
Chapter 7. Problem solving in NPD: systemic problems versus autonomous problems 
This chapter investigates the implications of the systemic nature of innovation processes 
within NPD projects. Whereas most of the literature about systems integration takes a 
firm-level perspective, i.e. the system firm’s boundaries with respect to various types of 
innovation, we investigate how systems integration can occur within projects. More 
specifically, we investigate how a project’s organizational form in terms of differentiation 
and integration (i.e. two main building blocks of systems integration; Brusoni et al., 2001) 
can assist project teams in their capability to solve technical project problems. More in 
particular, we investigate how project differentiation mechanisms (e.g. external search for 
ideas, decentralization) and integration mechanisms (e.g. team meetings, senior managers) 
can help project teams to solve different types of technical problems. We make a 
distinction between systemic problems, which have implications for multiple components 
of the product system that is being developed in the project, and autonomous problems, 
which are restricted to individual components. As outlined in the previous section, this 
distinction adds a new perspective to the literature about problem-solving in NPD projects 
(e.g. Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-Gima, 2003). The research question associated with this 
contribution is the following: 
 
How is the effect of the project-level organizational form on the project’s problem-
solving capability moderated by the extent that project problems are systemic rather than 
autonomous? 
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Assisted by prior literature (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-
Gima, 2003), we develop several hypotheses related to the moderating effect of the type of 
problem. We test these hypotheses statistically based on survey data about problem-
solving in development projects of web applications.  
 
Chapter 8. More on problem solving 
This chapter complements the previous chapter as it investigates whether (and if so how) 
problem-solving proficiency acts as a mediator of the effect that a project’s organizational 
form has on project performance. In addition, we investigate how the relationship between 
problem-solving proficiency depends on the frequency of the problems during a project. 
This points to the following two questions: 
 
Does problem-solving proficiency mediate the effects from the project’s organizational 
form on project performance? 
Does problem frequency moderate the relationship between problem-solving proficiency 
and project performance? 
 
Chapter 9. Interrelationships of firm-level and project-level organization 
This penultimate chapter studies the interrelationships between a project’s firm-level 
organizational form and its project-level organizational form. This chapter integrates 
several concepts that were studies separately in previous chapters. On the one hand, the 
firm-level organizational factor of ownership integration (Chapter 4 and 5) is considered. 
On the other hand, it takes into account project-level dimensions such as decentralization, 
free flow of information, and project management influence (Chapter 6, 7, and 8). It is 
investigated how projects are organized at the project-level for different ownership 
structures (i.e. integrated in a single firm, or dispersed across two or more investing firms) 
and how this affects project performance. This multi-level analysis makes use of the same 
survey data as the study in chapter 7. The central question in Chapter 9 is the following: 
 
Do ownership integration and project-level organizational factors complement each 
other in their effects on problem-solving proficiency and project performance? 
 
Chapter 10. Conclusions 
Finally, Chapter 10 provides some overall conclusions, limitations and implications.  
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2. Contingency Theory and Configurational Theory: An 
Overview of Perspectives and Methodological Issues 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe and discuss contingency theory and configurational theory. These 
two types of theory are core to much of the research in the field of management and 
organization. Also the chapters that follow use these approaches extensively. This chapter 
therefore provides an important background to the remainder of this thesis. This chapter 
starts with an introduction to contingency theory. This type of theory posits that the effect 
of a causal factor is dependent (contingent) on another factor - the contingency factor. As a 
result, there needs to be a ‘fit’ between the causal factor and the contingency factor for a 
certain effect to occur. Different conceptualizations of ‘fit’ are discussed, as well as ways 
to make them operational.  
 
The second section of this chapter introduces configurational theory, which can be 
considered an extension of contingency theory. Rather than investigating bivariate fit, i.e. 
fit between one explanatory factor and one contingency factor, configurational theories 
focus on combinations (configurations) of multiple factors. This second section also 
outlines the major differences between contingency theory and configurational theory. It 
also addresses several methodological issues for configurational theories. The third, 
concluding section outlines how the contents of this chapter will be applied in the chapters 
that follow. 
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2.2 Contingency ‘theory’  
Contingency theory has its origins in the literature on organization design (see for instance 
Dill [1958] and the classic studies of Woodward [1965], Thompson [1967] and Galbraith 
[1977]) and has become “the most widely utilized theoretical approach to the study of 
organizations” (Meilich (2006) citing Scott, 1998, p.97). It has influenced and continues to 
influence numerous fields of management research, such as strategic management (e.g. 
Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984), innovation management (e.g. Tatikonda and Montoya-
Weiss, 2001), knowledge management (Argote et al., 2003), human resource management 
(e.g. Delery and Doty, 1996), management control systems (e.g. Fisher, 1995), and 
operations management (e.g. Das et al., 2006). Contingency theory is not a theory 
however, in the sense that it is not a specific set of concepts with well-defined 
interrelationships (Bacharach, 1989). Rather, contingency theory is a ‘metatheory’ 
(Schoonhoven, 1981) that guides the study of organizational concepts.  
 
The central idea in the contingency theory approach is that different circumstances 
confront organizations with different challenges and that organizations therefore need 
different organizational approaches to deal with these challenges effectively. According to 
Tushman and Nadler (1978, p.613) it were Burns and Stalker (1961) who ‘presented the 
idea that different approaches to structuring organizations might have differential 
effectiveness under varying conditions’ and ever since ‘much work has been done 
attempting to identify the critical contingencies of design.’ Phrased more formally, 
contingency theory argues that the effect of an organizational concept, such as 
decentralization or communication frequency, on organizational performance depends on a 
third concept, the contingency concepts. This contingency concept often refers to an 
exogenous factor, such as task uncertainty or environmental turbulence. Burns and Stalker 
(1961) for instance claimed that organizations operating in highly uncertain environments 
require organic structures, whereas mechanic structures are more suitable for organizations 
operating in stable environments. The better the ‘fit’ between the organizational concept 
and the contingency concept, the higher performance is expected to be. Contingency 
theory in this way contrasts universalistic theories, which ‘only’ study causal direct effects 
between organizational concepts (e.g. formalization, centralization, etc.) and organizational 
performance. Whereas the universalistic approach therefore essentially claims a ‘one best 
way’ to organize that is beneficial for all organizations under all circumstances (e.g. the 
more formalization the better), contingency theory would argue that ‘it all depends’ 
(Schoonhoven, 1981, p.371).  
 
The concept of ‘fit’ 
Central to contingency theory is that a separate concept is introduced to explain 
performance (see Figure 2.1 for an illustration), i.e. in order for a preferable outcome to 
occur there needs to be ‘fit’ between the organizational concept and the contingency 
concept. The better this match, the higher performance is expected to be. Failure to achieve 
fit (i.e. misfit) will result in suboptimal performance. The popularity of contingency theory 
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can largely be explained by the strong intuitive appeal of this idea of fit. At the same time, 
this concept is also the major criticism of the contingency approach, because it tends to be 
ill-defined and deviations often exist between the (implicit) definition of fit and its 
operationalization.  
 
Figure 2.1 Basic building blocks of contingency theory 
 
 
Despite the frequent use of contingency theory, it has received mixed empirical support 
(e.g. Mohr, 1971; Pennings, 1975, Schoonhoven, 1981, Meilich, 2006). According to 
Schoonhoven (1981) this might be explained by the fact that contingency theory suffers 
from a lack of clarity about the meaning of ‘fit’. Often, researchers use the concept of ‘fit’, 
or equivalent concepts like ‘alignment’, ‘congruence’, ‘match’, and ‘consistency’, without 
providing a precise definition of its theoretical meaning. Without such a precise definition 
it becomes very difficult to test whether an organization achieves fit or not (Pennings, 
1975) and to compare research findings. To facilitate rigorous empirical testing, rich verbal 
theories about the relationships between specific organizational and contingency concepts 
need to be translated into mathematical functions to make sure that the operationalization 
of fit is grounded in theory (Schoonhoven, 1981; Venkatraman, 1989). Most theories of fit 
are bivariate theories of fit, i.e. they aim to explain performance differences from the fit 
between one organizational concept and one contingency concept (e.g. Drazin and Van de 
Ven, 1985; Venkatraman, 1989). The dominant bivariate type of fit involves ‘fit as 
interaction’.   
 
Figure 2.2 Fit as interaction 
 
Source: adapted from Meilich, 2006 
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Fit as interaction  
The interaction approach (e.g. Schoonhoven, 1981; Baron and Kenny, 1986) argues that 
the impact of the organizational concept on performance varies over the range of the 
contingency concept. To be more precise, the interaction approach typically assumes a 
linear relationship between the organizational and the outcome concept and argues that the 
interaction effect increases or decreases the slope of this relationship (Meilich, 2006). A 
positive interaction effect implies that the slope of the relationship between the 
organizational concept (i.e. the moderator) and the outcome concept increases (decreases) 
as the contingency factor increases (decreases). In contrast, a negative interaction effect 
means that the slope of the organization-performance relationship decreases (increases) as 
a result of increases (decreases) in the contingency concept. Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
interaction model of fit. In this example a negative interaction effect is depicted because an 
increase of the contingency concept (i.e. from low to high) changes the slope of the 
organization-performance relationship from positive to negative.  
 
Interaction fit is typically operationalized by including the interaction term (the product) of 
the organizational variable and the contingency variable in a regression model with the 
direct effects of these variables (i.e. the classic interaction model). To prevent problems of 
multicollinearity between the interaction term, the structural term, and the contingency 
term, another possibility to operationalize and to statistically analyze interaction fit is the 
deviation or difference scores approach (e.g. Dewar and Werbel, 1979). In this approach fit 
represents the similarity between the actual value organizational concept and an ‘ideal’ 
value of the organizational concept, which is then itself considered as a separate concept 
that can be used to explain performance (Edwards and Parry, 1993). In this approach the 
contingency factor determines the value at which the organizational concept results in 
optimal performance.  
 
Deviation is typically operationalized as the absolute or the squared difference between the 
structural and the contingency variable. The essential prediction in this approach is that the 
extent of deviation from the optimal point (either as a result of insufficient or excessive 
‘structure’) reduces performance. In this respect the classic interaction approach and the 
deviation approach are identical, i.e. they both essentially assume a high-performing ideal 
for different values of the contingency concept and they assume that departure from this 
ideal reduces performance. Statistically they are different however (Drazin and Van de 
Ven, 1985), i.e. the product of the contingency variable and the structural variable (in the 
classic interaction approach) versus for instance the squared difference between the 
structural variable and the contingency variable (the deviation approach).  
 
Critique on bivariate models of fit: the polynomial regression alternative 
Several authors (e.g. Edwards and Parry, 1993; Meilich, 2006) address the 
operationalization of the classic interaction approach and the deviation approach in greater 
detail. According to Meilich (2006) these approaches make it less conducive to detect fit, 
because they are based on several problematic constraints, such as the assumption of 
linearity and the combination distinct structural and contingency concepts into a single 
score. These constraints can be relaxed by operationalizing fit using polynomial regression 
analysis (Edwards and Parry, 1993; Edwards, 1994; Edwards, 2001, Meilich, 2006). 
According to these authors polynomial regression is an effective way to test contingency 
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theories as it is based on a more comprehensive model of fit which tests different possible 
effects of the contingency concept simultaneously, including the deviation approach and 
the interaction approach. In other words, the interaction approach and the deviation 
approach are constrained cases of the polynomial regression model, and if tested these 
constraints often do not hold (Edwards, 2001).  
 
Polynomial regression analysis adds the squared term of the organizational variable (and 
possibly also the squared term of the contingency variable) to the regression model with 
the direct terms and the interaction term. Just as in the deviation approach the result can be 
represented in a three-dimensional surface with the structural variable on the X-axis, with 
the contingency variable on the Y-axis, and with performance on the Z-axis. Keeping the 
organizational variable and the contingency variable apart (as opposed to the deviation 
approach) facilitates a better interpretation of causal effects (Edwards, 1994). The 
inclusion of the squared term for the organizational variable allows for a curvilinear 
relationship between the organizational concept and performance. This allows for a better 
test of the interaction effect, as it prevents confounding between the interaction term and 
the squared term (Edwards, 1994; Venkatraman, 1989).  
 
Box 1. The difference scores approach, the interaction approach and polynomial regression 
 
Edwards and Parry (1993) and Meilich (2006) state that the difference scores approach and the 
interaction approach are constrained cases of the polynomial regression model. They illustrate this 
point as follows. Equation 1 shows a typical regression equation for the difference scores approach. 
Here the difference between X and Y (e.g. the structural and the contingency variable) is the single 
predictor for Z (e.g. organizational performance). Equation 2 shows that this model is similar to the 
assumptions that X and Y are related to Z with an equally large regression coefficient albeit that X is 
related positively to Z and Y negatively. A model without these constraints is provided in equation 3. 
 
( ) eYXbbZ +−+= 10     (1) 
 
eYbXbbZ +−+= 110     (2) 
 
eYbXbbZ +++= 210     (3) 
 
A different way to operationalize the difference scores approach is the use of squared differences 
(see equation 4). This equation can be rewritten as in equation 5, which shows that the squared 
difference approach basically assumes that Z is a function of the squared terms of X and Y and the 
interaction term of the two. In addition, the squared terms have an equal effect on Z while the 
interaction term is twice as large, but with a negative sign. Relaxing these constraints and with the 
appropriate lower-order terms results in the polynomial regression equation (equation 6). This 
polynomial regression equation also tests the difference scores approach and the interaction 
approach, but without their associated constraints. 
 
( ) eYXbbZ +−+= 210     (4) 
 
eYbXYbXbbZ ++−+= 211
2
10 2    (5) 
 
eYbXYbXbYbXbbZ ++++++= 25423210   (6) 
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Applying polynomial regression analysis to contingency theories has shown to result in 
new theoretical insights (Edwards and Parry, 1993) and in statistically significant 
improvements in terms of variance explained (Edwards, 1994). Although the polynomial 
regression model is often the preferred model to test contingency theory, the resulting 
three-dimensional surfaces are typically difficult to interpret, which might explain the 
limited usage of this approach (Edwards and Parry, 1993). Box 1 provides a mathematical 
overview of the constraints assumed in the interaction approach and the deviation approach 
and contrasts them with polynomial regression. 
 
The strength of the selection regime 
As a final note regarding contingency theory, Meilich (2006) points to the importance of 
investigating the correlation between structure and contingency before any attempt is made 
to explain performance. This correlation reflects the strength of the selection regime and 
this strength influences the possible and preferable ways to assess fit. In a strong selection 
regime (roughly correlation .95 or beyond) the difficulty to separate the explanatory power 
of the structural and the contingency variable means that performance differences cannot 
be explained. Therefore, selection is the only notion of fit that can be assessed under these 
circumstances. With a less strong selection regime (.70-.95) a comparison should 
according to Meilich be made between the polynomial and the interaction-only regression 
model to assess their relative predictive value and assess the multicollinearity problems of 
the polynomial model. For medium and low selection regimes (correlation values below 
.70), which are most common, Meilich recommends the polynomial model for assessing 
bivariate contingency models.  
 
2.3 Configurationalism 
Contingency theory as discussed in the previous section is interested in the effects of fit 
between a contingency concept and an organizational concept. This bivariate approach has 
the advantage that knowledge can be developed about the links between specific concepts, 
but it is seen by some as a ‘reductionistic’ approach in the sense that it assumes that the 
interaction between a single contingency concept and a single organizational  concept is 
capable of significantly explaining variation in performance (e.g. Meyer, Tsui and Hinings, 
1993). Other factors might influence this interaction effect and pose conflicting 
contingencies, thereby resulting in conflicting empirical findings. Some authors therefore 
question the theoretical meaningfulness of the bivariate approach (Venkatraman and 
Prescott, 1990; Miller, 1981). Anderson & Zeithaml (1984, p.5) for instance make the 
following claim about strategy research: “…strategy researchers have searched for a 
construct or contingency variable with broad explanatory power. The attractiveness of this 
kind of construct is self-evident. It would simplify strategy formulation and 
implementation. No single construct or combination of constructs has however emerged as 
predominant in the industry. This is probably due to the large number of environmental 
and organizational variables that affect the performance of businesses.” 
 
Configurational theories (here considered synonymous with ‘typological theories’ or 
‘typologies’) take the complexity of social and business phenomena into account by 
arguing that organizational design and organizational performance can only be understood 
by considering simultaneously multiple, conceptually distinct organizational and 
contingency factors. This multivariate ‘holistic’ or ‘systems’ approach aims to capture the 
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synergistic effects and internal consistency of these factors (Khandwalla, 1973; Miller and 
Friesen, 1984; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Doty and Glick, 1994). A distinctive feature 
of typological theories is their ability to deal with equifinality, which means that a certain 
level of performance can be achieved with more than one configuration. Hence, 
organizations can follow different paths to reach the same result (Katz and Kahn, 1966; 
Miller, 1981; Gresov and Drazin, 1997). Porter (1980) for instance, specifies different 
generic competitive strategies that each are thought to result in industry positions that 
confer sustainable competitive advantage. The configurational approach is quite common 
in several areas of management research, such as organization design (Doty et al., 1993), 
strategy (Miller, 1986), human resource management (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 
1988; Delery and Doty, 1996), management accounting (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 
1998), and marketing (Vorhies and Morgan, 2003). Furthermore, several well-known 
studies, such as Miles and Snow (1978) and Mintzberg (1979) constitute typologies.  
 
Parsimonious sets of viable and equifinal combinations of factors are popular for research 
and pedagogical goals (Bozarth and McDermott, 1998) and at the same time they are 
argued to result in higher practical relevance for managers and policymakers (George and 
Bennett, 2005). Mintzberg (1979) for instance famously theorized about five internally 
consistent configurations of organizations (the simple structure, the machine bureaucracy, 
the professional bureaucracy, the divisionalized form, and the adhocracy) in terms of: (1) 
key parts of the organization (e.g. the strategic apex or support staff); (2) prime 
coordination mechanisms (e.g. direct supervision or mutual adjustment); (3) main design 
parameters (e.g. centralization, formalization, and unit size); and (4) several contingency 
factors (e.g. the size and age of the organization and the stability of the environment). An 
internally consistent organizational configuration is for instance the ‘Simple Structure.’ In 
this organizational configuration the strategic apex is the most important part of the 
organization and coordination between different parts of the organization is largely based 
on direct supervision. Furthermore, the structure of these organizations is typically highly 
organic and centralized, and these organizations are generally young and small. 
 
In contrast to ‘classifications’ or ‘taxonomies’, which partition instances of a phenomenon 
in different types that are preferably mutually exclusive and exhaustive, configurational 
theories or typologies are considered here as theories that aim to explain variation in 
organizational performance (e.g. Doty and Glick, 1994; Short et al., 2008). As pointed out 
by Doty and Glick (1994), typological theories contain two types of constructs (first-order 
constructs and second-order constructs) and two types of theories (middle-range theories 
and a grand theory). First-order constructs - the explanatory constructs in bivariate studies 
- constitute the building blocks of typologies. While the number of combinations of first-
order constructs may be huge, many combinations will be unlikely or even logically 
impossible. The configurational approach believes that ‘only a finite number of coherent 
configurations are prevalent in the social world’ (Meyer et al., 1993, p.1192). These 
coherent configurations or ‘ideal types’ - the second-order constructs in typological 
theories - are internally consistent combinations of the first-order building blocks.  
 
The overall prediction of typological theories, i.e. their grand theory, holds that deviation 
from an ideal type reduces performance. Hence, the main independent concept in 
typologies is the extent of deviation or misfit from an ideal type. Put differently, the closer 
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observations resemble the ideal profile, the higher performance is expected to be. 
Supporting this universal law, Ketchen et al. (1997) found in a meta-analysis that about 8% 
of performance variance can be explained by configurational membership. At a finer level 
of detail, typologies consist of ‘middle-range theories’ (Merton, 1957). In the context of 
normative typological theories, middle-range theories explain for each individual ideal 
type the internal consistency of its first-order constructs and how this contributes to 
performance. Each middle-range theory therefore offers a very specific explanation that 
holds under the assumptions and contingencies of an individual ideal type. Hence, 
“…theories of the middle range attempt to predict and explain only a subset of all 
organizational phenomena. As such, each midrange theory makes different sets of 
assumptions about organizations, considers different parameters to be important, and 
leads to entirely different prescriptions for practice from other midrange theories” (Pinder 
and Moore, 1979, p.100). Contingency theories constitute the first step from universal 
theories to middle-range theories, but configurational theories take an extra step to develop 
much more fine-grained middle-range theories. Because middle-range theories constitute 
the theoretical foundations of typological theories, we will discuss them below in some 
greater detail. 
 
Middle-range theories 
Rather than rich and thick descriptions, ideal-typical configurations require precise 
definitions of the interrelationships among its basic building blocks, because this is central 
to the conceptualization of fit (Gerdin and Greve, 2004) and because this is a prerequisite 
for modelling fit (Doty and Glick, 1994). Hence, there is a trade-off between the number of 
dimensions to include in configurational analyses and the purpose of configurations as 
generalizable abstractions of reality (Meyer et al., 1993). More accurate configurations are 
gained at the cost of increased complexity because of the requirement to specify a middle-
range theory for each ideal type (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; Doty and Glick, 1994). 
 
According to Miller (1996) it is of crucial importance to show how and why the first-order 
attributes in specific ideal types interrelate. To improve the theoretical understanding of 
ideal types, Miller argues that research should focus on what he labels ‘central 
orchestrating themes’ which bring about complex systems of interdependence between the 
attributes of configurations. In his field of interest – strategy – such a theme is the primary 
goal or focus of an organization, such as its focus on cost reduction and efficiency, or its 
focus on innovation and R&D. In this sense, organizations can differ in terms of their 
‘degree of configurationalism’, i.e. the extent that a single integrative theme orchestrates 
the dimensions of the configuration to cluster together in a particular way. According to 
Miller (1996) ‘a high degree of configuration’ is likely to be a greater source of 
competitive advantage than any individual element of strategy. In his view, firms can also 
be too obsessed with a single theme, thus resulting in an excessive and dysfunctional 
degree of configuration. 
 
Ideal types and their middle-range theories can be specified either empirically or 
theoretically (George and Bennett, 2005). Empirical approaches, such as cluster analysis 
(e.g. Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995), often lack theoretical significance as they are 
dependent on the selected variables and the sample from which the clusters are derived 
(Miller, 1996). Some authors (e.g. Doty and Glick, 1994) therefore prefer the theoretical 
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development of typologies. Das et al. (2006) however point to the difficulty of developing 
and specifying middle-range theories, because bounded rationality prevents us from 
knowing all relevant first-order concepts. Although it is possible according to Das et al. 
(2006) to make a reasonable, literature-based identification of the most relevant first-order 
elements, existing theory is in general insufficiently developed to enable deduction of 
complex ideal types.  
 
Examples of more complex ideal types are ‘contingent middle-range theories’ (George and 
Bennett, 2005; Doty and Glick, 1994). In addition to the explanation of ‘internal fit’ 
among organizational concepts, more complex middle-range theories might specify how 
one or more contingency factors determine under which circumstances an internally 
consistent configuration results in high performance. Such theories therefore also consider 
‘external fit’ (Miller, 1992). For these more complex middle-range theories we can 
imagine circumstances of conflicting contingencies and conflicting pressures for internal 
and external fit (e.g. Gresov, 1989; Miller, 1992). 
 
George and Bennett (2005) argue that contingent middle-range theories fill the theoretical 
vacuum that is typically left by the broad and abstract predictions made by contingency 
theories. They argue that these context-specific theories are deliberately limited in scope 
and that they reduce the gap between scientists and practitioners because contingent 
generalizations of typologies are generally more useful for managers and decision-makers 
in guiding their actions in specific circumstances. In this respect, Mintzberg (1979, p.vi) 
states that his aim is to develop ‘descriptive theory’ and that he leaves the application and 
prescription based on this knowledge to practitioners and consultants who are much more 
familiar with their specific contexts.  
 
Differences between contingency theory and configurational theory 
The contingency approach and the configurational approach are often seen as two totally 
different paradigms in the study of organizations (Meyer et al., 1993; Doty and Glick, 
1994; Gerdin and Greve, 2004; de Treville and Antonakis, 2006). Whereas contingency 
theories typically hypothesize linear and interaction effects of one independent concept and 
one contingency concept, typologies highlight the synergistic effects among multiple first-
order concepts within each ideal type (Bozarth and McDermott, 1998; Das, Narasimhan 
and Tallure, 2006). Unlike contingency theories, typologies therefore do not specify the 
direct relationships between individual first-order concepts and performance, because the 
way that first-order concepts combine to determine the dependent variable can vary across 
the set of ideal types. Typologies therefore allow for the specification of synergistic, 
nonlinear relationships among first-order constructs that cannot be represented with linear 
models (Meyer et al., 1993). 
 
Gerdin and Greve (2004, p.306, emphasis in original) argue that “results (empirical or 
theoretical) based one school of thought should not be validated by comparisons with those 
of the other. In fact, even if applied to the same empirical data, the two approaches may 
yield very different results.” Hence, both paradigms are “competing rather than 
complementary approaches to fit.” The difference between both approaches is illustrated in 
Box 2. 
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Box 2. Comparing the configurational approach and the contingency approach  
That contingency theory and configurational theory are distinct approaches can be illustrated with the 
following example drawn from chapter 5 of this thesis1. In this chapter it is argued that architectural 
innovations involving core components require an organizational configuration consisting of high 
values for the four organizational dimensions of coordination integration, task integration, ownership 
integration, and knowledge integration. The figure below depicts three different organizational 
forms. The organizational form for Project A perfectly matches the ideal organizational form. 
Performance is high for this project. Project B shows medium values on each organizational 
dimension and therefore results in a lower performance than Project A. Project B performs better 
however than Project C, since Project C shows a greater total distance from the ideal profile than 
Project B (a total deviation on three dimensions and perfect fit on one dimension for Project C versus 
a slight misfit on all four dimensions for Project B).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a contingency perspective it could be hypothesized for each individual organizational 
dimension that a positive relationship exists with performance. For ownership integration, 
coordination integration, and task integration this hypothesis is supported in the above example. As 
the figures below illustrate, a positive correlation exists between all three organizational dimensions 
and performance. However, knowledge integration is not positively associated with performance, 
because Project C performs poorly despite its high value for knowledge integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This example supports the main configurational proposition that deviation from the ideal type 
reduces performance. Hence, knowledge integration is seen as an element of a configuration that 
helps explain performance. In contrast, the contingent hypothesis is not supported in this example, 
meaning that this approach would consider knowledge integration as an unimportant factor for the 
explanation of performance for architectural core component innovations. The difference between 
the contingency approach and the configurational approach becomes even more obvious if one 
considers that equifinal configurations might exist, which further reduce the possibility of finding 
linear relationships between individual independent variables and the dependent variable in a 
population. 
 
Thus far the discussion of bivariate and configurational types of fit adopted a static 
perspective. This is also the focus in this thesis, but it must be recognized that achieving fit 
is a dynamic and never-ending process (Venkatraman, 1989) whereby the organization is 
                                                          
1
 This example follows the logic of a similar example in Gerdin and Greve (2004, p.306). 
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continually “shooting at a moving target of coalignment” (Thompson, 1967, p.234). 
Organizations are constantly confronted with forces that move it away or towards 
equilibrium, but achieving both internal and external fit, i.e. fit among the structural 
elements and fit between multiple organizational characteristics and environmental 
contingencies, is difficult to obtain (Miller, 1992) and might even be an elusive goal 
(Gresov, 1989; Sinha and Van de Ven, 2005). Hence, organizations need to be able to deal 
with the negative effects of misfits and must constantly strive for organizational change to 
improve fit (Donaldson, 2001). Furthermore, organizations may have to trade-off the short-
term and the long-term benefits of fit (Miller, 1992).  
 
In terms of processes of change, another fundamental difference often exists between 
contingency theory and configurationalism. This is due to “the difference between fit as a 
continuous line in a multidimensional space and fit as a limited number of discrete system 
states” (Gerdin and Greve, 2004, p.305; see Figure 2.3 below). In contingency theory (A in 
Figure 2.3) small and incremental changes are the primary mode of change (Meyer et al., 
1993), whereas such small changes from a configurational perspective (B in Figure 2.3) 
could result in the destruction of the synergy among the elements of the configuration 
(Gerdin and Greve, 2004). Effective organizational change in configurationalism might 
mean change on all dimensions of the configuration to form ‘giant leaps’ or ‘quantum 
jumps’ from one high performing configuration to the other (Miller, 1996; Gerdin and 
Greve, 2004). 
 
Figure 2.3. Different views of fit 
 
 
Source: Gerdin and Greve, 2004. 
 
Operationalization of configurational theories 
In the configurational approach the concept of fit is typically operationalized using profile 
similarity indices (PSIs). These indices reflect the overall congruence (i.e. fit) between the 
ideal profile and observed profiles, which is then used to predict performance (e.g. Drazin 
and Van de Ven, 1985, Gresov, 1989, Venkatraman, 1990; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990; 
Doty et al., 1993). An important category of profile similarity indices is based on the sum 
of differences between profiles (see Box 3). Basic to this approach is first of all that the 
difference is calculated for each pair of corresponding elements (i.e. the differences 
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between the ith element of the ideal profile and the ith element of an observed profile). 
Subsequently all differences are summed to reflect overall profile congruence. 
 
Just as the common ways to operationalize bivariate models of fit, PSIs have several 
methodological problems (Edwards, 1993). First of all, PSIs result in the loss of relevant 
information. PSIs for instance combine conceptually distinct first-order elements into a 
single second-order profile. Furthermore, they combine two conceptually distinct profiles 
(e.g. the ideal and the observed profile) into a single score: the deviation or misfit score. In 
this approach information about the contribution of each element and of each profile is 
lost. The combination of concepts into a single score might therefore give the impression 
of a parsimonious approach, but this is achieved only with the introduction of considerable 
conceptual ambiguity.  
 
Box 3. Profile similarity indices based on the sum of differences  
 
Edwards (1993) describes several profile similarity indices based on the sum of differences between 
profile elements. Three of these are described and discussed here in some greater detail. First of all 
D² represents the sum of squared differences. This approach operationalizes configurational fit by 
summing the squared differences between all corresponding elements (Equation 1). Because this 
approach squares the differences, two important consequences are that (1) the sign of the difference 
is neglected (i.e. it does not matter whether the value for an observed profile element was below or 
above its ‘ideal’ value); and (2) that larger differences are assigned a greater weight. 
 
( )∑ −= 22 ii YXD    (1) 
 
D, the square root of D², represents the so-called Euclidian distance measure (see Equation 2). 
Because this approach also squares the differences, it results in a non-directional measure as well. 
Unlike D² however, the square root means that a geometric interpretation is possible for the 
(Euclidean) distance between profiles. 
 
( )∑ −= 2ii YXD    (2) 
 
The absolute difference between elements |D| (Equation 3) is also non-directional, but assigns equal 
weight to differences and therefore D reflects the cumulative distance between profiles.  
 
∑ −= ii YXD     (3) 
 
Additionally, with the use of PSIs information is lost about the absolute magnitude of the 
observed profile. This is because the traditional configurational hypothesis, i.e. 
‘configurational fit is associated positively with performance’, assumes that only the 
difference explains variation in performance and that the absolute values of the profiles are 
irrelevant. For example, the explanatory power of a small difference between two profiles 
with high values for each element is considered similar to an equally small difference 
between two profiles with low values on each element. This assumption of iso-
performance is also an assumption in contingency theory (Donaldson, 2005). Donaldson 
(2005) proposes to replace this idea with that of hetero-performance. He illustrates this 
with the example of organizational size and formalization: fit between high formalization 
and a large size could result in greater performance than fit between low formalization and 
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small size. PSIs also loose information about the direction of differences between 
compared profiles. This is due to the calculation of squared differences or the absolute 
value of differences in many PSIs (see Box 2). Hence, it is assumed that positive and 
negative differences relate similarly to performance. Researchers are therefore advised to 
study the effects of insufficient and excessive ‘structure’ (e.g. Reuer and Arino, 1998).  
 
Finally, Edwards (1993) shows - in a similar way as for bivariate models of fit (see Box 1) 
- that PSIs impose a restrictive set of constraints on the coefficients in regression models 
that relate PSIs to performance. Edwards (1993) therefore argues that PSIs should no 
longer be used and that its problems can be avoided by using polynomial regression 
analysis. This also solves the problems associated with aggregating distinct concepts into a 
single measure. Polynomial regression in the case of configurational theory means that the 
regression equation should contain the individual first-order elements, their squared terms, 
and the interaction term for each pair of the elements for which otherwise the difference 
would be calculated. Hence, polynomial regression captures the individual effects as well 
as the holistic and synergistic effect of the multidimensional profile by means of the total 
variance it explains (R²). Profiles are usually built from a considerable number of elements 
however, which requires a large sample size to achieve sufficient statistical power and 
which complicates the interpretation of the regression results.  
 
Configurationalism and case study research 
In statistical tests of contingency and configurational theories the general hypothesis 
typically holds that fit between observed and predicted profiles increases the likelihood of 
high performance (Doty et al., 1993; Doty and Glick, 1994). The fit-performance 
relationship is therefore assumed to be probabilistic in nature. The alternative approach 
holds that the causal effect of individual (combinations of) variables on the dependent 
variable is deterministic, i.e. in terms of (combinations of) necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions (e.g. Mackie, 1965). Dul and Hak (2008) for instance adopt the perspective of 
“pragmatic determinism”, which holds that “it is sometimes preferable to act as if a 
complete determinism exists, although it is acknowledged that there might be some 
exceptions to the assumed determinism” (Dul and Hak, 2008, p.75). In this approach it is 
possible to test theories rigorously with case study methodology (Goertz and Starr, 2002; 
Dul and Hak, 2008; Jaspers and Van den Ende, 2008). In this thesis we consider causal 
effects to be probabilistic rather than deterministic however. Below we explain the 
rationale for this approach and what this means for the application of case study 
methodology in this thesis. 
 
Organizational phenomena are typically influenced by a large number of causal factors. 
Consequently, many variables will inevitably be omitted from the analysis, which makes it 
inherently uncertain whether a particular combination of scores on an independent variable 
and a dependent variable reflects the causal effect between the two (King et al., 1994; 
Mohr, 1982). Individual real-life cases can for instance impossibly be exactly repeated 
with another value of the independent variable to assess the associated change in the 
dependent variable. As a result of this overdetermination, causal inference remains 
uncertain when comparing two or more cases - even if many factors are controlled for 
(King et al., 1994), i.e. there might always be countervailing forces that obscure a true 
effect (Glick et al., 1990).  
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In this case of overdetermination our understanding of organizational phenomena can be 
improved in two ways (Glick et al., 1990). The first (idiographic) approach is to describe 
and analyze the dynamics of individual instances in-depth. This approach therefore 
provides the possibility for case-to-case generalization, e.g. by practitioners (Firestone, 
1993). The second (nomothetic) approach aims for knowledge about the causal strength of 
variables in wide theoretical domain or in a specific population of instances. This second 
approach recognizes that true causal effects can be obscured by countervailing forces, but 
it assumes that these forces occur at random. Hence, it is assumed that: “any causal effect 
is a probabilistic rather than a deterministic event” (Glick et al., 1990, p.297).2  
 
Under the assumption of probabilistic theories, it is difficult to assess the strength of a 
causal effect with case study research, let alone to state for individual cases that “X 
determines Y”. A more appropriate strategy to estimate the strength of a probabilistic 
causal effect is to apply statistical techniques (Dul and Hak, 2008), and this is perfectly 
possible for configurational hypotheses (Doty et al., 1993; Doty and Glick, 1994; Edwards, 
2001). However, while inferior as a technique to test probabilistic theories, case study 
research is highly complementary to statistical techniques because of its capability to study 
within cases the causal mechanisms that show ‘how and why’ a certain effect is produced 
(King et al., 1994; Yin, 2003; George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007). Suppose one 
finds evidence within an individual instance about how a high value of X contributed 
positively to Y. Even though the actual value of Y in this instance might be low (due to 
one or more other explanatory variables), the observation of such a causal process at a 
lower level of aggregation does provide support for the theory that X has a particular effect 
on Y (King et al., 1994; Van de Ven, 2007).  
 
This benefit of case study research is particularly strong for configurational theories 
(George and Bennett, 2005). Whereas statistical data analysis focuses on causal effects 
(e.g. regression coefficients), case-study research is highly complementary to this approach 
because of its capability to study causal mechanisms (George and Bennett, 2005). In other 
words, while statistical research is able to investigate how much an independent variable 
(or “fit with an ideal profile”) explains performance, i.e. the strength of a causal effect, 
case study research is capable of providing insights about how and when a factor matters. 
These benefits of case study research are especially relevant for middle-range theories, 
which are more complex and at the same time more limited in scope than bivariate models 
of fit. Whereas statistical research studies individual causal effects or lumps them together 
in a single measure of fit (e.g. PSIs), (comparative) case study research is capable to 
elucidate interaction and synergy among variables at a lower level of aggregation (King et 
al., 1994; George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007), i.e. to study “the cogs and wheels 
behind the regression coefficients” (Davis and Marquis, 2005, p.341). Chapter 5 builds 
upon this principle and discusses it in greater detail. 
                                                          
2
 Interestingly, Glick et al. (1990) refer to Mohr (1982) and to Markus and Robey (1988) as 
methodological considerations of the idiographic approach. Both studies theorize about processes of 
change in terms of (combinations of) necessary conditions. In other words, this implies that the 
idiographic approach rests on the assumption of determinism. Contrary to what one might believe 
based on Glick et al. (1990) it is shown elsewhere (Jaspers et al., 2008) that it is perfectly possible to 
generate generalizable knowledge about these ‘process theories’ (Mohr, 1982) by means of rigorous 
theory testing. Hence, this is not only the realm of the nomothetic approach.   
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2.4 Conclusions and relevance for this thesis 
This chapter introduced and discussed several key characteristics of contingency and 
configurational ‘theory’. Although important differences exist between these two types of 
theory, they both focus on the explanatory power of ‘fit’ between concepts. This idea has 
strong intuitive appeal and this might be why many theories are based more or less 
explicitly on contingency or configurational logic. The overview presented in this chapter 
by no means aims to be comprehensive, but it does provide a sufficient background to the 
chapters that follow. As already outlined in Chapter 1 (see for instance Figure 1.1), all 
chapters are founded on the idea that successful innovation requires fit between the 
characteristics of the innovation and the characteristics of its organizational form.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) considers whether systems integrators should be ‘open’ or 
‘closed’ with respect to the design and development of new products and components and 
how this is contingent on the technical characteristics of these innovations. Part 2 of this 
thesis (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) adopts a configurational perspective as it views the 
organizational form of NPD projects as a configuration of two or more organizational 
elements. Furthermore, these configurations are expected to be contingent on the technical 
characteristics of the innovations. Chapter 4 focuses on the involvement of mobile 
telecommunications operators - in terms of integration and ownership - in the development 
of mobile telecommunications applications. This chapter operationalizes fit using a 
combination of the deviation and the interaction approach. Chapter 5 involves a qualitative 
analysis of thirty cases in order to refine a theoretically-developed configurational theory. 
This analysis is based on the assumption outlined in this chapter that social phenomena can 
be considered to be probabilistic in nature. Under this assumption, case study research is a 
valuable method for the purpose of theory refinement and for the elucidation of causal 
mechanisms. Chapter 6 focuses on the characteristics of one very specific type of 
development project, i.e. the development of so-called inter-industry architectural 
innovations, and explores which organizational configurations fit the characteristics of this 
type of project.  
 
Part 3 of this thesis applies the classic contingency approach to the conceptualization of fit. 
Chapter 7 initially tests such a bivariate interaction effect using moderated regression 
analysis. In addition analyses, a less constrained model is tested using polynomial 
regression. Chapter 8 and chapter 9 also involve moderated regression analyses to test 
bivariate (interaction) theories of fit.  
 
Whereas the current chapter provides a theoretical background to this thesis in terms of the 
types of theories that will be developed and tested, the next chapter provides a more 
detailed introduction to systems integration, which is one of core concepts in this thesis. 
More specifically, Chapter 3 explores the concept of systems integration in relation to 
Open Innovation, which refers to an overall approach to innovation management that has 
received a lot of attention recently. 
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3. Open Innovation and Systems Integration: 
How and Why Firms Know More Than They Make 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the application of Open Innovation for the development of 
complex products. Open Innovation refers to a popular approach to the management of 
innovation that seeks to improve the value of a firm’s innovation efforts by making use as 
much as possible of the firm’s environment. In particular, we investigate the relation 
between Open Innovation and systems integration. Systems integration refers to the 
capability to design new product architectures and to align existing product systems in the 
face of component innovation. We argue that Open Innovation and systems integration are 
complements. Open Innovation essentially results in firms that ‘know more than they 
make’ as this approach stimulates firms to monitor and to absorb external technological 
developments. Systems integrator firms integrate this ‘excessive’ knowledge to generate 
detailed architectural knowledge about component interrelationships, which is core to their 
systems integration capability. This suggests a balanced approach to Open Innovation, i.e. 
open as far as abundant knowledge and capabilities about individual components and 
technologies are concerned, and closed with respect to the generation and exploitation of 
scarce architectural knowledge. Furthermore, we suggest a contingent approach to Open 
Innovation, as different types of component innovation require different Open Innovation 
mechanisms to provide systems integrators with the knowledge they need to ensure the 
integrity of their product systems.  
 
This chapter is important as a background to the remainder of this thesis, because systems 
integration is a core concept in the chapters that follow. As will be outlined in this chapter, 
systems integration is critical to the management of systemic innovation. In addition, the 
discussion of systems integration relative to Open Innovation is relevant because Open 
Innovation has received a lot of attention recently by both academics and practitioners. It is 
therefore important to position this thesis relative to this popular trend and to investigate 
whether opportunities exist for cross-fertilization. Furthermore, by discussing Open 
Innovation in this introductory part of the thesis, we are able to discuss in subsequent 
chapters how our findings are able to improve our understanding of Open Innovation.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors (Ferdinand Jaspers and Jan van den Ende) thank Andrea Prencipe for his 
useful suggestions. This chapter is conditionally accepted for publication in the special 
issue “Broadening the Scope of Open Innovation” of the International Journal of 
Technology Management. 
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3.1 Introduction  
Open Innovation - as put forward by Rigby and Zook (2002) and Chesbrough (2003a) - 
refers to the trend that more and more firms adopt an ‘open’ innovation strategy. Whereas 
firms used to perform the entire innovation process internally (i.e. from idea generation to 
technology commercialization), Open Innovation deviates from this classic ‘closed’ 
approach in that firms extensively interact with and rely upon their environment for one or 
more stages of the innovation process. For instance, firms may actively search for and 
absorb ideas from universities, users, suppliers, or firms from other industries, and they 
may also actively involve them in the development and testing stages. In addition, firms 
may use external actors in the commercialization of their intellectual capital, e.g. by 
licensing technologies and by creating spin-offs.  
 
Existing literature has indicated that Open Innovation is a pervasive phenomenon that can 
be found in a wide variety of industries (Chesbrough et al., 2006; Chesbrough and 
Crowther, 2006), including consumer electronics (Christensen et al., 2005), manufacturing 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006), mobile telecommunications (Dittrich and Duysters, 2007), 
agricultural biotechnology (Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt, 2006), and open source software 
development (West and Gallagher, 2006). Furthermore, evidence exists that Open 
Innovation influences the innovative performance of firms, but that firms must be careful 
not to become excessively open, e.g. as they might ‘over-search’ for innovative ideas 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
 
According to Chesbrough (2003a) the fundamental reason for the emergence of Open 
Innovation is that firms operate more and more in ‘a landscape of abundant knowledge’ 
(Chesbrough, 2003a, p.xxv). Whereas firms used to have all relevant technologies in-house 
and used to rely on its own experts, in the last decades numerous ‘erosion factors’ have 
made closed innovation untenable. For instance, employees are much more willing to seek 
employment elsewhere; suppliers have become much more capable to support their 
customers; venture capital has emerged as a way to finance external innovations; and 
people in general are more educated than ever before. These forces have resulted in the 
adoption of Open Innovation practices that exploit external knowledge and capabilities in 
order to improve the speed, the quality, and the cost of innovation and - ultimately of 
course - to improve the value that firms create and capture with own innovate effort. 
Practices included in the umbrella concept of Open Innovation for instance include the 
well-known ideas of supplier involvement, technology monitoring, licensing-in and 
licensing-out, establishing spin-offs, and university collaborations. In the quest for 
competitive advantage the increased adoption of such practices is seen as a critical source 
of competitive advantage (Rigby and Zook, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003a). There is no room 
for the Not Invented Here syndrome. 
 
Although we have a basic understanding of the emergence of Open Innovation over time, 
the development of ‘an Open Innovation theory’ to explain the (innovation) performance 
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of firms is still in its infancy. To fully understand this phenomenon in today’s economy 
and to provide managerial guidance, we need a better understanding about why, how, and 
when firms do or do not apply Open Innovation and what its performance consequences 
are. In other words, research is needed to explore the boundary of this relatively new 
concept and theory, e.g. in terms of assumptions about values, time, and place (Bacharach, 
1989). In this regard an important approach is to ‘broaden the scope of Open Innovation’ 
by investigating and ‘challenging’ this paradigm in extreme settings, because this increases 
the likelihood to find new insights and important scope conditions (e.g. Firestone, 1993; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Gerwin, 2006). 
 
In this chapter we focus on the application of Open Innovation in the development of 
complex product systems, such as mobile telecommunications networks, flight simulators, 
jet engines, oil platforms, defense systems, and large construction works (Miller et al., 
1995; Hobday, 1998; Brusoni et al., 2001; Van den Ende, 2003). Several studies have 
touched upon the issue of Open Innovation in the context of complex products (e.g. 
Chesbrough, 2003a [Chapter 3], Chesbrough, 2003b, Maula et al., 2006) or have called for 
future research in this area (Laursen and Salter, 2005; West et al., 2006), but to our 
knowledge no studies have explicitly aimed to integrate the literature about Open 
Innovation and the literature about the development of complex products and - more in 
particular - systems integration. Our study therefore involves a first integrative analysis of 
both bodies of literature. This is based on the conviction that fruitful research at the 
intersection of both fields can only proceed if prior findings are used to identify and to 
clearly define conceptual linkages and to guide the development of questions and 
propositions for future research. This approach seems all the more relevant given the 
substantial body of literature that has developed on the issue of complex product 
development in recent years (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001; Prencipe et al., 2003; Hobday et al., 
2005).  
 
Complex product industries provide a unique context to study Open Innovation. First, 
complex products consist of many technologically distinct components and subsystems. 
No single firm can therefore master all technologies involved and develop internally all of 
the product’s components and subsystems (Hobday et al., 2005). Open Innovation is 
therefore most likely to be applied in this context, which means that findings for this 
setting can have strong implications for our understanding of this concept and its 
theoretical claims (Markus, 1989; Gerring, 2007). Not surprisingly, the empirical literature 
about complex product systems has indeed pointed out that the development of complex 
products typically involves substantial networks of collaborating component and 
technology developers (e.g. Miller et al., 1995; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001b). 
 
Secondly, complex products are typically highly interdependent and require 
interoperability among its customized components for the product as a whole to perform as 
intended (Hobday, 1998). Hence, there is a strong and apparent need in this setting for 
coordination and control, which can be regarded the major benefits of the traditional 
‘closed’ approach to innovation (e.g. Teece, 1986). This need for coordination and control 
seems even more important in the face of rapid technological change and given the 
necessity to recoup the substantial investments that are required for complex product 
innovation. In other words, the innovation process for complex products is characterized 
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by the need for being simultaneously open and closed. This gives rise to our central 
research question, i.e. how firms (should) manage the dilemma between being open and 
being closed in the development of complex products and why?  
 
The literature about the development of complex products indicates that networks of 
component and technology developers are typically coordinated by ‘systems integrator 
firms’ that ‘know more than they make’ (Brusoni  et al., 2001). By maintaining and 
improving knowledge about externally developed technologies and components these 
firms are able to design coherent product architectures and to align components in the face 
of technological change (Brusoni et al., 2001). Our conceptual analysis points to strong 
complementarities between Open Innovation and this concept of ‘systems integration’. We 
illustrate the findings from our integrative literature study by presenting a brief case of 
Intel’s innovation strategy. This case is well-known as an example of Open Innovation, 
and by analyzing this case from the perspective of systems integration we are able to show 
how much both concepts are intertwined. We go as far as to claim that one cannot go 
without the other.  
 
One the one hand, Open Innovation forms an integral part of systems integration, because 
systems integrators do not and cannot have the capabilities to master every technology and 
to develop every component. In particular, whereas systems integration indicates why firms 
need to ‘know more than they make’, Open Innovation provides mechanisms and practices 
indicating how firms may access external knowledge. Furthermore, we propose that the 
application of Open Innovation mechanisms is contingent on the type of technological 
change that needs to be integrated. In this respect, we propose a tentative model of Open 
Innovation for different types of component innovation. In sum, systems integration cannot 
be effective without Open Innovation. 
 
On the other hand, Open Innovation cannot be successful without systems integration. In 
this respect, systems integration clearly points to the limits of Open Innovation. Whereas 
Open Innovation is based on the premise of ‘abundant knowledge,’ the context of complex 
products stresses the scarcity of architectural knowledge about how technologies and 
components interrelate. To optimally benefit from one’s own capabilities and from the 
external knowledge and ideas that can be accessed through Open Innovation, some form of 
systems integration is needed to integrate and combine them into new products. 
Furthermore, systems integration literature points to the competitive advantage one could 
derive from introducing entirely new product architectures, and to the durability of this 
advantage as a result of the unique mix of internal and external capabilities.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First we briefly introduce the literature about systems 
integration. After that we explore its relationships with Open Innovation in two separate 
sections for two different subclasses of systems integration (i.e. static and dynamic systems 
integration). Subsequently, we present the illustrative case of Intel’s strategy of Open 
Innovation. The concluding section discusses our findings, presents opportunities for 
future research, and points to several manager implications.  
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3.2 Systems integration and complex product innovation 
Unlike most (commodity) products, the ‘ideal-typical’ complex product system consists of 
a large number of technologically distinct and interdependent components and subsystems 
(Miller et al., 1995; Hobday, 1998). Examples are aircrafts, submarines, flight simulators, 
telecom networks, etc. For individual firms it is simply impossible to develop and produce 
these products entirely in-house (Hobday et al., 2005; Nosella and Petroni, 2007). Instead, 
firms responsible for the design and development of complex product systems, i.e. prime 
contractors or ‘systems integrators’ (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001b), rely extensively on 
networks of external actors (e.g. suppliers, users, complementors, universities, and 
research centers) for the development of components and technologies. This indicates that 
Open Innovation is an integral part of the innovation process of complex product systems.  
  
However, whereas the detailed design and development of many components is performed 
by external parties, Brusoni et al. (2001) found that systems integrators tend to develop and 
maintain a basic technological understanding of these components and their dynamics, i.e. 
these firms ‘know more than they make’. Furthermore, systems integrators integrate this 
external knowledge and their own capabilities to develop a detailed understanding about 
component interactions and the design of the product architecture. This architectural 
knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990) is fundamental to the system firm’s capability to 
design coherent product architectures and to coordinate technological changes (Brusoni et 
al., 2001). Systems integration is therefore far more than the capability or the activity to 
assemble components, instead it also refers to the higher-order capability to understand and 
integrate multiple technological disciplines (Prencipe, 2003).3 Consider the case of the 
Airbus A380. The development of this multi-billion airliner involves a completely new 
aircraft design and consists of a huge amount of complex components and subsystems (e.g. 
with the cabin wiring alone consisting of 100,000 wires and more than 40,000 connectors). 
Airbus maintained overall responsibility for the design and the integration of the aircraft, 
but for many components and subsystems (e.g. engines, materials, electronics, etc.) it 
cooperated with and relied upon many different actors, such as suppliers and universities. 
This tight integration for the airplane as a whole was needed to ensure that the plane would 
meet its strict security demands and design trade-offs, in terms of for instance its weight, 
strength, and durability.  
 
Whereas Open Innovation is based on the principle that firms operate in ‘a landscape of 
abundant knowledge’, the case of complex product innovation shows that systems 
integrators are focused on the internal generation, maintenance, and nurturing of high-
quality architectural knowledge. External specialists are most likely to possess valuable 
and specialized component-level capabilities, but architectural knowledge is typically 
highly tacit and product-specific and therefore far from abundant. The strategy to position 
                                                          
3
 It has to be noted that systems integration as used in this thesis pertains to what could be called the 
narrow definition of the term (Hobday et al., 2006), referring to a specific coordination mechanism 
for the network of component suppliers based on a knowledge ‘surplus’ by the systems integrator 
firm. In a more broad sense the term systems integration is also used to describe and study the related 
trend that large product system firms increasingly outsource component development and 
manufacturing, and at the same time integrate forward by providing the end products together with 
advanced services, such as maintenance and other support activities, i.e. systems integrators are total 
solution providers, like IBM in the computer industry (e.g. Prencipe et al., 2003; Davies et al., 2007). 
50
 40 
oneself as a systems integrator and to develop broad and deep systems knowledge is a 
lengthy, a costly, and a risky process (Adner, 2006), but given the scarcity of this 
knowledge and the difficulty to imitate systems integration capabilities, its potential pay-
offs are significant, i.e. a strong and sustainable competitive advantage may result. 
 
The notion of systems integration is closely related to concepts in other parts of the 
literature. Systems integration for instance refers to network organizational forms 
coordinated by leading firms. In the literature this principle is also referred to as ‘network 
orchestrators’ or ‘hub firms’ (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2007) that 
manage and coordinate ‘ecosystems’ (Adner, 2006) or ‘value constellations’ (Normann & 
Ramirez, 1993; Vanhaverbeke & Cloodt, 2006). Furthermore, systems integration is 
similar to the concept of absorptive capacity, which entails that firms are able to more 
effectively assimilate and integrate external knowledge if they already possess related 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
 
Systems integration also has close links with Open Innovation. For instance, it perfectly 
illustrates the importance and the changed role of internal R&D in the Open Innovation 
era, i.e. the firm’s R&D activities should no longer be mainly concerned with internal 
knowledge generation, but instead they should aim to integrate internal knowledge and 
external knowledge to come up with new product architectures (Chesbrough, 2003a). 
Below we explore and discuss these linkages in greater detail for two different but related 
types of systems integration: i.e. static (or synchronic) systems integration and dynamic (or 
diachronic) systems integration (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001b; Prencipe, 2003). The 
former focuses on the coordination of component innovations within a firm’s current 
product architecture, whereas the latter plays a crucial role in renewing the product 
architecture itself.  
 
3.3 Open Innovation and synchronic systems integration 
Systems integrators are confronted with continuous technological change to the many 
components that constitute their products. Given their limited resources, system firms face 
difficult decisions regarding the extent that they should be involved in the design and 
development of these innovations. Brusoni et al. (2001) have shown that this is not simply 
a choice between make or buy, because system firms often maintain capabilities and 
knowledge related to components that are developed externally. Based on their study of 
technological change in the jet engine industry, Brusoni et al. (2001) propose a framework 
of appropriate coordination mechanisms for four different types of component innovation. 
These four types of technological innovation are defined in a two-by-two matrix based on 
the rate of component technology change and the predictability of interdependencies. The 
resulting four types of component innovation closely resemble the four types of innovation 
as put forward by Henderson and Clark (1990), i.e. incremental, modular, architectural, 
and radical innovation (see Figure 3.1). Below we discuss this model from the perspective 
of Open Innovation and we suggest how Open Innovation can be applied in each of the 
four types of innovation. 
 
Incremental component innovation  
Incremental component innovations are based on existing technology and for them it is 
known in advance how they can be implemented in the product system. Many elements of 
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the PC architecture are for instance continuously being refined while staying within the 
limits of existing interface specifications (e.g. monitors, processors, software applications). 
In line with the reasoning of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975) and the 
literature about product modularity (Sanchez en Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000), Brusoni 
et al. (2001) propose the market as the most appropriate organizational form to coordinate 
this type of innovation. In this approach, the system firm and component producers interact 
at arm’s length. This is appropriate since there is no need for information exchange to 
(re)define interfaces and since it can be assumed that high-powered incentives exist that 
motivate external specialists to come up with (incrementally) new components.  
 
In general, the market mechanism is not considered to be Open Innovation. Once 
components have been successfully developed externally, the system firm can simply 
decide to buy these components and integrate them in their product system or not. 
However, the invisible hand of the market mechanism is an extreme coordination 
mechanism and system firms can certainly play an active role for this type of innovation. 
System firms may for instance publish and spread interface specifications about how 
components have to be designed to fit with their products (e.g. ‘cookbooks’). They may 
even want to more actively promote component development, such as for the development 
of complementary products. To the extent that external innovators come up with a wide 
variety of innovative components and complementary products, this of course benefits the 
system firm. In the mobile telecommunications industry for instance a wide variety of third 
parties (e.g. start-ups, banks, retail chains, entertainment and media companies, etc.) 
develops and commercializes advanced mobile data applications without any involvement 
of telecom operators. System firms may also implement several practices to tap into the 
creativity and complementary resources of external actors, such as organizing developer 
contests and issuing awards, promoting the generation of external ideas for specific certain 
components (i.e. focused and open idea generation).  
 
In their study of the Japanese video game industry for instance, Aoyama and Izushi (2003) 
show that platform developers (i.e. system firms) rely on the flexibility, diversity, and 
creativity of hundreds of independent software publishers. To facilitate innovation by these 
software publishers, platform developers provide them with detailed architectural 
knowledge about for instance software development standards, new versions of operating 
systems, and quality inspections. Similarly, Funk (2003) illustrates that NTT DoCoMo 
shared detailed information about its open mobile telecommunications standard PDC with 
a set of intimate mobile phone suppliers. This early access to in-depth and standardized 
architectural knowledge provides certainty to suppliers and enables them to set the 
dominant design for mobile phones, whose technological core may well be straightforward 
(i.e. incremental component innovation). Furthermore, external entrepreneurial activity, 
although perhaps not technologically advanced, may result in promising components with 
respect to certain market needs, thus prompting the system firm to internalize them. 
 
Radical component innovation 
Radical component innovations are based on new technology and it is generally unknown 
how these innovations can best be implemented in the product system. Electric car engines 
for instance use a completely different technology than gasoline engines. Their 
implementation in cars requires substantial adjustments of many other car components and 
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only after extensive experimenting and testing it is understood how other components have 
to be adjusted and how interfaces can best be defined. In line with transaction cost 
reasoning and in line with many studies on the organization of innovation (e.g. 
Chesbrough and Teece, 1996), Brusoni et al. (2001) propose vertical integration or ‘make’ 
as the most appropriate organizational form for this type of innovation.  
 
For Brusoni et al. (2001) the most important reason to propose vertical integration is that 
the hierarchy of authority within the systems integrator can be expected to facilitate the 
required information exchange that is needed to discover and resolve the high level of 
interdependence for this type of innovation (e.g. Tushman and Nadler, 1978). In addition, 
vertical integration implies that the system firm finances and performs the development 
project (e.g. Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Jaspers and Van den 
Ende, 2006). This can also be considered beneficial for this type of innovation, because it 
reduces concerns about knowledge spillovers and prevents the need to (contractually) 
safeguard this highly uncertain project. Furthermore, external component and technology 
developers might refrain from committing themselves to this highly uncertain type of 
innovation, which forces system firms to ‘go it alone’ (e.g. Van de Vrande et al., 2006).   
 
It is increasingly being recognized however that Open Innovation can play an important 
role in processes of radical and highly uncertain innovation processes (e.g. O’Connor, 
2006; Dittrich and Duysters, 2007). In this respect, a ‘learning dilemma’ exists (John et al., 
2001). On the one hand, vertical integration might facilitate coordination and reduce 
appropriation concerns. On the other hand, the involvement of external actors in the project 
may help to reduce uncertainty, i.e. it means that different capabilities and different views 
are included in the innovation process. In addition, collaboration may help to spread risks 
and investments. It must also be noted that radical component innovations may demand 
technological change of other components, which makes it likely that system firms need to 
collaborate with external developers of interdependent components to integrate the system. 
Fujitsu for instance developed an entire new architecture of the hard disk drive following a 
technological breakthrough related to one of its components, i.e. the magneto-resistive 
head (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001; Brusoni et al., 2007). 
 
Should firms apply Open Innovation in the case of radical component innovation, then we 
suggest them to do this cautiously, e.g. by closely monitoring the knowledge generation at 
partners and the information flows across its boundaries (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001). This 
may help to reduce appropriation concerns, but it also provides the firm with the 
knowledge to understand and act upon the technical and architectural implications of these 
innovations. Joint and collocated teams would for instance provide such monitoring. 
Furthermore, partner selection needs to be based on the likelihood that a partner is capable 
to help reduce the high degree of technological uncertainty of this type of innovation. In 
this respect, universities may be appropriate choices (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2004). Another, 
albeit rather ‘heavy’, option would be the creation of a joint venture. This allows risks to 
be spread, it increases a partner’s commitment, and it also allows for the establishment of 
formal safeguards. Finally, firms may stimulate creativity for the generation of radically 
new components by means of unfocused and out of the box idea generation mechanisms.  
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Modular and architectural component innovation 
Modular component innovations involve technologically new components that can be 
implemented in product systems based on existing interfaces. The modular PC architecture 
is for instance well-known for its capability to accommodate entirely new components 
without requiring adjustments to other components. However, an uneven rate of 
technological change between components can easily result in ‘technical imbalances’ 
(Rosenberg, 1976) that reduce the performance of the product system as a whole (e.g. these 
innovations could result in new ‘bottleneck components’). In the case of PCs, new and 
advanced software applications may for instance require the development of faster 
computer chips to fully exploit the benefits of the software.  
 
Architectural component innovations are the exact opposites of modular component 
innovations: these new components are based on mature technology, but their 
implementation requires the development of new interfaces. Consider the architecture of a 
mobile phone. The extension of these products with a digital camera module demands 
substantial adjustments to other components, such as the screen and the processor. Several 
redesigns are likely before this new but technologically straightforward component is 
optimally integrated in the product’s architecture. 
 
For both types of innovation Brusoni et al. (2001) suggest ‘systems integration’ as the 
most appropriate coordination mechanism. Systems integration is a coordination 
mechanism in between the extremes of the market and the hierarchy. In this organizational 
form the systems integrator relies on external firms for the detailed design and 
development of the component, but it maintains internally the knowledge and capabilities 
about the basic design of the component and therefore also about this component’s 
relationships with other components, i.e. architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 
1990). This architectural understanding helps the system firm to effectively coordinate 
component changes and therefore to ensure the integrity of the product. Takeishi (2002) 
for instance found that car manufacturers were better able to integrate externally designed 
car components if they maintained internal coordinative capabilities related to these 
components. 
 
Brusoni et al. (2001) define systems integration more precisely by referring to Weick’s 
(1976) concept of coupling. Different types of coupling can be viewed as distinct 
combinations of ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘responsiveness’ (Orton and Weick, 1990), or in the 
terms of Brusoni et al. (2001) as combinations of ‘specialization’ and ‘integration’ (see 
also Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Van de Ven, 1986; Sheremata, 2000). Coordination by 
means of market-based relationships can be considered a ‘decoupled’ organizational form. 
Component developers each pursue their own technological paths, go through their own 
learning processes, and innovate in parallel. At the same time, the systems integrator 
neither has the authority nor the required knowledge and information-processing 
capabilities to coordinate these dispersed activities at external suppliers. Put differently, 
this organizational form is characterized by high specialization and low integration. 
Conversely, vertical integration is a ‘tightly coupled’ organizational form that provides the 
system firm with strong capabilities to coordinate processes of component development, 
but this does not generate the specialization benefits of dispersed experimentation and 
learning.  
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The coordination mechanism of systems integration combines the organizational 
characteristics of specialization and integration in a ‘loosely coupled’ organizational form. 
Specialization results from the involvement of external actors that take on the 
responsibility for the detailed design and development of components. Integration (i.e. the 
capability to coordinate the dispersed innovation effort) results from the system firm’s 
extensive knowledge about the system as a whole and from its basic knowledge about the 
components’ core design concepts. In essence, systems integration therefore means that 
system firms ‘know more than they make’ (Brusoni et al., 2001). Brusoni et al. (2001) also 
explain why this is important: it enables systems integrators to identify and deal with 
interdependencies and technological imbalances so as to achieve unity of effort and to 
maintain a coherent product system. An important question is of course how system firms 
can expand their knowledge boundary beyond their production boundary to optimally 
accommodate modular and architectural component innovations. This is where Open 
Innovation comes in the picture.  
 
Modular component innovations can be implemented in the product system based on 
existing interfaces, but their technological novelty might result in technical imbalances. To 
learn about possible imbalances and to understand what technological changes are required 
to other components, systems integrators need to closely monitor modular component 
innovations. Close links are therefore required with for instance specialized suppliers and 
universities. In addition, technological developments in other industries need to be 
monitored for their potential influence on the product system. This monitoring is likely to 
be effectively performed by system engineers, because these people will understand the 
system-wide implications of these innovations. There is no need for extensive 
communication with external innovators however, because modular innovations are based 
on existing interfaces. Some collaboration with external innovators, such as the facilitation 
of components tests, might however be an effective way to generate a better understanding 
of new component technologies and their implications for the product as a whole. Another 
way to come to understand a new component technology may be to (temporarily) hire an 
external specialist. Should the idea for a modular component innovation appear internally, 
seed-funding or creating a spin-off can be appropriate mechanisms. Furthermore, idea-
generation systems might also be applied for modular innovations. Of course it is only in 
the actual design and development of an idea that it will be discovered or determined 
whether a technologically new component involves a modular or a radical component 
innovation.  
  
Architectural component innovations cannot be readily implemented in the product system, 
because of the required interface changes (e.g. the size and shape of interrelated 
components has to change). As a result, an important responsibility of systems integrators 
is to identify interdependencies and to coordinate the specification of new interfaces. 
Intense exchange of coordinative information is therefore needed, for instance by means of 
establishing teams and working groups with representatives from interdependent 
component developers, by designing new interface specifications, by reviewing externally 
specified interfaces, or by facilitating tests.  
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In sum, our analysis above has indicated that Open Innovation serves the purpose of 
systems integration as it facilitates the development of knowledge about externally 
developed components. Furthermore, we have seen that Open Innovation plays an 
important role in the case of component innovation, but that the specific application of 
Open Innovation differs across the four types of innovation. In other words, our analysis 
proposes a tentative contingency model of Open Innovation (see Figure 3.1). Note that 
‘cautious collaboration’ as suggested for radical innovation comes close to the concept of 
systems integration, because the ‘excessive knowledge’ as a result of monitoring not only 
serves a monitoring purpose (e.g. to prevent expropriation), but also a coordination 
purpose.  
 
Figure 3.1 Component innovation and a contingent Open Innovation model 
 
  Product Interdependencies 
  Predictable Unpredictable 
Ev
en
 
 
Incremental component innovation: 
coordination via market mechanisms 
 
External innovation with limited or no need 
to exchange information or monitor 
 
- Publish or license-out interface specs  
- Stimulate innovation (e.g. contests;   
  focused idea generation)  
- Possibly internalize promising  
  innovations 
 
Architectural component innovation: 
coordination via systems integration 
 
Intense exchange of coordinative 
information with external specialists 
 
- Participating in external teams 
- Providing and reviewing interface  
  specifications  
- Facilitating component tests  
 
R
a
te
 
o
f C
ha
n
ge
 
of
 
C
o
m
po
n
en
t T
ec
hn
o
lo
gi
es
 
U
n
ev
en
 
 
Modular component innovation: 
coordination via systems integration 
 
 
No need for active involvement or  
frequent information exchange 
 
- Monitoring by system engineers 
- Facilitate component testing.  
- Hiring of specialists. 
- Spin-offs/seed funding 
- Open, unfocused/out of the box thinking 
 
 
Radical component innovation: 
coordination via vertical integration or 
systems integration 
 
Cautious  
collaboration 
 
- Teaming up with universities or other  
   specialists 
- Joint, collocated teams 
- Joint ventures 
- Open, unfocused/out of the box   
  thinking 
    Source: Basic framework adapted from Brusoni et al., 2001, p.611. 
 
3.4 Open Innovation and diachronic systems integration 
Above we have seen that Open Innovation mechanisms provide system firms with 
knowledge about externally developed components and that they combine this knowledge 
to generate a detailed understanding of the product’s architecture. In this way Open 
Innovation helps system firms to coordinate component-level technological change and to 
ensure the integrity of their current product systems (i.e. synchronic systems integration). 
In addition, system firms use their systems integration capabilities to design and to 
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experiment with entirely new product architectures, i.e. dynamic, intergenerational or 
diachronic systems integration (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001b; Prencipe, 2003; Hobday et 
al., 2005). This section first of all discusses two views about how product architectures and 
organizational forms evolve over time and about the difficulty to make the shift to next-
generation product architectures and to start a new technological trajectory (e.g. Dosi, 
1982). Subsequently, we discuss how diachronic systems integration relates to these two 
views and what its implications are for Open Innovation. 
 
The modularity trap of loosely coupled organizational forms 
The modularity literature typically assumes that coordination and control within vertically 
integrated firms is needed to design experimental and interdependent product architectures. 
Over time these architectures become increasingly modular as interdependencies are better 
understood and as interfaces are clearly specified (Chesbrough, 2003b). Architectural 
stability for instance results from the emergence of a ‘dominant design’ from a set of 
competing product architectures (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Murmann and Frenken, 
2006). The stability of product interfaces contributes to component-level improvement as a 
result of focused and parallel innovation efforts from autonomous technology specialists 
(Dosi, 1982; Baldwin and Clark, 1997). The dominant view is therefore that product and 
organizational modularity are strongly linked, i.e. over time vertical integration is being 
replaced by market mechanisms (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). In this regard, Chesbrough 
(2003a) suggests that the application of Open Innovation changes over time (see also 
Christensen et al., 2005), i.e. Closed Innovation is needed in the early, highly 
interdependent stage of a product’s life cycle, gradually giving way to Open Innovation for 
mature and modular product architectures (see also Maula et al., 2006).  
 
As most industry participants focus on component improvement within the limits of the 
dominant product architecture, knowledge about how components interrelate and about 
how the system as a whole can be improved tends to erode. In this respect, Chesbrough 
and Kusunoki (2001) point to the danger of a ‘modularity trap’. As the technical limits of a 
given product architecture are reached, loosely coupled organizational forms lack the 
capabilities to design and adopt new architectures (Chesbrough, 2003b). Similarly, Brusoni 
et al. (2007) point to the constraints of problem solving under conditions of modularity, i.e. 
modular search helps to reach a local optimum fast and efficiently, but it lacks the 
capabilities of broad and integral search for distant but higher peaks.  
 
Given these limits of modularity at the end of a product’s life cycle, Chesbrough (2003b) 
suggests that industries need to find ways to move back to an integrated state at the end of 
a product’s life cycle to help them shift to the next technological paradigm. In a similar 
vein, Pisano (2006) argues that biotechnology has failed to live up to its expectations 
because of its disintegrated industry structure. He argues that more vertical integration, 
more network coordination, and more long-term relationships between large 
pharmaceuticals and small biotech entrepreneurs are needed to realize the systemic 
potential of biotechnology. 
 
The ‘embeddedness trap’ of vertical integration 
Whereas the modularity literature assumes that intermediate markets emerge for specific 
modules and activities (e.g. Jacobides, 2005), other literature exists that focuses on the 
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opposite scenario, i.e. where incumbents remain responsible for and in control of the 
product architecture (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Interestingly, Henderson and Clark 
(1990) also point to a competency trap to introduce new product architectures at the end of 
a product’s life cycle. They argue that architectural knowledge tends to become implicitly 
and tacitly embedded in the firm’s structures and processes. Units responsible for 
interrelated components will for instance develop formal and informal communication 
channels between them to effectively coordinate their tasks (Von Hippel, 1990; Sanchez 
and Mahoney, 1996). In addition, units tend to develop information filters to respond only 
to new information that is relevant to the way that components currently interact. Other 
information gets filtered out. Furthermore, firms create routine problem-solving strategies 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) that are specific to the dominant design and that reduce the 
need to communicate and negotiate in the case of interface problems.  
 
This embeddedness of architectural knowledge in the processes and structures of 
incumbents is efficient as long as the current product architecture meets the demands of 
users and as long as improvements can still be realized, but it makes it difficult for 
incumbents to identify architectural opportunities, to unlearn existing architectural 
knowledge, and to come up with new architectural designs (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
As a result of this ‘blindness’ (Dosi, 1982), or what we may call ‘embeddedness trap’, 
Henderson and Clark (1990) argue that new entrants (unencumbered by this 
embeddedness) may overtake incumbents with new product architectures.   
 
Systems integration: an intermediate position 
Systems integration is a coordination mechanism in between the market and the hierarchy 
(Brusoni et al., 2001). As a result, it deviates from the two abovementioned views. If 
complex products become more modular over time, systems integrators do tend to rely 
more and more on external actors, but it will not come to resemble a loosely-coupled, 
market-based organizational form. System firms maintain a coordinative role to integrate 
the dispersed activities of external actors (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001b), i.e. product 
modularity will not result in a modular organizational form (see also Takeishi, 2002; 
Hoetker, 2006). Neither will systems integrators ever be vertically integrated. Even for 
highly interdependent designs, system firms will have to rely at least in part on external 
firms given the sheer complexity of their products.  
 
Under all circumstances systems integrators therefore continuously need to monitor 
component-level dynamics and need to adapt their architectural knowledge accordingly. 
This continuous effort to monitor, absorb and integrate new technological developments 
not only allows systems integrators to ensure the integrity of their current product systems, 
it also provides them with the capability to design and experiment with entirely new 
product architectures, i.e. (system-level) architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark, 
1990). Furthermore, to the extent that a completely new product architecture requires 
changes to be implemented by external developers and complementors, i.e. systemic 
innovation (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Maula et al., 2006), this same architectural 
knowledge helps system firms to coordinate these changes. In sum, system firms are able 
to simultaneously exploit their current product systems and to explore new ones (Prencipe, 
2003).  
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The principle to design entirely new product architectures based on the integration of 
external ideas and technology is also applied outside the setting of complex products. 
Well-known is Procter & Gamble’s innovation strategy dubbed ‘Connect and Develop’. In 
this approach P&G searches for complementary products and ideas in a wide variety of 
disciplines. In addition, this open innovation approach is complemented by several 
organizational and technological mechanisms that promote the development of new and 
unobvious connections between internal and external knowledge (e.g. Dodgson et al., 
2006; Huston and Sakkab, 2006). This for instance involves digital prototyping, which is 
able to integrate many different technologies that may be embodied in a new product (e.g. 
Dodgson et al., 2006). Similarly, Rigby and Zook (2002) stress the importance of 
complementing Open Innovation with a centralized and formalized internal organization to 
monitor, disseminate, and integrate knowledge of the various innovation activities that 
move into, out of, and around the firm.  
 
By being open for external ideas and technology, and by developing deep systems 
knowledge, system firms are able to avoid the abovementioned competency traps 
(Prencipe, 2003; Brusoni et al., 2007). This complements prior literature (e.g. Henderson 
and Clark, 1990; Maula et al., 2006) by suggesting that systems integrators are less likely 
to be overtaken by new entrants. In fact, systems integrators tend to dominate successive 
generations of product architectures (e.g. Boeing and Airbus in aircraft manufacturing and 
Nokia and Ericsson in telecommunications technology). Incumbents sometimes increase 
their chances of survival and significantly reduce innovation risks by means of 
collaboration with other incumbents (e.g. Miller et al., 1995). For the design of a new 
DVD technology most incumbents for instance participated in one of two competing 
consortia (i.e. Blu Ray and HD DVD). 
 
In the conventional view on the dynamics of industries, new entrants emerge in periods of 
discontinuous technological change, i.e. when the competencies of incumbents tend to be 
destroyed in a wave of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). In complex product industries few firms have the capabilities and the resources 
however to overcome entry barriers. New entrants for instance generally lack architectural 
knowledge to successfully develop a product architecture of their own as well the financial 
resources to build such a knowledge base (e.g. Hobday, 1998). Whereas specialized 
knowledge about individual component technologies tends to be abundant, this shows that 
architectural knowledge is typically a scarce resource that requires substantial specific 
investments. This scarcity and its associated sunk costs are strong entry deterrents 
providing competitive advantage to incumbent systems integrators.  
 
In sum, systems integrators are able to design and coordinate new architectures based on 
the extensive knowledge and capabilities they maintain and integrate about components 
they do not develop in-house. The application of Open Innovation as discussed for the 
synchronic integration of component-level change is therefore also relevant for diachronic 
systems integration. Without up-to-date component knowledge there are no ingredients to 
explore system-level changes. In fact, close monitoring of component-level technological 
change may result in the recognition of new system-level opportunities (e.g. the design of a 
completely new hard disk drive by Fujitsu following strong technological improvements in 
one specific component).  
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3.5 An illustrative case: Open Innovation at Intel for reasons of systems integration  
Intel’s innovation strategy (Chesbrough, 2003a; Tennenhouse, 2004) is a well-known 
example of Open Innovation. It also provides a perfect illustration however of the 
conceptual linkages between Open Innovation and systems integration as discussed in this 
chapter. This brief case shows that Intel - to sustain its leading position as a computer chip 
provider - makes extensive use of external knowledge in order to generate rare and 
difficult to imitate architectural knowledge and systems integration capabilities. In other 
words, it is the combination of Open Innovation and systems integration that forms the 
basis of Intel’s innovation strategy.  
 
Illustrating the importance to create internally high-quality and proprietary architectural 
knowledge, Intel has set up three specialized labs (Chesbrough, 2003a) that each contribute 
to Intel’s systems integration capability. First, Intel’s Components Research Lab focuses 
on developments related to individual elements of microprocessors and their production 
processes. This for instance involves collaboration with suppliers to evaluate the impact of 
component innovations on other components and to learn about opportunities to combine 
them. Secondly, Intel Microprocessor Lab investigates future microprocessor architectures. 
Hence, this research facility focuses on a higher level of Intel’s value chain by viewing 
microprocessors as systems created from a range of component and operations 
technologies. Thirdly, Intel’s Architecture Lab operates at an even higher level of 
abstraction by adopting the perspective of entire computer architectures, in which 
microprocessors operate as a crucial subsystem. 
 
Open Innovation and external knowledge plays a crucial role in each of these research labs. 
Intel especially views universities as an important source to learn about technological 
developments that might result in new businesses and disruptive innovations 
(Tennenhouse, 2004). To explore promising ideas, Intel adopts a combination of four 
research approaches: (1) university research grants; (2) research labs located near 
universities; (3) corporate venturing; and (4) internal projects for strategically important 
and proprietary research. Intel actively coordinates the research activities of these four 
research facilities to make sure that their research efforts concurrently address the same 
themes (Tennenhouse, 2004). Each unit has its own research focus, but sufficient overlap 
and knowledge transfer exists to pursue and explore opportunities for synthesis. This 
integrative approach is inspired by the innovation approach of DARPA (the US Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency), which typically deals with the development of 
complex product systems.  
 
The underlying logic of Intel’s innovation approach is based on the recognition that deep 
specialists operate in the firm’s environment, such as in university labs. Intel aims to learn 
from these specialists, but its own innovation activities mainly focus on the establishment 
of linkages between specialists and the development of systems knowledge. In line with 
this logic Intel actively promotes the rotation of personnel, such as between universities 
and Intel labs (Tennenhouse, 2004), and requires researchers to spend some time in 
manufacturing (Chesbrough, 2003a). In this way, Intel aims to develop architects with the 
capacity to link knowledge domains rather than deep specialists. Such A-shapes skills 
(Madhavan and Grover, 1998) enable Intel to understand the interrelationships of diverse 
technologies and to actively control and influence the evolution of components and 
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systems. In sum, this case illustrates that Open Innovation and systems integration are 
closely intertwined. The primary reason for Intel’s Open Innovation model is to develop a 
unique stock of architectural knowledge, which enables Intel to further direct its internal as 
well as external innovation strategies, e.g. by investing selectively in component 
developers and start-ups. In other words, internal and closed innovation seems necessary to 
first of all integrate the knowledge that can be accessed by means of Open Innovation (e.g. 
as a result of monitoring) and subsequently it forms the basis for further Open Innovation 
to guide and direct external innovation.  
 
3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
Open innovation and systems integration are strong complements. Both need each other in 
order to be effective. First, systems integrator firms need to know more than they make in 
order to effectively integrate networks of component and technology developers for the 
coherence of existing products (i.e. static systems integration). In this regard, Open 
Innovation provides system firms with the mechanisms to expand their knowledge 
boundary. Secondly, in order to benefit from Open Innovation for the creation and 
development of new product architectures (i.e. dynamic systems integration), system firms 
need a strong systems integration capability to understand and create linkages between 
internal technology and the external ideas and technology that were acquired through Open 
Innovation.  
 
Prior studies have indicated that an important opportunity to broaden the scope of Open 
Innovation is to take into account the complexity of the innovation process (e.g. West et 
al., 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006). Our study meets this call by integrating the Open 
Innovation literature and the literature about the development of complex product systems. 
We contribute to these literatures by pointing out the strong complementarity that exists 
between the Open Innovation and systems integration. Whereas prior systems integration 
literature has outlined why firms know more than they make (Brusoni et al., 2001), our 
study has elaborated on this topic by outlining how firms may extend their knowledge 
boundary beyond their production boundary.  
 
Another contribution in this regard, involves the framework that we proposed outlining the 
contingent nature of Open Innovation. We argue that the effective coordination of different 
types of component innovation requires the application of different types of Open 
Innovation mechanisms, i.e. in terms of their capability to stimulate, monitor, and 
coordinate the innovation. In this way we suggest a future avenue for research to explain 
how, why, and when Open Innovation is likely to contribute to the innovative performance 
of firms.  
 
In our study we also touched upon one of the most fundamental assumptions underlying 
Open Innovation, i.e. the notion that firms operate in a ‘landscape of abundant knowledge’ 
(Chesbrough, 2003a). This chapter clearly points to a boundary of Open Innovation in this 
respect, because the systems integration literature stresses the strategic importance to 
generate internally high-quality architectural knowledge. Such knowledge is far from 
‘abundant’ and requires a conscious and long-term internal development strategy. Open 
Innovation has an important role to play to continuously feed into this internal integration 
process. The case of Intel illustrates how close Open Innovation and systems integration 
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are intertwined for the development of scarce and difficult to imitate architectural 
knowledge. Furthermore, the systems integration literature shows how the combination of 
Open Innovation and systems integration can result in strong and sustainable competitive 
advantage by surviving successive technological generations. 
 
A final contribution involves the explicit distinction that we maintained throughout this 
chapter between system-level innovation and component-level innovation, i.e. synchronic 
versus diachronic systems integration. Both types of systems integration point to two 
completely different purposes of Open Innovation, i.e. the coordination of component 
developers for existing products and the generation of architectural knowledge for future 
products. Such an explicit distinction between component-level innovation and system-
level innovation is often lacking in the innovation literature (Gatignon et al., 2002). Both 
types of systems integration are closely related however: whereas internal systems 
knowledge is required to generate new product systems, substantial parts of this 
proprietary knowledge may have to be made public (i.e. public interface standards) to 
stimulate and facilitate the development of components and complements. 
 
Our study has several limitations. First, our study by no means aims to be comprehensive 
in its coverage of the Open Innovation literature and the systems integration literature. We 
did aim however to draw upon and to integrate some of the most fundamental 
underpinnings of both fields of literature. These were mainly related to knowledge-related 
characteristics of and prerequisites for systems integration, rather than issues related to 
persuading and getting the commitment from complementors, i.e. power-related issues 
(e.g. Maula et al., 2006).  
 
Of course it has to be noted that our findings are derived from a conceptual analysis in the 
extreme setting of complex product systems. Many industries revolve around products that 
are significantly less complex, but given that many products consist of at least a few 
components and given the difficulty of many industries to design and implement 
substantial architectural innovations (e.g. PCs, biotech), we believe that the external 
validity of our findings is substantial. Of course future research is required in this regard, 
for instance to investigate the prominence of systems integration in a variety of industries. 
A promising line of research involves systems integration by small component developers. 
Although much of the systems integration literature takes the perspective of large system 
firms, its ideas also seem to apply to smaller-sized component developers.  
 
Ethiraj and Puranam (2004) for instance studied the innovation activities of component 
developers and found that these firms benefit from building architectural knowledge 
themselves. As component suppliers understand better how their components fit into larger 
product systems, they can innovate more effectively at the component level. Similarly, we 
have seen that Intel established a research facility dedicated to computer architectures in an 
attempt to understand and influence the role of microprocessors in future computer 
systems. Hence, firms responsible for components or subsystems should strike a balance 
between the focus of their R&D activities on core component technologies and the scope 
of their R&D activities for the development of architectural knowledge (Ethiraj and 
Puranam, 2004). Ethiraj (2007) for instance shows that component developers attempt to 
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increase the value of their own component innovations by targeting part of their R&D 
effort at bottleneck components.  
 
Finally, future research is needed to further improve the contingent nature of Open 
Innovation. We proposed a tentative model for the application of Open Innovation in the 
context of component innovations, but more evidence is needed about which specific Open 
Innovation mechanisms fit the characteristics of the different types of innovation. In this 
regard it is clear that system firms need very extensive monitoring capabilities. This results 
in the question how firms realize this capability while keeping its costs within limits. In 
this regard it is interesting to observe the emergence of systems integration specialists. In 
the mobile telecommunications industry, mobile operators for instance increasingly focus 
on marketing and customer care, while tasks of systems integration for the development of 
complementary mobile applications are increasingly being performed by intermediary 
platform or middleware owners, such as firms with their own switches, text messaging 
centers and application platforms. 
 
For managers this chapter presents several interesting insights. First, our study shows the 
importance of a balanced approach to Open Innovation, i.e. firms need to be open and 
closed at the same time: open with respect to new ideas and technological developments; 
closed with respect to developing and improving knowledge about how different 
technologies and components interrelate. This shows the important internal consequences 
of Open Innovation, i.e. Open Innovation provides the firm with knowledge the firm does 
not immediately need for its own production processes, but managers have to install 
mechanisms and processes to evaluate and integrate the knowledge they acquired 
externally with their own resources and capabilities. In this way, new avenues may be 
found to further exploit their proprietary technologies and their manufacturing and sales 
capabilities. Secondly, the model that we proposed for four different types of component 
innovation gives managers some preliminary clues on how to apply Open Innovation in a 
complex product context. Finally, our findings suggest that Open Innovation helps firms to 
experiment with entirely new product architectures. As firms develop a detailed 
understanding of technological interrelationships they are more likely to explore new 
connections and to identify architectural opportunities. In this way, proprietary and unique 
architectural knowledge may result in strong competitive advantage. 
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PART 2. 
 
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION:                                                       
A CONFIGURATIONAL APPROACH 
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4. Involvement of System Firms in the Development of 
Complementary Products: The Influence of Novelty 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter focuses on the involvement of system firms (systems integrators) in the 
development of products that are complementary to these firms’ product systems. The 
central question is: to what extent do the novelty of the system and the novelty of the 
complementary product affect the appropriate degree of involvement of system firms in 
the development of complementary products? A system firm has several options: it may 
develop the complementary product completely by itself, it can leave the development 
project completely to a specialized producer of complementary products, or it can apply 
different forms of collaboration with such specialized firms. As the first steps towards a 
configurational approach, we conceptualize the system firm’s project involvement in terms 
of two dimensions: the firm’s ownership of the project as a result of project investments 
and the firm’s integration of the project in terms of coordination. More specifically, this 
chapter presents a (configurational) model for the most appropriate degree of involvement 
of the system firm, contingent upon the novelty of the system and the novelty of the 
complementary product. Basic to the model are two objectives of firms developing a new 
complementary product: the reduction of information and transaction costs in the 
development process, and the timely creation of installed base of the novel system and/or 
the complementary product. We performed a pilot test of the model using data on new 
service development projects in mobile telecommunications. The results show that the 
novelty of the system and complementary product indeed affect the performance effects of 
system firm involvement. Particularly when the system is mature and the complementary 
product new, the system firm could better leave complementary product development to a 
specialized external firm. In other cases, the system firm can choose its degree of 
involvement from low to either medium or high, depending on novelty conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is published as: Van den Ende, J., Jaspers, F. and Gerwin, D. (2008). 
Involvement of system firms in the development of complementary 
products: The influence of novelty. Technovation, 28, 726-738. 
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4.1 Introduction  
To an increasing extent products are complements to larger systems. Examples are 
cartridges that are complementary to printers, video games to video consoles, pads to 
coffee-machines, and, the example of this chapter, content services that are 
complementary to mobile telecommunication systems. The functioning and market 
acceptance of the complementary products depend on their alignment with the technical 
characteristics and market positioning of the larger system. For this purpose the developers 
of complementary products have to communicate with the producer of the larger system. 
Particularly for novel systems or complementary products, achieving alignment requires 
extensive information processing between the developer of a complementary product and 
the developer of the system. At the same time, users can often choose the different 
complementary products of a system independently, meaning that separate markets exist 
for a system as a whole and for its complementary products. Often, in both markets 
network externalities may be important (Arthur, 1988; Shapiro and Varian, 1999), which 
means that the timely creation of installed base is important for survival. Therefore the 
developer of a complementary product has two major concerns: the alignment of the 
complementary product with the rest of the system, and the creation of installed base for 
the complementary product itself. 
 
This chapter addresses the degree that a system firm should be involved in the 
development of complementary products. It concerns the degree that system firms finance 
the development of complementary products, and the degree that they are involved in the 
execution of the complementary product’s development process. We address the influence 
of the characteristics of the innovation on these decisions, particularly the novelty of the 
system and the complementary product, since these characteristics affect the need to create 
installed base for the system and complementary product. 
 
The literature on the role of system firms in the development of complementary products, 
and on the effects of novelty conditions on that role, is scarce (Nambisan, 2002; Sengupta, 
1998; Venkatraman and Lee, 2004). The literature on systemic innovation addresses the 
degree that system firms should be involved in component development in general, not for 
complementary products in particular (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001b; Chesbrough and 
Teece, 1996; Teece, 1986, 1996). This literature focuses on the degree that system firm 
involvement facilitates the required alignment between system and component.  
 
However, system firms and component manufacturers have a supplier-buyer relationship, 
which provides the system firm with a certain degree of control over suppliers in 
component development (Carson, 2007; Takeishi, 2002). We consider a complementary 
product to be an example of a component, but, whereas other components form part of the 
system and are delivered together with the rest of the system to the client, the 
complementary product is supplied separately from the rest of the product to the customer. 
As a consequence, system firms have less control over the development of complementary 
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products, while the success of the system can still be highly dependent on these products. 
System firms will have to apply other methods to participate in complementary product 
development, such as financing the development or communicating intensively with the 
complementary product developer. Sengupta (1998) addresses the choices of system firms 
for participation in the development of complementary products, but he focuses on 
strategic considerations and does not investigate the effects of market conditions or the 
innovativeness of the system and complementary products on those choices, nor does he 
investigate the performance effects of those choices.  
 
In this chapter we contribute to the literature by developing a model for the degree to 
which and the way in which system firms should be involved in complementary product 
development. The model takes into account both the required alignment between system 
and complementary product, and the need to align the complementary product with both 
the system market and its own market. Moreover, whereas most prior models were case-
based (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Van den Ende, 2003), we performed a sample 
survey. The focus of our model on novelty conditions for the choice of system firm 
involvement in the development of complementary products does not mean that there are 
no other reasons that affect these decisions in system firms, such as considerations of 
resources and capacity available for innovation activities.  
 
We draw from the neo-evolutionary economics literature (Arthur, 1989, 1996; Schilling, 
2002) to develop our hypotheses on the influence of system firm involvement on the 
creation of installed base of complementary products (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Our 
model also draws from the innovation management literature, particularly by including 
findings with respect to rapid creation of installed base in dynamic environments 
(Christensen, 1997; MacCormack et al., 2001; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). The data 
concern development projects of mobile telecommunications services as complementary 
products of mobile telecommunications systems. We show that the novelty of the system 
and complementary product indeed affect the performance effects of system firm 
involvement. Particularly when the system is mature and the complementary product new, 
the system firm could better leave complementary product development to a specialized 
external firm. In other cases, the system firm can choose its degree of involvement from 
low to either medium or high, depending on novelty conditions. This result is particularly 
relevant for system firms which have to determine their degree of involvement in 
complementary product development. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the implication of the 
novelty of the system and complementary product for the organizational characteristics of 
the development project of the complementary product. Next, we develop hypotheses on 
the most appropriate degree of involvement of system firms, contingent on system and 
complementary product novelty. Subsequently, we describe our research methodology. 
Finally, we present our results and discuss the implications for theory and practice. 
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4.2 Theoretical background 
 
System and complementary product novelty 
A complementary product forms a component of a larger system. A system consists of a 
number of components, united in a common architecture (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
We consider a complementary product to be an example of a component. However, 
whereas other components form part of the system and are delivered together with the rest 
of the system to the client, the complementary product is supplied separately from the rest 
of the product to the customer. 
 
Like other components, complementary products are part of the architecture of the system, 
and are connected to the rest of the system by means of interfaces. The architecture and 
interfaces of systems are often subject to change in the early life of the system, until a 
dominant design emerges. In the early phase the interdependence between system and 
component is high, and the innovation on the component is truly systemic (Chesbrough 
and Teece, 1996). After the dominant design is set, developers of components and 
complementary products can conform to standard interfaces defined by the dominant 
design, and component innovation becomes largely autonomous (Abernathy, 1978; 
Utterback, 1994). Baldwin and Clark (1997) call the interfaces in such cases ‘visible 
design rules’ versus hidden design rules within the components. An important determinant 
of the novelty of the system is therefore the novelty of the architecture and interfaces 
(Table 4.1). 
 
Components, including complementary products, may be developed anew for a new 
system, but they may also already exist as part of other systems or as stand-alone products. 
An important determinant of the novelty of a component is therefore the degree of 
similarity to existing products. We consider a component of a system new if it offers 
features to users previously unavailable from stand-alone products or components of other 
systems. We consider a component mature if customers can acquire it in a similar form 
from other systems or channels. In terms of the product life cycle, we consider a system or 
component new when it is in the fluid phase of the life cycle, and mature when it is in the 
transitional or specific phase (Cusumano et al., 1992; Utterback, 1994). So, for a new 
component in general no dominant design will yet exist in the market. 
 
Table 4.1 Important criteria for novelties of system and complementary product 
 
 
Novel / Fluid phase 
 
Mature phase 
System Novel architecture and interfaces 
Standard architecture and interfaces 
(‘Visible design rules’) 
Complementary 
product New features for users 
Features similar to existing 
products 
 
The novelties of the system and of the components influence the degree of uncertainty in 
development projects of components. High system novelty creates technological 
uncertainty for the interfaces with the component (interdependence). A highly novel 
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component creates technological uncertainty for the hidden design rules of the component 
itself, and can also require changes of the interfaces. Moreover, the novelty of the system 
creates market uncertainty with respect to the behavior of competitors, the type and 
number of prospective users of the system, user preferences, and any substitutes that may 
appear for the system. Similarly, the novelty of a complementary product also creates 
uncertainty in the market of the complementary product. 
 
Integration and ownership 
Two types of firms may be involved in the development of complementary products: 
system firms and specialized producers of the complementary products. System firms are 
responsible for the architecture and the interfaces of a system as a whole (Bonaccorsi et 
al., 1999; Gann and Salter, 2000; Hobday, 2000), whereas specialized producers of 
complementary products may be responsible for their specific complement. 
 
We distinguish two dimensions of organizational forms for the development of 
complementary products: the degree of integration and the degree of ownership by the 
system firm (Robertson and Langlois, 1995. See also Gerwin, 2004; Gerwin and Ferris, 
2004). The literature on vertical integration uses the concept of ‘integration’ with respect 
to the structure of firms (Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Williamson, 1985), whereas 
organization theory and innovation management literature use it on a process level, with 
respect to the actual coordination that takes place between subunits or firms (Grant, 1996; 
Kahn, 1996; Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss, 2001). We use the concept on the first, 
structural level, but we relate it to the second level. We define integration as the extent to 
which the organizational form for the development project of the complementary product 
facilitates coordination and information exchange between the developers of the 
complementary product and the system. Internal development of a complementary product 
by the system firm of course means that the degree of integration is high, and even more 
so if system and complementary product development take place in one subunit. 
Integration is lower when a system firm and a complementary product firm collaborate on 
the development of the complementary product, for instance in the form of an alliance. 
Integration is least when the system firm leaves the development of the complementary 
product completely to a specialized complementary product firm. 
 
The degree of ownership by the system firm refers to the extent that the system firm 
finances the development activities of the complementary product. If the system firm fully 
finances these activities, a situation of common ownership of system and complementary 
product occurs (Mohr et al., 1996). At the other extreme, one or more specialized 
producers of complementary products finance the development activities, without any 
ownership by a system firm. In between these extremes the system firm shares ownership 
over the innovation project with one or more specialized producers of complementary 
products. It has to be noted that ownership and integration are different aspects of the 
involvement of the system firm, but they are not completely independent, since a high 
degree of ownership of the complementary product’s development activities by the system 
firm facilitates information exchange between the development activities for the system 
and complementary product, and thus supports integration as defined above (Robertson 
and Langlois, 1995). But ownership does not necessarily involve integration, since system 
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firms can financially participate in the development of complementary products, but leave 
all development activities to a supplier. 
 
4.3 Hypotheses 
We hypothesize that the novelty of the system and complementary product affect the two 
dimensions of the involvement of the system firm, but in different ways. First, we assume 
that both the novelty of the system and complementary product affect the optimal degree 
of integration between the system’s development activities and the complementary 
product’s development activities (Gulati et al., 2005). As noted above, when the system 
and complementary product are both new, interface uncertainty will be high. In line with 
transaction cost theory we assume that in that case a low degree of integration between the 
system’s and complement’s development activities creates high transaction and 
information costs, and that a high degree of integration will reduce these costs (Grover and 
Malhotra, 2003; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hoetker, 2005). In this case a high degree of 
integration will reduce the costs and duration of the complementary product’s 
development. Integration will also improve the quality of the output of the project, since 
the system and complementary product can be better aligned to each other (Chesbrough 
and Teece, 1996). When either the system or complementary product, or both, are mature, 
interface uncertainty will be lower, and integration is less needed. In this situation, 
superfluous integration may even create unnecessary coordination costs and delays. We 
therefore argue that the appropriate degree of integration between the development 
activities of the system and the complementary product increases with the novelty of the 
system and the complementary product. 
 
We define integration misfit as the difference between the actual degree of integration 
between the system’s and complementary product’s development activities and the 
appropriate degree of integration. In line with contingency theory, we hypothesize that the 
degree of misfit negatively affects the performance of the complementary product 
development project (Burton et al., 2002; Donaldson, 2001; Gresov, 1989; Naman and 
Slevin, 1993). We make a distinction between the performance of the development project 
(in terms of project duration, project cost efficiency and the quality of the development 
process) and the performance of the innovation in the market (e.g. number of customers 
and the financial return). As indicated above, we expect that project performance will be 
higher as the degree of integration between the development of the system and the 
development of the complementary product is more appropriately aligned with the novelty 
of the system and the complementary product. We also expect that the project’s duration 
and its quality will affect the market performance of the complementary product 
(Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss, 2001). We therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The degree of misfit between the actual and the appropriate degree 
of integration between the development of the system and the complementary 
product, where the appropriate level increases with the novelty of the system and 
the novelty of the complementary product, negatively affects the project and the 
market performance of the complementary product development project. 
 
Second, we assume that the novelty of the system and the complementary product affect 
the appropriate degree of ownership by the system firm. Neo-evolutionary theory shows 
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that in network markets installed base is important, particularly in the early phase of a new 
market (Arthur, 1988, 1989, 1996; Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Network markets are 
characterized by follower behavior amongst producers and consumers, since installed base 
creates benefits for both existing and new producers and users, for instance because of the 
higher availability of information about the product, decreased prices for the product or the 
availability of complementary products. To create installed base, firms have to align the 
product closely to the market, by introducing it within the ‘window of opportunity’. This 
requires equipping it with attractive features, adapting those features actively in response 
to customer feedback and spreading knowledge about the features through marketing 
communication (Christensen et al., 1998; MacCormack et al., 2001; Dew and Read, 2007; 
Schilling, 2002).  
 
Its will be clear that the markets of both systems and complementary products often have 
network characteristics. Network effects involve that a high installed base of a 
complementary product that is offered in addition to a specific system may be a reason for 
other system firms to use the same or a slightly adapted version of the complementary 
product for their system (Van den Ende and Wijnberg, 2003). For instance, once a 
computer program is popular on MS-DOS computers, Apple will be inclined to support 
the development of an adapted version of this program for its own computers. 
 
This means that for the producer of a complementary product the installed base of both the 
system and complementary product itself are important. Which of these markets is most 
important depends on the novelty of both markets. The installed base of the system market 
is especially important when the system is new, and when the complementary product is 
mature. In that situation the success of the complementary product stems primarily from 
its alignment to the system market (Teece, 1986). Examples are complementary products 
that form ‘killer products’ or ‘killer applications’ for new systems. In such cases, 
alignment of the complementary product to the systems market will create the best 
chances for success of both the system and the complementary product. The installed base 
in the market of the complementary product is especially important if the complementary 
product is new and the system mature. In that case the complementary product has to 
create installed base for itself, and thus has primarily to be aligned to the requirements of 
its own market. When both the system and the complementary product are new, the two 
markets are equally important, and the complementary product can best be aligned as 
much as possible to both markets. When both markets are mature, innovation for the 
complementary product is incremental in all respects, and market alignment is not a major 
issue since the product already has a sufficient installed base. Summarizing, we assume 
that the complementary product can best be aligned to the requirements of the newest 
market, the one of the system or the complementary product.  
 
We furthermore assume that ownership by a firm that has the most knowledge of the 
relevant market creates the best conditions for managing the aligning process (Cooper, 
2001; Danneels, 2002). Firms with knowledge of the market can better judge which time-
to-market is most appropriate for the system or product and which adaptations have to be 
made to the product to meet customer requirements. Ownership puts a firm in a position to 
decide on time-to-market and to make such adaptations, since it provides control over 
71
 61 
resources and design decisions in the development of the complementary product (Lewis 
et al, 2002). 
 
Since we explained above that the complementary product can best be aligned to the most 
novel market, the relative novelties of the system’s and complementary product’s markets 
determine the most appropriate party to have ownership of the development of the 
complementary product. Moreover, the firm addressing the most novel market will feel the 
highest urgency to introduce the complementary product and to create an installed base 
(Lambe and Spekman, 1997). This also means that ownership of the complementary 
product’s development can best be with the firm that addresses the market that is most 
novel. When the novelties of both markets are about equal, shared ownership of the 
development project of the complementary product seems the most appropriate solution.  
 
To summarize, we argue that the appropriate degree of ownership by the system firm of 
complementary product development activities increases with system novelty and 
decreases with the novelty of the complementary product. We define ownership misfit as 
the difference between the actual degree of ownership and the appropriate degree of 
ownership. Since our considerations are primarily based on market performance, we 
expect ownership misfit to affect market performance.  
 
Hypothesis 2. The degree of misfit between the system firm’s actual and 
appropriate degree of ownership of the complementary product’s development 
activities, where the appropriate level increases with the novelty of the system 
and decreases with the novelty of the complementary product, negatively affects 
the market performance of the complementary product. 
 
Finally we hypothesize that a misfit on one organizational dimension will reinforce a 
misfit on the other dimension. Misfit with respect to integration will mean that the 
alignment of the complementary product with the system is inappropriate. Misfit with 
respect to ownership will mean that the complementary product is not well aligned to the 
most novel and relevant market (system or complementary product market). We expect 
that the combined effect of the two misfits will be greater than the sum of their separate 
effects. The development of the component will wander off completely from the 
perspectives of both the system and the most relevant market. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Integration misfit and ownership misfit interact in their negative 
effects on the market performance of the complementary product. 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the most appropriate organizational forms for complementary 
product development activities under different conditions for the novelty of the system and 
complementary product. In each quadrant we present the degree of integration and 
ownership by the system firm according to the hypotheses (see also Van den Ende, 2003). 
The newer the system and complementary product, the higher will be the integration. As a 
result, integration is highest in Quadrant III, lowest in Quadrant II, and intermediate in the 
other two quadrants. 
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Figure 4.1. Appropriate organizational forms for system firms to develop 
complementary products 
 
The newer the system, the higher will be the ownership by the system firm, and the newer 
the complementary product, the lower the ownership by the system firm. Ownership by 
the system firm is therefore highest in Quadrant I, lowest in Quadrant IV, and intermediate 
in the other two quadrants. In each quadrant we illustrate the degree of involvement of the 
system firm that meets these conditions.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
Sample and data collection 
We tested the hypotheses in the Dutch mobile telecommunications industry. The mobile 
telecommunications industry is particularly suitable for this purpose since the technology 
develops at high speed, and thus a relatively high number of examples of completely new 
systems are available. Moreover, mobile services are complementary products of 
telecommunication systems with markets of their own, and thus are appropriate examples 
of complementary products for the purpose of this study. Mobile telecommunications 
systems consist of a physical transmission network such as GSM, GPRS or UMTS4, 
                                                          
4 GSM: Global System for Mobile Communications; GPRS: General Packet Radio Service; UMTS: 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. 
    
M
a
tu
re
 
I 
Intermediate integration;  
High degree of ownership  
by system firm 
 
System firm develops system and finances 
complementary product development. 
Specialized producer of complementary 
product performs the development 
activities under contract with the system 
firm 
 
II 
Low integration; 
Intermediate degree of ownership  
by system firm 
 
System firm provides system. 
Complementary product firm performs 
complementary product development tasks 
within functional departments. System and 
complementary product firms share the 
costs and benefits 
 
C
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 
pr
o
du
ct
 
N
o
v
el
 
III 
High integration; 
Intermediate degree of ownership  
by system firm 
 
Internal development by system firm with 
external funding by complementary 
product firm, or independent organization 
in which system and complementary 
product firm co-finance complementary 
product development 
IV 
Intermediate integration; 
Low degree of ownership  
by system firm 
 
System firm and complementary product 
firm co-develop complementary product.  
Complementary product firm finances 
complementary product development 
 
  Novel Mature 
  System 
73
 63 
middleware, and complementary products such as handsets and services. ‘Middleware’ 
refers to the software and protocols that facilitate the operations of the network and that 
specify interfaces between the network and the other complementary products. Usually, 
newly introduced networks provide tailor-made middleware, whereas over time telecom 
operators introduce standard so-called platforms for the connection of services such as I-
Mode and Vodafone live!  
 
Mobile services refer to the user applications available on mobile networks. Examples are 
location-based services, mobile games, ringtones and mobile office applications. We 
consider the physical network and the middleware to be the system, and mobile services to 
be the complementary products. Telecom operators develop or implement networks and 
middleware, and thus are system firms. Both telecom operators and specialized service 
firms, for instance ringtone providers or banks, can develop the services. 
 
Our sample consisted of thirty mobile service development projects that were executed in 
the Netherlands in 2001 and 2002, and for which data were collected in 2002/2003. The 
dataset included projects covering a wide range of both services and network and 
middleware technologies. Furthermore, the projects covered all five Dutch mobile telecom 
operators and numerous service firms, ranging from those dedicated to mobile applications 
to those with core activities in other markets, such as a retail bank. The projects ranged in 
size from fewer than five people to two hundred people, and in duration from less than a 
month to well over a year. 
 
We studied each project in a structured interview with the project manager(s). For each 
project performed in a single firm the project manager completed a questionnaire. If a 
project was executed by two or more firms, we interviewed the project manager of the 
most important telecom operator and the most important service firm. If two project 
managers were interviewed, we took the mean of the results. During the interview, the 
respondent first completed the questionnaire in the presence of the interviewer. Next, we 
discussed the project with the respondent to make up a case report, which served as 
additional backup qualitative data.  
  
Measurement of variables 
We measured the variables in our hypotheses using four-point and five-point scales. 
System novelty and complementary product novelty were each measured by a single item. 
To capture system novelty we asked for the degree of standardization of the platform to 
which the mobile service was connected. Platforms define the interfaces which connect the 
network and the services, and, as indicated in the theory section, the novelty of these 
interfaces is the most important aspect of system novelty. The platform standardization 
scale ranged from ‘no standardization’ to ‘a very high degree of standardization’. 
Complementary product novelty was measured by asking for the novelty of the service 
features to consumers. This scale ranged from ‘no new service features’ to ‘very new 
service features’. The absence of new service features indicated that the mobile service 
was a close copy of a service that was already being offered either in the mobile market or 
in other markets, and hence provided no new functionality. 
 
74
 64 
The level of integration between the development activities for the system and 
complementary product was measured on a five-point scale. A score of 1 indicated the 
lowest level of integration, which represented internal development of the mobile service 
by a service firm, independently of the telecom operator’s network development activities. 
A score of 2 indicated that a telecom operator and a service firm had an alliance to develop 
the service, with each of the partners performing their tasks internally. Consequently, this 
involves only a minor degree of integration between the service firm and the telecom 
operator. An alliance between a service firm and a telecom operator was characterized by 
a score of 3 when a dedicated service development unit included personnel from both 
partners. A score of 4 represented internal service development by a telecom operator, but 
in such a way that the service development tasks were performed independently of the 
system development tasks. The highest level of integration - indicated by a score of 5 - 
referred to the situation in which the telecom operator developed the service internally in 
such a way that personnel from the network department and the service development task 
worked together. Ownership by the system firm was measured by the relative amount of 
investment made by the telecom operator in the service development project. This variable 
ranged from ‘no investment’ to ‘all the investment’. 
 
To measure governance misfits, our framework defined that the appropriate level of 
integration (Appropriate I) in complementary product development projects increased with 
the novelty of both the system and the complementary product. Hence, we calculated 
Appropriate I as the sum of system novelty and complementary product novelty (Equation 
1 below). Furthermore, we stated that the appropriate degree of ownership by the system 
firm in complementary product development projects (Appropriate O) should increase 
with system novelty and decrease with the novelty of the complementary product. Hence 
we calculated Appropriate O as system novelty minus complementary product novelty 
(Equation 2 below). 
 
In line with Naman and Slevin (1993) we defined integration misfit (Misfit I) as the 
absolute difference between the actual and the appropriate levels of integration (Equation 
3 below). Similarly, ownership misfit (Misfit O) was the absolute difference between the 
actual and the appropriate levels of ownership (Equation 4 below). Also following those 
authors, we used the standardized values of the appropriate and actual levels of integration 
and ownership. Several authors have applied more simple binary scales for fit or misfit 
(e.g. Burton et al., 2002), but at the expense of a loss of information. Since we assume that 
the performance implications of the two types of misfit reinforce each other, we included 
the interaction term (Misfit I * Misfit O) in the analysis. Our treatment of misfits is 
summarized as follows: 
 
(1)  Appropriate I  =   System Novelty + Complementary Product Novelty  
(2)  Appropriate O  =   System Novelty – Complementary Product Novelty 
(3)  Misfit I   = | Actual I – Appropriate I | 
(4)  Misfit O  = | Actual O – Appropriate O | 
 
The dependent variables in our hypotheses are project and market performance. Informed 
by previous studies (e.g. Griffin, 1997; Kessler and Bierly III, 2001; Tatikonda and 
Montoya-Weiss, 2001), we measured each variable by five items, each of which was on a 
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five point scale. Each item reflected actual performance relative to expectations as 
perceived by the respondent. This use of subjective performance evaluations is in line with 
the literature (Blindenbach-Driessen et al., forthcoming). The lowest score represented 
very disappointing performance, a medium score meant that the performance lived up to 
expectations, and the highest score indicated performance level well beyond expectations.  
 
The five items that we used to measure different attributes of project performance were (1) 
cost efficiency, (2) budget performance, (3) quality of execution, (4) time-to-market, and 
(5) adherence to interim deadlines. Varimax rotated principal axis factoring revealed two 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. These two factors accounted for over seventy 
percent of the total variance. To increase reliability and to reduce the number of dependent 
variables, we aggregated the items into these two factors. The first factor clearly referred 
to the financial performance of the development project (Items 1 and 2). We therefore 
labeled this factor project efficiency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.6). The second factor contained 
the non-financial criteria for project performance (Items 3, 4 and 5). We labeled this factor 
project timeliness (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7), since two of the items (time-to-market and 
adherence to project deadlines) are clearly related to the speed of the development project, 
and the third item, quality of the project’s execution, also affects project speed since it 
facilitates decision-making and communication. Table 4.2 presents the factor loadings. 
 
Table 4.2 Factor Loadings for Performance Indicators 
Project Performance  Market Performance 
 Items 1 2  Items 1 2 
Efficiency  .645  User satisfaction  .808 
Budget  .687  Reliability .482  
Quality  .604   Number of users .731  
Time-to-market .737   Revenues .715  
Deadline 
.681   Growth .902  
Loadings below 0.35 are excluded. Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotations converged in 3 iterations. 
 
The market performance items asked for the degree to which the service could meet 
expectations regarding: (1) number of users for the service, (2) revenues, (3) growth of the 
service, (4) user satisfaction, and (5) reliability of the service. A varimax rotated principal 
factor analysis revealed two common factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. These 
factors explained over seventy percent of the total variance. The first factor, Item 4 or user 
satisfaction, had a factor loading of 0.8. This factor was therefore simply labeled as user 
satisfaction. We aggregated three of the remaining four items into a second factor. 
Because the item concerning reliability showed a relatively low factor loading (lower than 
0.5), we decided to remove it from further analysis. This significantly improved the 
internal consistency of the factor and increased the level of explained variance to over 
eighty percent. Furthermore, the three remaining items (Items 1, 2, 3) clearly pointed 
toward the commercial performance of the service. Therefore, we labeled this factor 
commercial performance (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.8). 
 
 
 
76
 66 
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
                  
 
 Variable Mean S.D.  1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7. 
   
                1.  System Novelty  2.10 0.96               
2.  Comp Product Novelty 2.87 0.87 - 0.05             
3.  Integration 
2.13 
1.14  0.15 - 0.30           
4.  Ownership 2.13 1.40 - 0.13 - 0.10  0.49***         
5.  Project Efficiency 2.92 0.71  0.08 - 0.31* - 0.16 - 0.54***       
6.  Project Timeliness 2.97 0.79  0.14  0.06 - 0.33* - 0.40**  0.35*     
7.  Commercial Performance 2.78 0.94  0.24  0.14 - 0.20 - 0.33*  0.15  0.32   
8.  User Satisfaction 3.55 0.85 - 0.07  0.17 - 0.14  0.11 - 0.11 - 0.11  0.13 
Pearson, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, N=30 (N=28 for correlations with 7. CP and 8. US). 
 
4.5 Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 4.3. The table shows a high 
correlation (r=0.49) between the two dimensions of organizational form (integration and 
ownership), but each variable still reflects considerable unique information. The sample 
varied with respect to novelty. Taking the middle of the novelty scales as the demarcation 
between novel and mature, we had 11 projects for new and 19 for mature 
telecommunication markets, and we had 19 projects developing services in new service 
markets, and 11 projects developing services for mature service markets. The sample also 
varied regarding the degree of ownership by the telecom operator (system firm). Fifteen 
projects were financed and executed by service firms (complementary product firms) 
without any involvement of a telecom operator. Twelve projects were financed and 
performed by a telecom operator in an alliance with a service firm. Three projects were 
completely financed by a telecom operator.   
 
To test our hypotheses we performed a stepwise regression analysis. For each of the four 
dependent variables we studied three models (see Table 4.4). Model 1 includes integration 
and ownership to investigate their direct effects. In Model 2 we added the misfit measures 
related to these two organizational dimensions to test whether they negatively influence 
performance (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Model 3 adds the interaction term of the two types of 
misfit to test whether they reinforce each other (Hypothesis 3). To mitigate the 
multicollinearity problem for this interaction term we mean-centered the Misfit I and 
Misfit O variables. The resulting variance inflation factors were well below the acceptable 
value of 2.5. For each regression analysis we ran an additional model that incorporated 
project duration as a control variable. This variable failed to reach significance and is 
therefore not included in the models presented below. 
 
Table 4.4 presents the results of the regression analyses. Model 1 significantly explains 
project timeliness and indicates that ownership by the telecom operator has a direct 
negative effect on project timeliness (p<0.10). This is a consistent finding as it also 
appears in Model 2 and Model 3. The misfit variables fail to explain project timeliness. 
Ownership is also negatively related to project efficiency (p<0.01) Adding the misfit 
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variables and their interaction term does not significantly improve the explanation of 
project efficiency. 
 
Model 1 has only weak explanatory power with regard to commercial performance 
(R2=0.11). Again we find a direct negative effect of ownership on the dependent variable 
(p<0.10). The explanatory power is strongly improved by adding the misfit variables. 
Ownership misfit is significantly and negatively associated with commercial performance 
(p<0.10), which supports Hypothesis 2. Supporting Hypothesis 3, we find a significant and 
negative interaction term (p<0.10). Finally, the explanatory power for the regression 
analysis explaining user satisfaction is limited, and the misfit variables are insignificant. 
In sum, the results show partial support for our hypotheses. We do not find support for 
Hypothesis 1, which stated that integration misfit has a negative effect on project 
performance. Hypothesis 2 stated that ownership misfit negatively affects market 
performance. Our results indicate that ownership misfit is negatively and significantly 
associated with commercial performance. We therefore consider Hypothesis 2 to be 
supported. Finally, Hypothesis 3, regarding the effect of the interaction between 
integration and ownership fit on project and market performance, is also supported for 
commercial performance. 
 
Table 4.4 The performance effects of organizational forms and misfit 
 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, a N=30, b N=28, probabilities for the misfit variables are 1-sided. 
Unstandardized coefficients are presented. 
 
4.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, we developed a framework for the most appropriate degree of involvement 
of system firms in complementary product development, based on life cycle considerations 
for the system and its complementary products. We postulated that, because of information 
and transaction costs, integration between development activities of the system and the 
complementary product has a positive effect on performance under higher degrees of 
novelty of both the system and complementary product. Moreover, we postulated that 
when a system is novel relative to the complementary product, ownership by the system 
firm has a positive effect on performance since it creates better conditions to create 
installed base. In the opposite situation, when the complementary product was new relative 
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to the system, we expected that ownership by a complementary product firm has a positive 
on performance. We defined measures of misfit in terms of the deviation between the 
actual degree of involvement of the system firm in the complementary product’s 
development and the postulated degree of involvement, based on novelties of the system 
and complementary product.  
 
We find some significant effects of misfit on performance. In line with our assumptions, 
ownership misfit appears to have a significant and negative effect on commercial 
performance (Model 2). We also find support for the expected interaction between 
integration and ownership misfit (Model 3). We find no significant effects of misfit with 
respect to integration. However, almost all the results concerning integration misfit 
provide directional support for our hypotheses.  
 
While integration does not show a clear direct effect on performance, we find a significant 
direct negative effect of ownership on project and commercial performance. The financial 
involvement of the system firm consistently deteriorates performance, irrespective of 
novelty conditions. A possible explanation refers to the size of system firms. The literature 
shows that employees of large firms often do not have the proper incentives to pursue 
innovations on products that have low revenue potential compared to the existing product 
(Chandy and Tellis, 2000; Christensen, 1997). This is clearly the case for system firms, for 
which complementary products have lower revenue potential than the systems that they 
exploit. Moreover, Ahuja and Lampert (2001) have pointed to the rigidities of a large 
organization in exploring new technologies as a consequence of its learning concerning 
past technologies (a form of path dependence). These rigidities will be reflected in slow 
decision-making and low commitment in radical innovation activities. The financial 
participation of the large system firm in complementary product development will be 
accompanied by participation in decision-making and control of the project, which will be 
adversely affected by such rigidities. Thus, the size of system firms may explain why their 
financial participation negatively affects the performance of complementary product’s 
development instead of helping it. 
 
A question of course is how the misfit effect and direct effect of ownership integration 
relate to each other. The misfit effect indicates that ownership should be chosen contingent 
on the novelty of the system and complementary product. The direct effect indicates that 
there is a ‘one best way’ of low system firm ownership, irrespective of novelty. In Figure 
4.2 we show the total effect of ownership and ownership misfit on commercial 
performance for different situations of novelty of the system and complementary product. 
The figures are based on Model 2, assuming that the value of the integration variable in 
each quadrant conforms to our model. 
 
We find a clear negative total effect in the lower right quadrant (Quadrant IV), in which 
low ownership by the system firm has the best performance effects. This confirms our 
assumption that for the development of a new complementary product for a mature 
system, ownership by the system firm should be low. In the upper left quadrant (Quadrant 
I) the direct effect and the misfit effect cancel each other out. In other words, the novelty 
of the system requires a high degree of ownership by the system firm, particularly to create 
an installed base for the new complementary product, but the inherent disadvantages of 
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these large firms cancel out the advantages of high ownership. In the other two quadrants, 
where we had expected an intermediate degree of ownership by the system firm, results 
indicate that ownership should be between low and intermediate. Within this range, 
ownership has no effect on performance. 
 
Figure 4.2 The effect of ownership by the system firm on commercial performance 
 
Our results with respect to direct effects and misfit effects put the contingency view that is 
behind our model into perspective. The partial confirmation of our hypotheses is in line 
with a contingency view, but there is also some support for a ‘one best way’ approach, 
according to which specific elements of an organizational form have a specific effect on 
performance (in our case the negative effect of ownership by large system firms) 
irrespective of the novelty of the system and complementary product. The best solution so 
far is a combination of the two perspectives, which is illustrated by our interpretation of 
the results in Figure 4.2. 
 
This chapter makes some important contributions. The study takes market dynamics into 
account for the choice of organizational forms for complementary product development. 
So far, the literature has mainly considered organizational forms for the choice of 
components (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Gulati and Singh, 1998), whereas we 
developed a model for the choice of organizational form for the development of 
complementary products. Our approach considers the required alignment between system 
and complementary product, but adds considerations of the market alignment of the 
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complementary product to both the system market and its own market. In this respect, we 
build on the literature on network markets in our assumption that the creation of an 
installed base in novel markets is an important requirement to be met in the choice of 
organizational form for the development of complementary products, and that accordingly 
the type of firm that is in control of the innovation project should be based on these 
relative novelties. The importance of this aspect is emphasized by the fact that we do not 
find support for our hypothesis regarding the required alignment between system and 
complementary product (Hypothesis 1), but that we do find support for the hypotheses 
based on considerations of market alignment (Hypothesis 2 and 3). 
 
Our results have several implications for the practice of system and complementary 
product development. Our results show that system firms should take the novelty of the 
system and complementary product into account in their decisions on their degree of 
involvement in the development of complementary products. Particularly when the system 
is mature and the complementary product new, the system firm could better leave 
complementary product development to specialized external firms, which are in that case 
better positioned to create installed base for the complementary product. In other cases, the 
system firm can choose its degree of involvement between low and either medium or high, 
dependent on novelty conditions.  
 
The implications for mobile telecom operators include that they should seriously consider 
more participation in service development than is usual at this moment. Today at least, 
most European telecom operators prefer to rely on the market for the development of 
services, since they themselves lack the required resources and capabilities. Our results 
show that under conditions of network novelty, telecom operators should participate in the 
development of services. Recently, some European telecom operators have changed their 
strategy, internalizing service development to some extent.5 
 
Although mobile telecom operators often create a ‘walled garden’ for service providers 
and users, we expect that these implications also hold for other types of system firms in 
which these walled garden may exist to a less pronounced extent. Examples include video 
game console manufacturers that may financially support the creation of dedicated games 
for their new consoles, developers of web applications that can provide early users with 
incentives to contribute to their sites6, and supermarket chains introducing new product 
scanning technologies that provide incentives to suppliers to include this complementary 
technology in their products. Also in such industries and cases the success of the system 
and complementary product are mutually dependent. Consequently we may assume that 
the reasons for the influence of novelty conditions on the appropriate degree of system 
firm involvement equally hold.   
 
Our study faces certain limitations. First, the two measures of organizational form are 
rather close to each other. For future research it would be useful to develop more detailed 
and distinct multidimensional measures for organizational characteristics (Jaspers and Van 
                                                          
5
 Today, France Telecom develops the majority of its mobile services internally. 
6
 For instance, the open innovation website Fellowforce provided financial compensation in its early 
period to people who recruited new members. 
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den Ende, 2006). Moreover, and despite the fact that most of the single-item scales 
measure fairly concrete objects and attributes (Rossiter, 2002), in future research the use 
of multi-item scales and multiple respondents would provide more valid and reliable 
results and prevent common method bias, although we expect that it is unlikely that the 
ratings of our respondents were structured by implicit theories concerning our rather 
complex misfit expectations (Podsakoff et al., 2003). To increase the validity of our data 
collection, we did personal interviews at the location of the interviewees. Moreover, since 
this study aimed to do a pilot, the number of cases was limited, but in a future full-scale 
study we intend to collect a larger sample, increasing the reliability of the measures. 
 
Second, in the case of mobile telecommunications, we considered the system to comprise 
the physical network and the middleware, and to be developed by telecom operators. Since 
new middleware is sometimes developed for an existing network and existing middleware 
can operate on new networks, the network and the middleware can better be considered as 
two parts of the system. In our case studies, it appeared that independent IT firms involved 
in middleware development had participated in the service development project. These 
firms can be included as a second category of system firms.  
 
Finally, while we focused on novelty, other factors such as resources, experience of R&D 
management, capacity, size of the system firm and market demand may also influence a 
system firm’s involvement in complementary product development. Resources may be 
influential due to the relatively poor financial situation of Dutch mobile 
telecommunications firms when we collected our data. Most cases in this study referred to 
periods in which the UMTS biddings in the telecom industry had just taken place in the 
Netherlands. These biddings have severely deteriorated the cash position of telecom 
operators, leading to a decreasing ability of telecom operators to participate in service 
development projects. The lack of resources may have increased the degree of misfit in 
our sample and at the same time have strengthened the negative direct effect of ownership 
by the telecom operator on performance. When used as controls in a future full scale study 
with a larger number of cases, these variables may increase the significance of the 
findings.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
In this study, we tested a model for the most appropriate degree of involvement of system 
firms in the development of complementary products, based on the novelties of the system 
and complementary product. In particular, we tested whether misfits between the 
appropriate and actual degree of involvement had negative performance implications, 
where appropriateness depended on novelty. We distinguished two elements of 
involvement: the degree of integration and the degree of ownership by the system firm of 
development activities for complementary products. We tested the framework on a dataset 
of service development projects in the Dutch mobile telecommunications industry.  
 
We found partial support for our hypotheses that the novelty of the system and 
complementary product are determinants of the degree of involvement by system firms in 
the development of complementary products. We particularly found support for our 
assumption that the degree of ownership by the system firm should depend on novelty 
conditions. Moreover, we found a negative direct effect of ownership by the system firm 
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on performance. These results support a combination of the contingency approach 
reflected in our model, according to which the degree of involvement of system firms has 
to be adapted to the specific phases in the life cycles of both system and complementary 
product, and a one best way approach, according to which the involvement of system firms 
should not be too high. The combination of the two approaches is reflected in Figure 4.2. 
 
This study implies for practitioners that performance requires a choice of involvement by 
system firms in accordance with novelty. The often chosen solution by telecom operators 
to outsource service development as much as possible is not necessarily always the best 
one. From the perspective of market performance, the system firm should not be involved 
too much when the complementary product is new and the system mature. In other 
situations the system firm may be involved to some extent, particularly when the system is 
new relative to the complementary product. Taking these novelty contingencies into 
account may improve performance in one of the most difficult environments for 
innovation, that of larger systems. 
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5. How Systems Integrators Organize Component 
Development Projects: Toward a Configurational Theory  
 
 
 
Abstract 
Systems integrators - firms responsible for the design and development of complex 
products - can not develop all components themselves. This chapter addresses the question 
how and when systems integrators need to be involved in component development projects 
themselves and how and when they can rely on external component developers. In this 
chapter we conceptualize the organizational form of component development projects as a 
configuration of four dimensions: (1) the extent that the firm finances the project, e.g. 
internal, collaborative, or external projects; (2) the extent that the firm performs project 
tasks itself or relies on other firms; (3) the extent that the firm coordinates the project to 
align it with other components; and (4) the extent that the firm possesses and absorbs the 
technological knowledge that is used and generated in the project. Based on existing 
literature we build a configurational model that proposes an ideal-typical configuration for 
each of six types of component innovations. To increase our confidence in this tentative 
theory and to refine it, we study thirty development projects of mobile telecommunications 
applications. The results partially support our model and also suggest several adjustments.   
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5.1 Introduction 
Systems integrators - firms responsible for the design and integration of multi-component, 
multi-technology products - are continuously confronted with processes of component 
innovation (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001). For these firms it is an important question how they 
should be involved in these many different development projects and how and when they 
can rely on external component developers. On the one hand, they have to control and 
coordinate component innovation to ensure the integrity of their products, but on the one 
hand they have to rely on external actors, because they do not have the capabilities to 
perform all innovations themselves (Hobday et al., 2005). To deal with this simultaneous 
need for specialization and integration, Brusoni et al. (2001) found that jet engine 
manufacturers ‘know more than they make’. By maintaining and developing deep 
knowledge about externally performed innovations (e.g. by developing the basic design of 
components) these firms were able to coordinate and integrate processes of component-
level change.  
 
Hence, by making a distinction between a system firm’s production boundary and its 
knowledge boundary, and by studying their interplay, Brusoni et al. (2001) were able to 
develop a better understanding of the way these firms manage component innovation. This 
chapter builds on and extends this approach by simultaneously taking into account multiple 
dimensions of the system firm’s organizational form of component development projects. 
More specifically, we draw on several fields of literature, such as transaction cost 
economics (e.g. Williamson, 1985), the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991), 
and organization theory (e.g. Tushman and Nadler, 1978; Thompson, 1967), to 
conceptualize the organizational form of development projects as a configuration of four 
‘dimensions of integration’ (see also Jaspers and Van den Ende, 2006).  
 
First, ownership integration (Robertson and Langlois, 1995) refers to the extent that a 
system firm finances a project and therefore owns its output and is able to control it (e.g. 
Pisano, 1990). This dimension is based on the legal and the transaction cost perspective of 
firm boundaries (e.g. Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986), which is the dominant 
approach to the study of vertical firm boundaries (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005; 
Holmström and Roberts, 1998). Subsequently, as becomes apparent from the literature 
about supplier involvement in NPD, a distinction can be made between the extent that a 
firm finances a project and the extent that a firm performs project tasks (task integration). 
For instance, a firm that fully finances a project might rely more or less extensively on 
suppliers for the execution of project tasks, e.g. ‘black box sourcing’ versus ‘white box 
sourcing’ (Petersen et al., 2005). Knowledge integration refers to abovementioned 
knowledge boundary of the firm. It reflects the extent that a firm possesses and absorbs the 
technological knowledge that is used and generated in a development project. As indicated 
above, a firm might know more than it makes (Brusoni et al., 2001), i.e. the level of 
knowledge integration can exceed the level of task integration. Finally, the dimension of 
coordination integration refers to the degree of information-processing by the systems 
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integrator to achieve unity of effort with the development project (e.g. Tushman and 
Nadler, 1978) Coordination integration is independent from the degree of ownership 
integration (Robertson and Langlois, 1995). Internally financed projects might for instance 
operate very autonomously, whereas the exchange of coordinative information with 
external development projects might be very intense.  
 
Different organizational forms of component development projects arise if systems 
integrators integrate projects to a greater or lesser extent in terms of these four dimensions. 
To illustrate, in between the extreme configurations of fully integrated projects (high levels 
of integration on all four dimensions) and fully disintegrated projects (low levels of 
integration on all four dimensions), a configuration could for instance be a component 
development project that a system firm partly finances (medium ownership integration), in 
which it performs only a few tasks (limited task integration), about which it develops a 
detailed understanding (high knowledge integration), and with which it exchanges a 
considerable amount of coordinative information to make sure that the component fits into 
the larger product (medium coordination integration).  
 
By considering the four dimensions of integration as basic building blocks, our objective in 
this chapter is to develop a normative configurational theory of organizational forms of 
development projects. A first contribution of this study involves that it extends and 
integrates literature about the multiple boundaries of the firm (e.g. Robertson and Langlois, 
1995; Brusoni et al., 2001; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005; Araujo et al., 2003). Although the 
dimensions of integration are based upon existing literature, to our knowledge no prior 
studies exist that have incorporated all four dimensions of integration in one 
comprehensive model. In the context of new product development projects, we aim to do 
so by adopting a configurational approach.  
 
This configurational approach in itself can be seen as a second contribution of this chapter. 
Only few configurational theories exist in the field of innovation management, even 
though these theories can result in valuable insights about synergistic effects between 
concepts (see Chapter 2). These insights have both theoretical and practical value. 
Theoretically, these insights pertain to the interrelationships between concepts that are 
usually treated as factors with independent, linear effects. In our case we are for instance 
able to integrate the fields of literature from which the four dimensions of integration 
originate (e.g. transaction costs economics, the resource-based view, and organization 
theory). In terms of practical relevance, the insights from this study come closer to the 
reality of practitioners, who have to consider multiple organizational dimensions 
simultaneously rather than in isolation (George and Bennett, 2005). As illustrated above, 
the configurational approach allows us to conceptualize in great detail the richness of 
organizational forms as they occur in practice. 
 
A third contribution of this study involves that our unit of analysis is the development 
project. Assisted by the availability of data at this level of analysis, many studies on the 
boundary of the firm for innovation take a firm-level perspective. These studies for 
instance consider the extent that a firm applies make, buy, or ally in order to get hold of 
innovations. However, theory and data at the project level are likely to provide richer 
insights (Veugelers and Casssiman, 1999), because this is where innovation actually 
86
 76 
occurs. Coupled with our configurational approach, this study is uniquely designed to 
conceptualize the organizational form of NPD projects and to investigate its performance 
implications.  
 
To achieve our theory-building objective, this chapter takes two steps in the iterative cycle 
of moving between theory and data (Eisenhardt, 1989). First of all, we build a tentative 
model that – from the perspective of a systems integrator – proposes an ideal-typical 
organizational configuration for six different types of component development projects. 
Following configurational logic, we expect that fit between the type of innovation and its 
organizational ideal type contributes to project performance. We develop our 
configurational model theoretically, which means that our model does not suffer from 
sample dependence (Miller, 1996, Doty and Glick, 1994; Das et al., 2006).  
 
Secondly, to increase our confidence in the theory and to refine it, we confront our 
tentative model with qualitative data about thirty cases of component development projects 
in the mobile telecommunications industry. Our analysis is based on the principle of 
analytical generalization (e.g. Yin, 2003; Firestone, 1993). To increase the strength of this 
analysis we employ tactics of pattern matching and of theoretical and literal replication 
(e.g. Yin, 2003). Furthermore, we perform within-case analyses to increase the internal 
validity of our findings (e.g. Yin, 2003; Van de Ven, 2007). Our results partly support the 
theoretically developed model as well as suggest several adjustments, such as the 
identification of equifinal organizational forms. This chapter is structured in the following 
way. First of all it introduces the four dimensions of integration. Secondly, existing 
theoretical insights are used to construct an ideal-typical configuration for six different 
types of component development projects. Next, the methodology is discussed, which is 
followed by the case study results. The chapter ends with a discussion and conclusions. 
 
5.2 Theoretical background: four dimensions of integration 
 
Ownership integration 
This section introduces four organizational dimensions of component development 
projects. We position them in existing literature and touch upon their interrelationships. 
These dimensions constitute the basic building blocks of the ideal-typical organizational 
configurations that we will construct in the next section. The first dimension, ownership 
integration (Robertson and Langlois, 1995), refers to the extent that two stages of 
production are under common ownership. This legal-administrative perspective on firm 
boundaries (e.g. Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Novak and Eppinger, 2001) 
plays an important role in many studies on the organization of innovation (e.g. Chesbrough 
and Teece, 1996; Pisano, 1990; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). In this chapter we define 
ownership integration as the extent that the system firm finances a component 
development project. Full ownership typically means that the firm has hierarchical control 
over the project and possesses the exclusive rights to the output of the project. Transaction 
cost economics indicates that external component developers might refrain from 
investments in component development projects if the innovation is highly asset specific, 
i.e. if investments have limited value in other applications because the new component is 
highly customized and adapted to the product system (Williamson, 1985). The system firm 
might thus be forced to finance such development projects internally.  
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The level of ownership integration for a development project is minimal if it is completely 
financed by one or more other firms. As pointed out in the product modularity literature 
(e.g. Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000), low ownership integration allows the 
system firm to benefit from the high-powered incentives of the market, which induces 
rapid and parallel innovation by external specialists (Robertson and Langlois, 1995; 
Brusoni et al., 2001). After the successful completion of an external project, the system 
firm might purchase the component and integrate it in its product. In between the extremes 
of high and low ownership integration, medium ownership integration refers to projects 
where the firm shares investments to a greater or lesser extent with one or more partners, 
i.e. in a new product development alliance (e.g. Gerwin, 2004). 
 
Task integration 
Secondly, task integration refers to the extent that the system firm performs the tasks in a 
component development project. This is distinct from the project’s ownership structure 
(Von Hippel, 1990; Ulrich and Ellison, 2005; Sinha and Van de Ven, 2005). When the 
firm for instance fully finances a project, it has several options with respect to task 
integration. At one extreme, a completely integrated project results if the firm also 
performs all the development tasks (high task integration). This has the advantage that 
appropriation concerns are minimal, because external actors have no direct opportunity to 
absorb critical information. In addition, integrated projects can be controlled and 
coordinated based on authority (Mintzberg, 1979; Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
 
At the other extreme, all development tasks are sourced from external actors if the 
investing system firm adopts a low degree of task integration, i.e. 
commissioned/contracted projects or black box sourcing. In between these extremes the 
firm might rely on external actors for only part of the project’s workload, e.g. white or 
grey box sourcing (Petersen et al., 2005). Supplier involvement in NPD has the advantage 
that the specialized competencies and the incentives of these firms might increase the 
speed and efficiency of the development process (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; 
Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Sheremata, 2000).  
 
Coordination integration 
Robertson and Langlois (1995) used the term coordination integration, our third dimension 
of integration, to refer to the extent of information exchange between two stages of 
production to achieve ‘unity of effort’ (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). In our context, we 
define it as the extent of information exchange between the system firm and the component 
development project to make sure that the component fits into the product system. A high 
degree of coordination integration is needed when the component is highly interdependent 
with other components (Thompson, 1967). In this situation of systemic innovation 
(Chesbrough and Teece, 1996), intense information-processing is needed, for instance by 
means of mutual adjustment and team coordination (Van de Ven et al., 1976; Tushman and 
Nadler, 1978), to make the component compatible with the rest of the product (Daft and 
Lengel, 1986; Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995).  
 
In contrast, a project can be performed without any information-processing (low 
coordination integration) when the new component operates within the limits of existing 
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interfaces (Schilling, 2000; Brusoni et al., 2001). Finally, it is important to note that 
coordination integration and ownership integration are two related, but distinct dimensions 
(Robertson and Langlois, 1995). Information processing occurs within the system firm if 
an internal project is involved, but information processing takes place across firm 
boundaries when external projects have to be coordinated. The extent of information-
processing between the system firm and the component development project reflects the 
strength of the tie between the two (Granovetter, 1985). In this respect coordination 
integration considers issues of embeddedness and integration beyond the distinction 
between market and hierarchy (Stevenson, 2000). 
 
Knowledge integration 
Fourth, knowledge integration refers to the extent that the system firm possesses and 
absorbs the knowledge that is used and generated in a component development project. For 
internally performed tasks the system firm automatically absorbs knowledge as a result of 
learning by doing. The system firm does not automatically learn from projects if task 
integration is low, i.e. if component design and development are performed externally 
(Venkatesan, 1992). Whereas the resource-based view advises firms to focus on its core 
competences and to leave all other activities to external actors (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), 
Brusoni et al. (2001) have shown that system firms might ‘know more than they make’, i.e. 
knowledge integration can exceed task integration.  
 
In a similar vein, Takeishi (2002) indicates that a distinction should be made between task 
partitioning and knowledge partitioning in inter-firm relationships. Firms can for instance 
expand their knowledge boundary by monitoring external component innovations or by 
specifying the basic design of components that are developed externally. The resulting 
internal knowledge of external capabilities helps system firms to access, coordinate, and 
control these capabilities (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Araujo et al., 2003; Tiwana and 
Keil, 2007). For instance, in the absence of formal control over a partner, it might help to 
specify and enforce project outcome controls (Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Brusoni et al. 
(2001) show how systems firms use knowledge about external component innovations to 
ensure the coherence of the product system over time.  
 
Figure 5.1 presents some illustrative configurations of component development projects by 
combining extreme values of the four dimensions. This figure shows some hybrid forms in 
between the extremes of ‘make or buy’, i.e. high values on all four dimensions versus low 
values on all four dimensions, and illustrates some of the interdependencies between the 
four dimensions. For instance, low ownership integration usually means that such 
externally financed projects are also being performed by external actors (the left-hand side 
of Figure 5.1). It is of course possible that the system firm does perform some tasks in 
externally financed projects, such as component testing or assisting in the design of the 
component. In addition, the right-hand side of Figure 5.1 indicates that high task 
integration automatically results in high knowledge integration. This reflects learning by 
doing. 
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Figure 5.1 Illustrative extreme configurations of the four dimensions of integration 
 
 
 
OI=Ownership Integration; TI=Task Integration; KI=Knowledge Integration; CI=Coordination Integration. 
 
5.3 A configurational theory 
In this chapter we conceptualize the organizational form of component development 
projects as a configuration of the four dimensions of integration. In this section we 
distinguish six types of component innovation (see Figure 5.2). Based on existing literature 
we propose an ideal-typical configuration for each of these types. Given that the resources 
of system firms are limited (e.g. Hobday et al., 2005), the guiding principle for the 
development of the ideal types is that these firms should only ‘integrate’ a development 
project if this is likely to provide benefits to the development project (e.g. in terms of 
quality, cost and speed) and/or to the product as a whole that can not be realized by 
external innovation.  
 
The six types of component innovation that we address in this chapter are primarily 
determined by the degree of change of the component’s technological basis and the degree 
of change of interfaces between the component innovation and other components 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). In addition, as far as 
components are based on existing technology, we make a distinction between core 
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components and peripheral components (e.g. Teece, 1996; Gatignon et al., 2002). Below 
we discuss the six innovations in greater detail as we use existing literature to propose 
ideal-typical configurations. Of course it is impossible to include an exhaustive amount of 
theory in this process (e.g. Das et al., 2006). In addition, it is difficult to theorize about 
equifinal organizational forms (e.g. Gresov and Drazin, 1997), especially given the scarcity 
of theory about high-performing configurations (Grandori and Furnari, 2008). Given that 
“(o)ne cannot possibly expect to be comprehensive in developing a taxonomy of 
innovations and organizational archetypes” (Teece, 1996, p.216), our approach is to 
develop only one ideal type for each type of innovation.  
 
Figure 5.2 Six types of component innovation 
 
Incremental innovation of peripheral and core components 
Incremental component innovations have two basic characteristics (e.g. Henderson and 
Clark, 1990; Teece, 1996). First of all, they connect to the product system based on 
existing interfaces. This type of innovation therefore can be implemented without the need 
to adjust other components, i.e. the level of interdependence for this type of innovation is 
low. This means that the system firm does not need to exchange information with other 
component developers to accommodate the integration of the new component. 
Coordination integration for these ‘autonomous innovations’ (Chesbrough and Teece, 
1996) can therefore be low (Robertson and Langlois, 1995). High coordination integration 
would result in higher costs and in the loss of time due to an excessive flow of information. 
Secondly, incremental component innovations are based on existing technology, i.e. the 
degree of technological change is low. This either means that existing technology is used 
to create a new component or that a minor adjustment is made to an existing component. 
The use of existing technology means that technological uncertainty in these development 
projects is low (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996).  
 
For components based on existing technology, Gatignon et al. (2002) make a distinction 
between core components and peripheral components. Core components are strategically 
important to the performance of the product. They are generally based on scarce 
capabilities and tightly coupled to the product, i.e. specificity tends to be high for these 
components, because they tend to be interconnected with other components by means of 
customized interfaces (Teece, 1996; Gatignon et al., 2002). In contrast, peripheral 
components are of limited strategic importance, because they tend to be based on generic, 
readily available technologies and tend to be loosely coupled to the product system through 
only a few standard interfaces (e.g. Venkatesan, 1992; Teece, 1996; Gatignon et al., 2002). 
Typically, components that are based on new technology are strategically important to 
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system firms, because customized interfaces are required to integrate these components 
and because it will not yet be clear how they affect other components. Over time 
technologies mature and interfaces become standardized, thus decreasing the importance of 
the component. This was for instance the case for the digital control systems of jet engines 
(Brusoni et al., 2001). 
 
Based on the abovementioned characteristics, system firms are likely to benefit from the 
high-powered incentives of the market for the development of incremental innovations of 
peripheral components (Type 1 in Figure 5.2). Many external firms will possess the 
required technological capabilities (or have easy access to them) and are likely to feel the 
pressure to exploit these capabilities by developing new components (Robertson and 
Langlois, 1995; Teece, 1996). The system firm therefore does not need to finance and 
perform such projects, i.e. ownership integration and task integration can in general be 
low. In addition, the limited strategic importance of peripheral components means that 
system firms do not need to acquire deep knowledge about these innovations to ensure the 
coherence of their products, i.e. knowledge integration can be low as well.  
 
In sum, we suggest that the ideal-typical organizational configuration for incremental 
innovations of peripheral components consists of low integration on all four dimensions, 
i.e. external projects or ‘outsource everything and anything’ (Teece 1996, p.218). For this 
type of innovation we do not expect that the absence of a system firm negatively influences 
its outcomes, i.e. external specialists do not need the system firm to perform this type of 
innovation fast, cheap, and with high quality. Furthermore, this configuration allows the 
system firm to focus its resources on more important projects. Figure 5.3 indicates for each 
type of innovation the ideal type that results from the theory-building process. Like in 
Figure 5.2, the top-left cell represents incremental innovations of peripheral components. 
 
Figure 5.3 A configurational theory of component development projects 
 
L = Low; M = Medium; H = High 
 
Just as for incremental innovations of peripheral components, we expect that the level of 
coordination integration can be low in the case of incremental innovations of core 
components (Type 3 in Figure 5.2). On the other three organizational dimensions we 
suggest high levels of integration. High ownership integration gives the system firm full 
control over the design and development of these important components. When the firm 
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decides to share project investments with other firms this might result in compromises that 
are not in the best interest of the product as a whole. Typically, control over core 
components provides the basis of a firm’s position as a systems orchestrator (Adner, 
2006). Furthermore, collaboration and contracting with external firms might be difficult for 
this type of innovation, because strategically important and tacit knowledge is likely to be 
involved and because investments tend to be highly specific (Teece, 1996).  
 
In addition, it is likely that the system firm already possesses the strategically important 
capabilities at the start of the development project (Teece, 1996). A combination of high 
ownership integration and high task integration therefore seems appropriate, because this 
provides full control and prevents hold-ups and knowledge spill-overs. Furthermore, high 
task integration means that the system firm is able to exploit these capabilities and that it 
can maintain and improve its knowledge about these important components through 
learning by doing, i.e. high knowledge integration. In sum, the ideal-typical configuration 
for incremental innovations of core components combines low coordination integration 
with high ownership, task, and knowledge integration. A configuration that resembles this 
ideal type would be a unit or team that operates autonomously within a system firm.  
 
Architectural innovation of peripheral and core components 
Architectural innovations are reconfigurations of existing product systems (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990). In terms of component innovation, this means that the technological basis of 
a component remains the same, but that new or radically different interfaces are required to 
connect this component to the rest of the product, for instance because significant changes 
are required to the size and shape of other components. Hence, the implementation of these 
‘systemic innovations’ (Teece, 1996) means that design information has to be exchanged 
extensively between those responsible for interdependent components (Berggren and 
Bengtsson, 2004; Brusoni et al., 2001). In our case, where a systems integrator exists that 
overlooks the coherence of the product as a whole, we assume that this firm takes on the 
responsibility to identify and resolve interdependencies. In line with information-
processing theory we therefore suggest a high degree of coordination integration for this 
type of innovation, e.g. as a result of mutual adjustment or team coordination (Tushman 
and Nadler, 1978; Van de Ven et al, 1976; Barki and Pinsonneault, 2005). Low 
coordination integration would mean that component developers have insufficient 
information about how to align their components with the rest of the product, which might 
result in component malfunctions or even in a product failure.  
 
For architectural innovations of peripheral components (Type 2 in Figure 5.2) we propose 
that ownership integration and task integration can in general be limited. Just as for 
incremental innovations of peripheral components, the system firm can rely on specialized 
external firms to finance and perform this type of innovation without any substantial risk. 
However, to understand the consequences of these innovations, system firms need to adjust 
their knowledge about the affected interfaces. To keep this architectural knowledge 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990) up to date, Brusoni et al. (2001) suggest that system firms 
need to ‘know more than they make,’ i.e. knowledge integration should be high although 
task integration can be low. This knowledge of external activities can help to improve the 
effectiveness of coordination integration (e.g. Argote et al., 2003).  
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In sum, for the development of architectural innovations of peripheral components we 
suggest a configuration of high levels of coordination integration and knowledge 
integration, coupled with low levels of ownership integration and task integration. This 
means that the system firm relies on external innovation, but at the same time - for instance 
by closely monitoring these external innovation processes - the firm is ‘cautious’ 
(Chesbrough and Teece, 1996) regarding the coherence of its product. Hence, the firm is 
able to coordinate component changes if needed. 
 
Architectural innovations of core components (Type 4 in Figure 5.2) involve components 
that are based on existing technology, but that interconnect with the product system by 
means of new or significantly altered interfaces. Furthermore, these innovations are 
strategically important to the performance of the larger product. System firms are therefore 
likely to possess a detailed understanding of these components and how they relate to other 
components, and they are likely to feel the need to control the development of these 
components (Teece, 1996). By performing these innovations internally, i.e. high task and 
ownership integration, the firm can exploit its capabilities and at the same time maintain 
full control over the component and how it interconnects with other components.  
 
This integrated approach also has the advantage that it prevents spillovers of strategically 
important knowledge, and it also results in the automatic absorption of the newly created 
architectural knowledge. This architectural knowledge enables the firm to effectively 
coordinate systemic changes with internal or external actors responsible for interdependent 
components (Brusoni et al., 2001). The ideal-typical configuration that fits best with the 
characteristics of this type of innovation thus consists of high levels of integration on all 
four dimensions. An example could be an internal unit that performs the incremental 
adjustment of the core component and that extensively coordinates interface changes with 
internal and/or external units responsible for interrelated components.  
 
Modular component innovation 
Modular innovations are based on new technology, but they comply with existing 
interfaces (Henderson and Clark, 1990). A modular component innovation (Type 5 in 
Figure 5.2) either replaces an existing component or adds an entirely new element to the 
product. Like incremental innovations, modular innovations operate within the limits of 
existing interfaces and can therefore be integrated into the product with limited or no 
coordinative effort from the system firm. Coordination integration can therefore be low. 
The development of technologically new components is a highly uncertain task. To solve 
technical problems efficiently and fast, the modularity literature stresses the benefits of 
external organization and specialization for this type of innovation (Baldwin and Clark, 
1997; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000). Facilitated by established interfaces, 
firms can seek flexibility by letting others take the risks in these highly uncertain 
development activities (Sanchez, 1995; Lambe and Spekman, 1995). This allows a system 
firm to benefit from trial and error and idiosyncratic learning at specialized component 
developers without having to internalize the technology (Robertson and Langlois, 1995; 
Geyskens et al., 2006). This division of labor, which is commonplace in for example 
biotechnology and aerospace networks (e.g. Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Brusoni et al., 
2001), results in economies of specialization that system firms can not realize on their 
own.  
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Although external projects bring specialization benefits, system firms need to closely 
monitor these dispersed innovation efforts (Brusoni et al., 2001). Uneven rates of progress 
at the component level might result in technical imbalances that could influence the 
performance of the product as a whole (Rosenberg, 1976). Brusoni et al. (2001) therefore 
suggest that firms need to know more than they make for this type of innovation in order to 
understand its system-wide implications and to be able to coordinate changes of other 
components if needed. Hence, for the purpose of systems integration the level of 
knowledge integration needs to be high. In sum, the configuration that seems to fit best 
with the characteristics of modular component innovation consists of low integration in 
terms of coordination, task execution, and ownership, but of high knowledge integration. 
In other words, this configuration requires the system firm to install mechanisms to 
monitor external projects.  
 
Radical component innovation 
Radical component innovations (Type 6 in Figure 5.2) involve the development of new 
interfaces and of components that are technologically new. First of all, high coordination 
integration is of course needed to accommodate this systemic innovation. Secondly, we 
suggest a high degree of ownership integration for radical component development 
projects. External firms might not be willing to commit themselves to these highly 
uncertain projects, because they are characterized by both high technological uncertainty 
and high asset specificity (e.g. Geyskens et al., 2006).  
 
In terms of task integration, system firms are faced with a ‘learning dilemma’ (John et al., 
2001). On the one hand, firms may want to perform radical innovations themselves to fully 
control and understand their design and development. On the other hand, they could 
benefit from external sources to solve technical problems faster, cheaper, and better 
(Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Sheremata, 2000). As a compromise, we propose a 
medium level of task integration. This allows the firm to perform the most crucial tasks 
internally, such as the design of the component, and at the same time it allows the firm to 
benefit from external expertise and creativity. Although collaboration may be difficult for 
uncertain projects such as these, for instance because of honest differences of opinion 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998), a high degree of ownership integration provides the firm with the 
authority to - if needed - prevent and resolve costly and time-consuming disputes ‘by fiat’ 
(Tadelis, 2002). At the same time, coordination can be achieved by means of direct 
supervision (Radner, 1992; Hoetker, 2005).  
 
Finally, the system firm is likely to acquire in-depth knowledge of radical component 
innovations, because they can have important consequences for the system as a whole. For 
the tasks the system firm performs itself, high knowledge integration automatically results. 
For the tasks performed externally, the firm’s hierarchical control as a result of high 
ownership integration enables it to closely monitor them. In combination with the firms 
existing architectural understanding, this newly generated knowledge about this innovation 
also facilitates the extensive coordination that is needed to effectively align the component 
with the rest of the system. In sum, we propose a highly integrated organizational form for 
radical component innovations, with a medium degree of task integration. This indicates 
internal projects (as a result of high ownership integration), that are strongly coordinated 
and monitored, and that are partly performed by external specialists.  
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5.4 Method 
 
Analytical generalization 
Above we have followed a theoretical approach to propose a configurational theory of 
organizational forms for component development projects. As part of the further theory-
building process, it is our objective to increase our confidence in this tentative theory and 
to further refine it using case study research (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989). For this purpose, our 
application of case study research is based on the principle of analytical generalization 
(Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Firestone, 1993). To increase our confidence in the validity 
of a theory this approach entails that “a previously developed theory is used as a template 
with which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin, 2003, p.32-33). When 
comparing expectations with case study findings it has to be recognized that cases differ in 
their potential to provide evidence that supports a theory.  
 
In principle, a single case provides support for a theory (but not definitely proves it!) if this 
case has an outcome that would be predicted by the theory. This support would be 
particularly strong if such a case is at the same characterized by values on other 
explanatory variables that would predict a completely different outcome, i.e. a least-likely 
case (Gerring, 2007; George and Bennett, 2005; Jaspers, 2007). In contrast, most-likely 
cases can only provide weak support for the validity of a theory because they are from the 
outset most likely to corroborate the theory, i.e. confirmation here merely means that the 
theory has survived a ‘plausibility probe’ (King et al., 1996). However, a failure to observe 
the expected outcome for most-likely cases would seriously damage our confidence in the 
theory (Markus, 1989; Gerring, 2007). For deterministic and precisely formulated theories, 
which are very rare in the social sciences (Mohr, 1982), a single (crucial) case can even 
decisively falsify the theory (Gerring, 2007). In sum, findings from individual cases can 
increase our confidence in a theory to the extent that they are more or less likely to show 
the predicted outcome, i.e. to the extent that they are difficult tests. When a case supports 
the theory, analytical generalization - at the very least - means that we can expect the 
theory to hold in cases that are (almost) similar (Yin, 2003; Firestone, 1993).    
   
Of course our confidence in the validity of a theory grows stronger if we are able to 
replicate findings in multiple cases (Yin, 2003; Dul and Hak, 2008; Jaspers et al., 2008). In 
addition to replication with very similar cases, another tactic to increase our confidence in 
the validity of a theory is to analyze cases that are completely different and for which we 
would therefore expect different outcomes, i.e. theoretical replication (Yin, 2003). Hence, 
it is of great importance for replication logic to select cases on theoretical grounds 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). To the extent that multiple cases also support the theory 
under different scope conditions, the generalizability of the theory increases as it can be 
expected to hold in a wider domain (Firestone, 1993; Dul and Hak, 2008). It is important 
to stress that analytical generalizability also applies to other research methods, such as 
surveys and experiments. The results from surveys for instance need to be replicated in 
surveys on other populations to increase our confidence in the validity of the theory in its 
theoretical domain (Dul and Hak, 2008).  
 
The abovementioned ideas about analytical generalization are based on the principle of 
‘pattern matching’ (Yin, 2003). This means that cases are compared with a theoretical 
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expectation in terms of (a pattern of) scores on the independent and the dependent variable. 
In addition to this approach, another tactic to increase the analytical insights that can be 
gained from case studies is to perform within-case analyses. These are able to provide 
evidence about the causal mechanisms that contribute to a certain outcome. This evidence 
from a lower level of aggregation (King et al., 1994) has the potential to increase our 
confidence in the causality that is assumed by the theory (Van de Ven, 2007). Such within-
case analyses allow us to ‘trace the causal process’ (George and Bennett, 2005) and to 
‘elucidate the causal mechanisms’ (Gerring, 2007), i.e. it facilitates ‘explanation building’ 
for the benefit of internal validity (Yin, 2003).  
 
In this chapter, detailed analyses of individual cases provide an excellent opportunity to 
increase our understanding of the inner-workings of configurations. Although this can be 
considered as theory-building ‘at a lower level of aggregation’ (King et al., 1994), our 
main interest is to use within-case analysis to refine our theory at its current level of 
analysis (i.e. configurations of the four organizational dimensions) and to increase our 
confidence in it (see also Chapter 2). More specifically, we compare in this chapter the six 
ideal types with a convenience set of thirty component development projects (these cases 
were analyzed quantitatively in Chapter 4). First of all, we classified these cases as one of 
the six types of innovation. For each type of innovation, the configuration as presented in 
Figure 5.3 shows the organizational configuration that we expect to find for each 
individual case. For each case we compare its observed organizational configuration with 
its expected configuration and for each case we perform a within-case analysis.  
 
Based on configurational logic (Doty et al., 1993; Doty and Glick, 1994), we expect that a 
situation of perfect fit (i.e. when an observed instance perfectly resembles its respective 
ideal profile) contributes positively to project performance. Given the large number of 
factors that possibly influences project performance, we do not propose that perfect fit is 
sufficient for high project performance, but we do propose that it makes high project 
performance more likely. Obviously, case study research is unsuitable to determine the 
extent that fit contributes to performance, i.e. the size and strength of its causal effect, but 
within-case analysis does make it possible to show how fit contributes to performance, i.e. 
it can show that the ideal type ‘works’ (George and Bennett, 2005). Besides pattern-
matching and a within-case analysis, we perform a cross-case analysis for all the cases that 
classify as the same type of innovation. To the extent that more cases confirm the ideal 
type (replication) we are able to increase our confidence in the theory.  
 
In principle, we can expect that deviation from the ideal type has a negative effect on 
project performance. However, given the possibility of equifinality, cases that deviate from 
the proposed ideal type might also point to an alternative high-performing organizational 
form (without reducing our confidence in the viability and the appropriateness of the 
original ideal type). All in all, the case study research that we are proposing can be seen as 
a step in the iterative cycle of moving between theory and data (Eisenhardt, 1989) in the 
development of a configurational theory.  
 
Data and measurement 
The unit of analysis in each of the thirty cases is the organizational form adopted by a 
Dutch mobile telecommunications operator for the development of a value-added mobile 
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application. Examples of such applications are mobile games, mobile office applications, 
and mobile payment services. These software products can be considered (complementary) 
components of the larger mobile telecommunications product system, which for instance 
also consists of mobile handsets, various content platforms and protocols (SMS, MMS, i-
mode, etc.), and the mobile telecommunications network itself (switches, base stations, 
etc.). This context is very suitable for our study. First, mobile operators can be considered 
systems integrators for mobile applications. These firms own and operate the networks that 
enable mobile applications and because of their need to recoup investments in licenses and 
infrastructure, they have a great interest in the generation of a wide variety of value-added 
applications. Because of rapid changes in network technologies and protocols, these firms 
play a central role in the coordination and integration of mobile applications.  
 
Secondly, we are able to keep many factors constant by focusing on one type of 
component and on one specific product system and industry. In addition, mobile 
applications are not typical physical components that are sold as integral parts of a larger 
product (such as car parts). Instead, mobile applications have a market of their own, 
because mobile users typically have the option to use or to subscribe to specific value-
added services or not, i.e. these applications are complementary (software) components of 
the mobile telecommunications system. For this type of component we might expect that 
additional factors play a role in determining the organizational form of mobile operators. 
Chapter 4, for instance, argues that the involvement of operators depends on the need to 
create an installed base for the network as well as for the application itself. This makes it 
more likely that our case study analysis provides rich insights, because we focus on an 
empirical setting that might be considered closer to the boundary of the theoretical domain 
of our configurational model than regular component development projects, i.e. our setting 
is less-likely to corroborate the theory. 
 
Third, the mobile industry is very innovative, which allowed us to select projects that 
differ considerably in terms of the type of innovation. In addition, the projects vary 
significantly in terms of their organizational forms. They range from fully integrated by 
mobile operators to fully disintegrated, i.e. external innovation by independent third 
parties, such as financial institutions, game developers, and news agencies. In addition, our 
set of cases includes projects from all five mobile network operators that were active in the 
Dutch mobile market at the time of data collection (2002-2004). The projects range in size 
from fewer than five people to 200 people, and in duration from less than a month to over a 
year. Table 5.1 gives a short overview of the projects. 
 
For each case the project manager acted as the key informant. At the time of the interview, 
each project was completed less than a year before. For several projects we interviewed 
project managers from the different participating firms. In a semi-structured interview each 
respondent was interviewed during at least one hour. Right after the interviews the field 
notes were converted into case reports. For some cases additional information was 
collected in follow-up telephone interviews. To increase the richness of the data we 
promised respondents not to disclose the names of firms or applications.  
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Table 5.1 Brief description of the thirty applications and their organizational form 
 
Mobile application Brief description of the organizational form
Case 1 A text-messaging service for groups Internal development by an IT firm with its own platform 
Case 2 An SMS-based dating application Internal by a start-up firm with its own SMS platform
Case 3 An MMS greeting card service Internal development by a start-up
Case 4 A voice-response service to remotely control a web page Internal by an operator-independent IT firm
Case 5 A mobile payment terminal Internal by an electronic payment service provider 
Case 6 A MMS communication service Internal by a start-up firm with its own text messaging platform
Case 7 An location-based game using GPS and WAP External development by a start-up and a platform owner
Case 8 An SMS-based multiplayer game External development by a start-up 
Case 9 A WAP-based directory service Internal by the directory company 
Case 10 A text-messaging service for groups An autonomous unit of a mobile network operator 
Case 11 An on-line photo management application Internal by an operator together with its platform supplier
Case 12 An SMS-based lottery service An alliance between an operator and a lottery firm
Case 13 A mobile Internet chat application Collaboration between an operator and a broadcasting organization
Case 14 A mobile e-mail application facilitating attachments Collaboration between an operator and an external developer
Case 15 SMS content messages Internal by a mobile network operator
Case 16 A mobile office application based on GPRS An alliance of an operator, a PDA developer, and a software firm 
Case 17 An SMS application to report the status of security personnel An alliance between an operator and an security system provider 
Case 18 Mobile Internet route planner Collaboration between an operator and a route planner developer
Case 19 A mobile office application based on GPRS Internal by an IT service provider
Case 20 Mobile video on demand Internal by a small and operator-independent IT firm 
Case 21 A mobile ticketing application An alliance between an IT firm and a train company
Case 22 A mobile parking application External development by a start-up
Case 23 A mobile banking application External development by a start-up
Case 24 Car navigation based upon real-time traffic information IT firm Internal by a motorists’ association
Case 25 A track-and-trace application An alliance of an operator, a security agency, and a software firm
Case 26 A mobile personal assistant service An alliance by an operator and its spin-off 
Case 27 A network-specific notification service A spin-off from a mobile operator
Case 28 A mobile patient management system Collaboration between a mobile operator and an ASP
Case 29 A mobile banking application An alliance between an operator and a retail bank
Case 30 A content SMS application based on a new platform Internal by a hardware and systems integrating company
 
 
During the semi-structured interviews we addressed the organization of the development 
project (i.e. the four dimensions of integration), the characteristics of the innovation itself 
(e.g. technical novelty, interface change), and project performance. Based on the 
qualitative data that we obtained we rated our variables of interest ourselves. For some 
variables we could validate our ratings using the quantitative data that we obtained at the 
start of each interview using a self-completion questionnaire (see Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
Ownership integration and task integration were for instance measured on a five-point 
scale ranging from a score of 1 (the operator did not invest in the project/performed no 
project tasks) to a score of 5 (the operator made all investments itself/performed all project 
tasks). A score of 3 referred to the equal division of investments and project work load 
between the operator and its partner firm(s).  
 
We rated ownership integration and task integration as low when the operator did not 
invest in the project or did not perform any project tasks (these ratings corresponded to 
scores of 1). Both variables were rated as medium to indicate that the operator performed 
or financed at least some part of the project up to half of the project (these ratings 
corresponded to scores of 2 and 3). We rated ownership integration and task integration as 
high when the operator financed or performed considerably more than half of the project or 
the entire project (corresponding to scores of 4 and 5). In 6 out of the 60 ratings the 
quantitative data were not in line with our qualitative ratings. For these instances we had 
clear qualitative evidence to deviate from the quantitative score as indicated by the 
respondent. In two cases (Case 2 and Case 8) the respondent for instance indicated that an 
operator financed part of the project (scores of 2). However, these investments involved 
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the costs for the first commercial implementation of wholesale applications. The actual 
development of these applications was however financed completely by external 
application developers (i.e. low ownership integration).  
 
In principle, knowledge integration was assigned the same rating as task integration 
because of learning by doing. However, for nine projects we found qualitative evidence 
that the operator developed a detailed understanding of the application although it did not 
perform all project tasks, i.e. high knowledge integration. This evidence, for instance, 
involved the operator asking (ex ante) if it were possible to get access to the insights and 
the lessons learned from the (external) project (Case 19), but in most cases the operators 
‘knew more than they made’ because of their involvement in the basic design of the 
application, in application testing, and/or because of project monitoring. 
 
In terms of coordination integration we rated twenty-two projects as low. In fifteen of 
these projects no operator was actively involved and there was as a result no coordination 
between the project and an operator. In the remaining seven projects an operator was at 
least to some extent involved in terms of ownership integration and/or task integration, but 
this involvement did not pertain to the exchange of coordinative information. In these 
seven projects the interface specifications were clear from the outset in these projects. In 
five cases coordination integration was rated as high, because an operator was heavily 
involved in establishing interface specifications and in making sure that the network would 
accommodate the application. In three of these cases interfaces were established in close 
collaboration with external application developers (Case 17, Case 18 and Case 28), and in 
two cases (Case 15 and Case 27) the application was developed within a mobile operator, 
i.e. coordination integration involved frequent communication between different internal 
units. Finally, in the three remaining cases coordination integration to accommodate the 
implementation of the application was medium. In Case 16 and Case 29 the managers from 
the operator indicated that information exchange with external actors was limited and far 
from extensive. In the third case, Case 30, the project manager from an external developer 
stated that there had been some, but limited contact with operators for the implementation 
of the application.  
  
Figure 5.4 presents how the thirty projects are allocated to the six types of innovation. This 
figure also shows the ideal profile for each type of innovation (taken from Figure 5.3) and 
for each case this figure reports its observed profile in terms of the four dimensions of 
integration. As can be seen from Figure 5.4 our set of cases contains eight incremental 
peripheral component innovations, only one architectural peripheral component 
innovation, five incremental core component innovations, four architectural core 
component innovations, eight modular component innovations, and four radical 
component innovations. Below we outline the measures that we used to classify the thirty 
cases into the different types of innovation. 
 
In total, twelve projects were concerned with the development of applications that were 
technologically new, i.e. modular component innovations and radical component 
innovations. These applications involved new pieces of hardware (e.g. a GPS tracking 
device that included a data only SIM card), new pieces of software (e.g. a technology to 
transform live television streams into a mobile format), and/or technologically new 
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interfaces within the application itself (e.g. a mobile banking application that integrated a 
customized mobile handset and a banking system).  
 
Figure 5.4. An overview of ideal and observed configurations 
 
OI=Ownership Integration; TI=Task Integration; KI=Knowledge Integration; CI=Coordination Integration;  
L = Low; M = Medium; H = High. 
 
The remaining eighteen projects involved incremental and architectural innovations. These 
innovations were incremental adjustments of existing applications or new applications that 
were based on technological capabilities that were familiar to the project team. Nine of 
these applications can be considered core applications and the other nine can be considered 
peripheral applications. Core applications are tightly coupled to the mobile network and/or 
strategically important to the operator (e.g. Gatignon et al., 2002). Tightly coupled 
applications involve applications that interface directly with multiple mobile network 
elements, such as switches and billing systems, by means of customized interconnections. 
Case 15, Case 16, Case 17, and Case 18 involved the creation of new and tailor-made 
interfaces. Case 18 for instance involved a specific interface with the operator’s billing 
system and Case 17 involved customized SIM cards. In addition, Case 13 and Case 14 
were tailored to one specific mobile network using the operator’s proprietary standard. 
These integral applications could therefore not be readily implemented on other networks. 
Furthermore, in our set of cases several projects were regarded as highly important by the 
operator. These projects for instance served to increase the operator’s innovative image 
(Case 12), to generate additional revenues (Case 10 and Case 15), to attract users for a new 
network technology (Case 11, Case 13, Case 14, and Case 18), or to build a footprint in a 
new user segment (Case 16). In contrast, eight cases (Case 1 - Case 8) use standard and 
open communication protocols and are of limited strategic importance to the operators. 
Mostly, these peripheral applications interconnect with application platforms using only a 
single interface). Case 9 is neither strategically important nor customized, yet it does 
involve radical change to network interfaces. 
 
In the questionnaire we also asked respondents about the novelty of the interface(s) 
between the application and the mobile network. This allowed us to determine the degree 
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of interface change, i.e. the vertical axis of Figure 5.4. Nine projects involved new 
interfaces or the radical adjustment of existing interfaces, i.e. the architectural and the 
radical innovations. The remaining twenty-one projects operated within the limits of 
existing interfaces, such as those specified in protocols like SMS, WAP, MMS, and i-
mode, and in network technologies like GSM and GPRS. These projects involve 
incremental and the modular innovations.  
 
Finally, we discussed several dimensions of project performance with our informants, such 
as the speed of the development project, the project’s adherence to budget goals and 
interim deadlines, and the quality of the application. We could complement these 
qualitative insights with quantitative data from the questionnaire about the extent that 
performance in terms of each dimension was below, in line with, or beyond expectations.  
 
5.5 Results 
In this section we report the findings for each type of innovation. Given space limitations 
we focus on the most insightful within-case findings and on the results from cross-case 
analysis. Figure 5.5 on the next page illustrates the results as it shows whether - and if so 
how - the findings cause adjustments to the theoretically developed configurational theory 
(as displayed in Figure 5.3).  
 
Type 1. Incremental innovation of peripheral mobile applications 
Eight cases fit this type of innovation and they all perfectly resemble the ideal profile of 
low values on all four dimensions, i.e. development projects without any involvement of a 
mobile operator. In line with our expectation these ‘perfect fits’ generally performed very 
well. Given the generic technologies and the standard interfaces involved, the innovators 
could successfully develop and implement the applications without the support of mobile 
operators. As far as performance was somewhat disappointing, this was not due to the 
absence of a mobile operator. One project manager for instance indicated that project 
efficiency was somewhat disappointing, because project members communicated too 
frequently (Case 2). Another manager was disappointed with project speed as a result of a 
slow regulatory certification process (Case 5). Collectively, these eight replications 
increase our confidence in external innovation as a viable configuration for the 
development of incremental innovations of peripheral components. Hence, there is no need 
to adjust the original ideal profile (see Figure 5.5). 
 
Type 2. Architectural innovation of peripheral mobile applications 
Only one case involved the development of an architectural innovation of a peripheral 
mobile application (Case 9). In this project a mobile Internet version was developed of an 
already existing directory service. The alignment of the application with the mobile 
network was an uncertain task however, because the application had to be adapted to the 
specific requirements of each new mobile handset that supported the WAP (Wireless 
Application Protocol) mobile Internet technology. At the time of this project, WAP was 
still a very new technology. In line with the ideal profile, this project was financed and 
performed without the involvement of a mobile operator (low ownership integration and 
low task integration). And in line with what we might expect, the application developer (a 
directory firm) was able to successfully develop this straightforward application.  
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The development of the interfaces was another story though. The directory firm had 
designed the application with limited specificity in order to make the application available 
through multiple mobile networks. However, at the request of a pioneering operator the 
application was initially included in the new mobile Internet portal of this operator. This 
operator collected the specifications of new mobile phones itself (high knowledge 
integration), but it did not communicate this architectural knowledge to external 
developers (low coordination integration). The operator was of the opinion that developers 
had to acquire handset specifications themselves. However, the directory firm decided not 
to invest in the collection of information about how to connect new mobile phones. As a 
result, the application worked on just a few handsets and malfunctioned on many others.  
 
In line with what we might expect, this case shows that the absence of coordination 
integration reduced the quality of the application (and therefore also the quality of the 
operator’s portal). The project manager from the directory firm indicated that the 
application would have been regularly updated should the directory firm have had easy 
access to the right information. In sum, the operator could have prevented the limited 
performance of this project by communicating the architectural knowledge it possessed 
anyway, i.e. by taking on a more active role as a systems integrator. The required high 
degree of knowledge integration was present, but without a high degree of coordination 
integration this does not contribute to project performance. On the contrary, this deviation 
from the ideal profile shows exactly the type of interface problems that we would expect. 
This case therefore supports the originally proposed ideal profile.   
 
Figure 5.5 The refined configurational theory of component development projects 
 
L = Low; M = Medium; H = High. 
 
Type 3. Incremental innovation of core mobile applications 
Five cases fit into this category of technologically straightforward, yet strategically 
important (all five) and network-specific (Case 11, Case 13, and Case 14) innovations. One 
of them (Case 10) perfectly resembles the ideal profile of low coordination integration and 
high levels of ownership integration, task integration, and knowledge integration. This 
project was performed by a team within the R&D unit of a mobile operator. This operator 
considered this application strategically important because of its strong potential to 
increase the operator’s revenues by allowing groups of people to exchange text messages. 
The application used straightforward SMS interfaces, which meant that the team could 
easily implement the application without any communication with units responsible for 
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other network elements. In line with our expectations for this ‘perfect fit’ the project 
manager indicated that the project was performed successfully and that it resulted in a 
high-quality application.  
 
The other four projects all deviate from the ideal profile, but still performed in line with 
expectations. Next we discuss these four cases in some greater detail to investigate why 
these deviations occurred and why they did not coincide with disappointing performance. 
First of all, we expected to observe high task integration for these projects, but in all four 
projects the operator performed only part of the project workload (medium task 
integration). In Case 11 the operator collaborated with an IT platform supplier with whom 
the operator had a long and a strong relationship. Considerable trust therefore existed 
between both firms and the supplier could effectively contribute to the project because of 
its detailed understanding of the operator’s application platform. Case 12 and Case 13 
involved applications that the operators considered strategically important, but these 
applications heavily relied on complementary assets owned by external actors, i.e. a lottery 
firm and a broadcasting organization. The active involvement of these firms was therefore 
more efficient and effective than full task integration (and duplication) by the operator. In 
Case 14 the operator attempted to develop the application internally, but because of 
technical problems it approached a web agency to continue the project. In sum, in all four 
projects an external actor was involved to some extent because of the operators’ 
expectation that this would contribute to the project’s performance. 
 
In addition, in all four projects the operators performed only those tasks that enabled them 
to develop a detailed understanding of the project. These tasks for instance involved the 
basic design of the application and application testing. In addition to this selective type of 
task integration, in each project the operator closely monitored the detailed design and 
programming work that was performed by their partners. In Case 13 the operator for 
instance communicated with its partner on a daily basis and in Case 14 the operator tested 
and discussed the latest version of the application once a week. Hence, despite only a 
medium level of task integration, knowledge integration in all four projects was high. Note 
that communication between the operator and its partners did not serve the purpose of 
coordination integration, because in each project the network interfaces already existed and 
remained stable. Instead, the high degree of knowledge integration contributed to the 
operators’ ability to control these projects in the absence of high task integration. 
 
For three projects this ability to exercise control was especially important given the 
absence of the expected high degree ownership integration. The operator in Case 11 did 
finance the project itself, but in Case 12 the operator financed the project only in part 
(medium ownership integration), and in Case 13 and Case 14 the external actors even 
financed the entire project (low ownership integration by the operator). In Case 13 and 
Case 14 the operator allowed these external actors to finance the entire project, because 
these projects used the operator’s proprietary mobile Internet standard. In combination 
with their high degree of knowledge integration, this allowed the operators to strongly 
control these projects. In Case 12 the application was not specifically tailored to the 
operator’s network, which might explain why the operator at least in part invested in this 
project.  
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Then the question remains why the operators’ partners were willing to participate and 
invest in these projects even though these projects were heavily controlled by the 
operators. In Case 12 and Case 13 the operators’ partners were willing to invest in the 
project because they wanted to exploit their complementary brand names and their 
customer base in the mobile market. In Case 14 the application developer met the request 
of the mobile operator to finance the entire project, because it hoped to perform projects 
for this operator in the future. In this regard, this firm took for granted that it would not 
make a fair return on this project,  
 
All in all, whereas Case 10 illustrates that the ideal type of autonomous internal projects 
provides an appropriate organizational setting to execute this type of innovation, four 
replications suggest that monitored collaborative projects (i.e. high knowledge integration 
coupled with medium task integration and possibly even with low ownership integration) 
constitute a suitable alternative. This alternative allows operators to benefit from the 
expertise, the (complementary) resources, and the incentives of external actors, while they 
are still able to strongly control the development process. We can therefore extend our 
model for this type of innovation with an equifinal organizational configuration of low 
coordination integration, medium task integration, and high knowledge integration that can 
be coupled with various degrees of ownership integration (see Figure 5.5).  
 
Type 4. Architectural innovation of core mobile applications 
Four projects classified as architectural innovations of core components. The ideal profile 
for these projects is high integration on al four dimensions. Case 15 perfectly resembles 
this ideal profile of fully integrated projects. In this case an operator financed and 
performed the creation of new and specific interfaces between several of its network 
elements to make it possible for mobile users to send and receive content text messages, 
such as news alerts and ringtones. Ownership integration and task integration are therefore 
high. There was also considerable information exchange between the different internal 
units that were responsible for the network elements that were affected by this project 
(high coordination integration). Because the operator already possessed the relevant 
technologies itself, and because it performed and coordinated all project tasks, the degree 
of knowledge integration can be considered high as well. The team for instance developed 
detailed knowledge about how to adjust the network elements as a result of the intensive 
internal coordination effort. 
 
However, despite this perfect fit, Case 15 experienced severe problems with the 
development of the interfaces for this network-specific application. According to the 
project manager, external specialists should have been involved in the project, such as a 
developer of SMS centers. Although the operator did possess all the relevant network 
elements, the operator lacked a detailed understanding of these pieces of equipment at the 
start of the project. The operator managed to develop internally the necessary architectural 
knowledge, but this required much more investments than expected and the quality of the 
resulting interfaces was disappointing. According to the project manager the quality of the 
interfaces would have been better should one or more external component specialists have 
performed part of the development project. In other words, ex post there was a high degree 
of knowledge integration, but at the start of the project the degree of knowledge integration 
was limited. In this situation, a medium degree of task integration, i.e. cooperation with 
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external specialists, seems appropriate, because this would have increased the degree of 
knowledge integration at the beginning of the project. 
  
The other three cases seem to corroborate this view. In Case 16 an operator developed a 
mobile office application that consisted of several off-the-shelve hardware and software 
components, such as PDAs and synchronization software. A substantial part of the project 
involved adjusting these components to tailor them to the operator’s network. The operator 
performed these interface tasks all by itself (high task integration) based on only limited 
information exchange with its suppliers (medium coordination integration). The operator 
managed to develop the required interfaces, but according to the project manager the 
project performed below expectations. The operator lacked the detailed expertise of its 
component suppliers that could have helped to develop the interfaces fast and efficiently. 
A medium degree of task integration therefore, coupled with a high degree of coordination 
integration with the suppliers, is likely to have resulted in better project performance. This 
would have been in line with the original plan for this project, which was to arrange an 
alliance between the operator and its suppliers. In the end, the operator’s (large-sized) 
suppliers were hardly committed to this project, which forced the operator to go it alone.  
 
Unlike Case 15 and Case 16, Case 17 and Case 18 did involve the active participation of 
external specialists in the application development project. In each project an external actor 
applied its specific expertise to successfully perform a part of the development project 
(medium task integration). Hence, these cases show that external specialists, in the absence 
of a knowledgeable operator, can help to prevent disappointing project performance. In 
addition, we find that these external actors financed respectively part of the project 
(medium ownership integration) and the entire project (low ownership integration). In line 
with our findings for incremental innovations of core components, we find that the 
operators in both Case 17 and Case 18 aimed to control these collaborative projects by 
performing tasks selectively, for instance by designing and developing the interfaces, in 
order to build a detailed understanding of the project (high knowledge integration). In 
addition, the operators had further possibilities to control these projects because they of 
course owned the networks to which the applications had to be customized. In Case 18, 
progress by the application developer was for instance fully dependent on operator 
approvals.  
 
In sum, the four cases suggest an organizational form that is different from the original 
highly integrated organizational form. The cases indicate that monitored and coordinated 
collaborative projects, i.e. high knowledge integration, high coordination integration, 
medium task integration, and possibly medium or low ownership integration, provide the 
ingredients for an organizational form that contributes to project performance. This new 
configuration assumes however that the operator lacks a detailed ex ante understanding of 
the technologies involved. This is why the involvement of external specialists can be 
beneficial. The assumption for the original ideal profile was that the operator does possess 
a detailed understanding of the technologies involved. In this regard, Case 15 perfectly fits 
the original ideal profile, but it does not meet the assumption of high ex ante knowledge 
integration. Hence, this case can not be considered to disconfirm the original ideal profile. 
Instead, we consider this case as support for the new profile. Because of the different 
assumptions for the original and the new organizational configuration, we depict them both 
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in Figure 5.5. In our dataset we have no cases that allow us to qualify the appropriateness 
of the original ideal profile. 
 
Type 5. Modular mobile application innovation 
Eight projects were technologically new and could be implemented using existing 
interfaces. One of these cases (Case 19) perfectly resembled the ideal profile of monitored 
external projects, i.e. low degrees of ownership integration, task integration, and 
coordination integration, and a high degree of knowledge integration. The operator in this 
case realized a high degree of knowledge integration because it got access to the lessons 
learned in this external development project. The operator wanted to use this expertise in 
the future development of its own mobile office application. Hence, the high degree of 
knowledge integration did not contribute to the performance of this specific project of Case 
19. Given that Case 19 lived up to its expectations, this suggests that the ideal-typical 
organizational form for modular component development projects can be adjusted to a 
configuration of full disintegration on all four dimensions of integration.  
 
Five of the remaining seven projects in fact resemble such a completely disintegrated 
organizational form. Three of these projects (Case 20, Case 21, and Case 22) performed 
very well and therefore support the idea that it is perfectly possible for external innovators 
to develop a modular component innovation without a high degree of knowledge 
integration from the side of an operator. The other two fully disintegrated projects (Case 23 
and Case 24) performed very badly, because both projects required significantly more time 
and financial resources than expected. However, supporting the configuration of full 
disintegration, the within-case analyses for these two cases did not reveal that the 
disappointing performance was due to a lack of operator involvement and knowledge. 
Arguably, both cases were technically the most ambitious projects of the five ‘perfect fits’ 
and at the same time they were initiated by firms with the least capabilities, i.e. a small 
start-up and a motorists’ association without any IT-related NPD experience. It can 
therefore be no surprise that these projects failed. 
 
In sum, from the perspective of operators, external innovation appears a viable and an 
attractive organizational form, because external firms appear to be willing to take 
substantial risks to realize this technologically ambitious type of innovation and they can 
succeed without any operator involvement. The originally proposed high degree of 
knowledge integration by a mobile operator does not appear to be important to successfully 
complete this type of innovation project. In line with these findings we can adjust the 
configuration to low values on all four dimensions (see Figure 5.5). However, as shown by 
Case 19, a high degree of knowledge integration might still have important long-term 
benefits for operators.  
 
Unlike the six prior projects, Case 25 and Case 26 actively involved mobile operators in 
terms of ownership integration and task integration. These projects therefore substantially 
deviate from the adapted ideal profile of full disintegration. Both cases are different from 
the six cases above however, in that the operators actively participated in these projects for 
its learning and long-term benefits. The operators did not have a great interest in the 
performance of these two projects themselves and for the completion of these projects they 
relied as much as possible on external actors. This is in line with the rationale for the ideal 
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type of full disintegration.  
 
In Case 25 the operator performed part of the project’s tasks and was responsible for part 
of the required investments (medium levels of task integration and ownership integration). 
This involvement from the operator mainly pertained to the development of an innovative 
component of this mobile application (a data only SIM card). In future projects other 
application developers could use this component to develop many other applications 
without the active involvement of the operator. The operator therefore participated in this 
specific project for its long-term effects. In a similar vein, the operator in Case 26 
developed a technologically uncertain application within its research division, but 
externalized the new technology as soon as it got patented. Hence, besides the 
configuration of disintegration on all four dimensions we also find evidence for a 
configuration with substantial operator involvement. We have included this possibility in 
Figure 5.5, but we have to take into account that this configuration serves to promote the 
operator’s learning and long-term interests, rather than project performance. In this respect, 
this additional organizational configuration is not really an equifinal organizational form. 
 
Finally, we would like to elaborate on an additional insight from the within-case analysis 
of Case 26. The operator financed and performed the initial development of this innovative 
application, and once this was completed, an autonomous spin-off was created that 
invested in the further development of the application. Ownership integration for the 
project as a whole was therefore medium. The operator performed almost all development 
tasks however (high task integration), because the spin-off contracted the additional 
development work to finalize and further improve the application from the operator’s 
research division. In fact, the spin-off had no other choice, because it was highly dependent 
on the knowledge and the expertise of operator’s technicians. These specialists still 
operated within the operator however, and once they had initially designed the application 
and externalized it, they had much less incentives to optimize the application. According to 
a director from the start-up, the resulting lack of commitment and responsibility from the 
operator’s technicians - as they gave priority to internal projects - meant that the platform 
malfunctioned for a long time because essential redesigns were not completed in time. This 
provides a fine illustration of the operator’s long-term focus for these projects. 
 
Type 6. Radical mobile application innovation 
Four projects classify as radical component innovations. None of the four projects that 
classified as a radical component innovation match its ideal profile of high levels of 
integration in terms of ownership, knowledge and coordination integration and medium 
task integration. The medium degree of task integration was proposed as a compromise 
between the need for high task integration (to fully control proprietary and tacit know-
how) and the possibility to benefit from external resources to reduce the significant 
uncertainties in this type of innovation. The organizational form of Case 27 almost 
matches this ideal profile as it consists of high levels of integration on all four dimensions. 
This application was developed internally by the research division of a mobile operator. 
The fact that this application was developed by a research division and that the operator 
wanted to patent the underlying application platform might explain the full internalization 
of the project, i.e. the desire to learn and the need to prevent knowledge leakage was high. 
The application that resulted from this project performed as intended, but we can not 
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exclude the possibility of course that the involvement of external actors could have 
reduced for instance the project’s costs. As soon as the application’s technology was 
patented, an independent start-up licensed the operator’s platform to commercialize it. 
 
Case 30 deviates substantially from the ideal-typical configuration, since operator 
involvement in this project was very limited, i.e. it was financed and performed without 
any substantial operator involvement (low ownership integration and low task integration). 
The project involved the first application of a completely new text messaging platform. 
This platform made it possible to exchange content messages, whereas text messages used 
to involve only person-to-person messages. The platform and the application were 
developed mainly by a technology company that used to produce SMS centers and that 
used to consult operators with the implementation of this equipment. Hence, this company 
labels many of its activities as ‘systems integration’. By developing this platform it wanted 
to become a service company that takes an intermediary role in between operators and 
content providers. At the time - according to the project manager - operators were hardly 
aware of the opportunity to generate revenues with content messages.  
 
The operators did communicate with this technology company to interconnect the 
platform, but this was very limited since the technology company - as a systems integrator 
- understood in great detail the needs of the operators (medium coordination integration). 
Neither did the operators develop any detailed understanding of the service platform (low 
knowledge integration), as they felt no urgency to introduce this type of application. The 
development of the first pilot application for this platform was very costly, but in terms of 
quality it performed very well. Hence, this case indicates that radically new applications 
can be successfully developed in the presence of systems integration intermediaries, thus 
reducing the need for operators to become involved in these projects and to coordinate 
them. This challenges our assumption that mobile operators take on the responsibility to 
act as a systems integrator. We elaborate upon this finding below in the discussion section. 
This finding of ‘downstream systems integration’ is included in Figure 5.5 by suggesting 
an ideal type of ‘external, lightly coordinated projects’ (a configuration of low task 
integration, low ownership integration, low knowledge integration, and medium 
coordination integration).  
 
Case 28 and Case 29 were both performed only in part by mobile operators themselves 
(medium task integration). This is in line with our expectation that external actors should 
be used to assist in the successful completion of this complex type of innovation. Both 
projects also involve external investments however, which reduces the control of operators 
over these projects (medium ownership integration). Next we discuss these two projects in 
some greater detail. Like Case 30, Case 28 involves the development of an application as 
an integral part of a new platform development project. The majority of the detailed 
development work was performed by an IT company that wanted to become a wireless 
application service provider. The platform was connected to one mobile network, and its 
operator was also involved in the project, i.e. it financed part of the project (medium 
ownership integration), it participated in the design of the application and in project tests 
(medium task integration), and it was closely involved in its coordination (high 
coordination integration). Because of its coordinating role (e.g. integrating for instance the 
activities of several hardware providers) and its involvement in application tests, the 
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operator also obtained a detailed understanding of the application (high knowledge 
integration). The project performed very well. It was for instance completed much faster 
than expected.  
 
Case 29 involves an alliance between a mobile operator and a retail bank for the 
development of a mobile banking application (medium ownership integration and medium 
task integration). For the operator it would not have been possible to develop this 
application on its own because it lacked any detailed banking expertise and capabilities. 
The operator was not involved in the design phase and during the detailed development 
phase sub teams from both firms often operated autonomously. Furthermore, cultural 
differences between the two firms resulted in substantial communication barriers. Hence 
the level of coordination integration was medium and also knowledge integration was 
restricted (medium knowledge integration). As we might expect for this type of innovation, 
the project was confronted with significant interface problems in the absence of intense 
coordination integration. The interdependencies between the banking systems and the 
telecommunications network were for instance completely underestimated and large 
uncertainty existed about whether and how the activities of both actors would be aligned.  
 
The project required much more financial resources than expected and the project also 
failed to meet most project milestones. To improve the security of the interfaces between 
the mobile network and the banking system it was for instance necessary to develop a 
customized SIM card. During the process the bank took on more and more responsibilities 
from the operator, because the bank had an important deadline to make (it wanted to use 
the application as a summer gift to its users) and because it did not want to damage its 
strong image with a malfunctioning application. The operator also felt the urgency to 
realize this application, but substantially less than the bank. The operator’s main objective 
was to attract new users with this application. Coupled with the differences between the 
telecommunications industry and the highly regulated financial services industry, which 
strongly emphasizes security, this meant that the operator was less concerned than the bank 
about the quality and the security of the application and its network interfaces.  
 
In sum, Case 28, Case 29 and Case 30 show that external actors possess relevant skills and 
resources to help perform development projects of radically new components. In addition, 
Case 28 shows that a combination of high knowledge integration and coordination 
integration can help to prevent architectural problems and provides the operator with 
control over these projects, thus partly substituting the loss of formal control based on 
project investments. In this respect, Case 29 shows that insufficient coordination 
integration causes interface problems. We adjusted our ideal type accordingly (see Figure 
5.5) by including an organizational form of monitored and coordinated collaborative 
projects (high knowledge integration and coordination integration, coupled with medium 
ownership integration and task integration).  
 
5.6  Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter deals with the decisions of systems integrators (i.e. firms responsible for the 
development and the integration of product systems) regarding their involvement in the 
development of components for their products. Whereas most studies on the organization 
of innovation consider the extent that a firm sources its technology and innovations 
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internally, externally, or through alliances, we extend the literature that focuses on the 
organizational form of specific innovation projects (e.g. Pisano, 1990; Veugelers and 
Cassiman, 1999). Furthermore, we move beyond the dominant focus on the decision 
between make, buy, or ally (ownership integration) by also considering: the actual 
integration of project tasks by the system firm (task integration); the project’s integration 
by the system firm in terms of coordination (coordination integration); and the extent that 
the system firm possesses and develops a detailed technological understanding of the 
project (knowledge integration). 
 
By considering the organizational form of component development projects as 
configurations of these four dimensions of integration, we extend the existing multi-
dimensional conceptualization of organizational forms in the systems integration literature 
(Brusoni et al., 2001). Our configurational approach materialized as we proposed an ideal-
typical configuration for each of six different types of component innovation. In spite of 
the tentative nature of this configurational model, which we developed based on existing 
theoretical insights, our case study analysis was largely unable to disconfirm the claim that 
the ideal types are suitable to deal with the challenges and the characteristics of their 
respective component development projects. Overall our case study analysis provided no 
grounds to change four of the six initially formulated ideal types. The other two ideal types 
were adjusted only slightly based on the case study findings. In addition, our case study 
analysis identified several equifinal organizational forms.  
 
The resulting refined configurational model (Figure 5.5) suggests that organizational forms 
for component development projects need to be tailored to the project’s characteristics and 
that multiple ways exist to achieve this objective. This supports prior contingency models 
(e.g. Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Teece, 1996; Brusoni et al., 2001), adds project-level 
empirical substance to this field, and indicates the existence of internally consistent 
configurations. We for instance found that operators for several types of innovation 
complement collaborative projects with selective task involvement and with high 
knowledge integration. This adds to existing literature about how ‘excessive’ knowledge 
plays a role in the innovation process (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2001; Tiwana 
and Keil, 2007). Below we discuss our findings in greater detail. We start with the ideal 
types that were left unchanged and then move on to the ideal types that we slightly adapted 
and finally we address the new equifinal configurations. After that we reflect on our 
methodology, pinpoint limitations, and suggest opportunities for future research. We end 
with managerial implications. 
 
Unchanged ideal types 
In terms of the unchanged ideal types we found first of all that the ideal types for the 
development of incremental innovations of peripheral components (Cases 1-8) and core 
components (Case 10) constituted organizational forms that are appropriate for the 
execution of these projects. They contributed to project performance and/or they were 
beneficial to the interests of the systems integrator in general. All nine cases were perfectly 
in line with the ideal type. Individually, these cases therefore have limited potential to 
increase our confidence in the ideal types.  
 
However, coupled with the within-case evidence, the eight replications for incremental 
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innovations of peripheral components strongly increase our confidence in this ideal profile 
as an appropriate organizational configuration. All eight cases show that external actors are 
able to successfully complete this type of component development project. Of course this 
is a very straightforward type of innovation, which suggests that also operators themselves 
(in highly integrated organizational forms) are able to perform this type of innovation. 
However, the fact that our set of cases did not include any projects with operator 
involvement is in line with our expectation that operators focus their activities on more 
important and more difficult innovations that are less likely to be generated externally. In 
fact, external developers might well perform projects of this kind better than operators 
because the existence of a separate market for value-added mobile applications provides 
them with strong incentives to develop new applications. In addition, as shown by our 
cases, this external innovation by very different firms (e.g. start-ups, IT companies, a 
payment service provider) benefits mobile operators by generating a wide range of mobile 
applications for their networks (e.g. a multi-player game, a location-based service, a dating 
application, a mobile payment application, and a greeting card service). In sum, the 
findings for incremental innovations of peripheral components provide a first and a strong 
indication of the validity of the ideal type and they provide no basis for adjustments.  
 
Supporting the ideal type, we found for architectural innovations of peripheral 
components that deviation from the ideal type contributed to disappointing performance 
(Case 9). More specifically, we found that low coordination integration in the face of 
radical interface change resulted in interoperability problems. More in general, these 
negative effects of insufficient coordination integration appear to be a strong finding, since 
replications in Case 16 and in Case 29 also report interface problems when we observed 
only medium coordination integration. Furthermore, architectural problems were absent in 
the five cases that showed high coordination integration to deal with radical interface 
change (Case 30 involves an exception that will be discussed below). Finally, the four 
cases of architectural innovations of core components were unable to assess the originally 
proposed ideal type. Rather - and as will be discussed below - these four project point to a 
new, equifinal organizational form. As a result, the originally proposed ideal type remains 
unchanged for now. 
 
Adapted ideal types 
Based on our case study results we slightly adjusted the ideal types for modular and radical 
component innovations. For modular component innovations we concluded that low 
integration on all four dimensions is an appropriate organizational form for this type of 
innovation. Case 19 indicates that the originally proposed high level of knowledge 
integration does not appear to contribute to project performance. Instead it appeared to 
serve a long-term learning objective. This suggests an adjustment of the ideal profile to 
low values on all four dimensions. Supporting this view, three projects that perfectly fit 
this adapted ideal profile report high project performance and show no signs of any 
negative effects from having only a low level of knowledge integration. Two other projects 
with low values on all four dimensions performed badly, but for these projects we did not 
find that this was the result of any organizational misfit. Instead, we found rival 
explanations for the failure of these high-risk projects.  
 
We also find support in the literature for this adjustment of the ideal type. A closer look at 
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the systems integration literature reveals that a distinction can be made between static (or 
synchronic) systems integration and dynamic (or diachronic) systems integration (Brusoni 
and Prencipe, 2001b; Prencipe, 2003). Static systems integration focuses on the short-term 
challenge to integrate interdependent components and to maintain a coherent product. 
Hence, a high degree of knowledge integration seems especially relevant for the 
performance of development projects for architectural innovations. On the other hand, 
dynamic systems integration means that knowledge integration should be high to monitor 
technological developments in order to support the design of future component innovations 
and product architectures. This seems especially relevant for modular innovations. Hence, 
a low level of knowledge integration can not be expected to negatively influence the 
performance of modular component development projects, but it could well deteriorate the 
firm’s long term capability to coordinate and to innovate (e.g. Danneels, 2002).  
 
We find that our original ideal type for radical component innovations needs adjustments. 
We initially proposed a highly integrated organizational form with a medium level of task 
integration as a compromise between on the one hand the need to fully integrate tasks to 
prevent knowledge spillovers and to learn and on the other hand the need to reduce 
uncertainty and solve problems by benefiting from the variety provided by collaborating 
with one or more external actors. Not surprisingly we found that a completely integrated 
project performed very well (Case 27). In line with what we might expect we find that 
Case 27 involves the development of a proprietary application for which spillovers have to 
be prevented. Hence, it seems best to split the original ideal type into two ideal types: the 
completely integrated organizational form (Case 27) and a highly integrated organizational 
form with some involvement of one or more external actors. This latter possibility is 
discussed below.  
 
New, equifinal ideal types 
Rather than confirming or disconfirming the original ideal type, several cases suggested 
the existence of alternative organizational forms to deal with the characteristics of their 
respective development projects, i.e. equifinal organizational forms. First of all, an 
important trend across incremental innovations of core components (Case 11 – Case 14), 
architectural innovations of core components (Case 17 and Case 18), and radical 
component innovations (Case 28) involves that operators not always opt for the full 
integration of project investments and project tasks. Instead these seven cases report the 
successful involvement of third parties that executed project tasks and that possibly also 
invested in the project. For operators this first of all reduces their own project investments 
of course. This is of considerable importance to operators, because they tend to have huge 
debts as a result of investments in network licenses and in the deployment of new network 
technologies. In addition, collaboration enabled operators to benefit from the 
(complementary) resources and capabilities possessed by third parties.  
 
At the same time, the operators in these seven cases collaborated very carefully as they 
aimed to extensively control these collaborative projects. We can understand this need for 
control as it is a principle that also underlies the original, highly integrated ideal types to 
protect strategic interests and to reduce appropriation concerns. More specifically, in all 
seven cases the operators aimed to control the projects by maintaining and developing 
substantial knowledge about them. On the one hand, they generated this knowledge by 
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monitoring the project and by communicating intensively with their partners. On the other 
hand, they also achieve a high level of knowledge integration by performing their own 
tasks (medium task integration) very selectively. For instance, they were typically heavily 
involved in or responsible for the basic design of the component and for testing the 
component, i.e. tasks that contribute strongly to understanding and controlling the project 
as a whole.  
 
In sum, systems integrators can successfully seek specialized input from external actors for 
these three types of innovation by substituting for the loss of formal control by applying 
non-ownership mechanisms (e.g. Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005; Mohr et al., 1996). This 
finding complements prior literature (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001; Tiwana and Keil, 2007) as it 
shows - at the level of individual projects - that operators apply knowledge integration to 
balance the need for specialization and integration and to protect their interests. These 
cases therefore suggest equifinal organizational forms for incremental and architectural 
innovations of core components and for radical component innovations that consist of 
medium task integration and high knowledge integration, possibly combined with medium 
or low ownership integration. In other words, these projects are essentially monitored 
collaborative projects. 
 
Case 29 provides additional support for this new configuration in the case of radical 
component innovation. This case did involve collaboration with an external actor, but 
without a high degree of knowledge integration. This misfit (i.e. medium rather than high 
knowledge integration) made effective coordination and collaboration more difficult and 
therefore reduced performance. Similarly, Case 15 and Case 16 show how highly 
integrated organizational forms fail to work for architectural innovations of core 
components (i.e. high rather than medium task integration). The project managers of these 
highly integrated and disappointing projects both indicated the need for external expertise, 
because the operators themselves lacked a detailed understanding of the (existing) 
technologies that were involved in these projects. This indication that medium task 
integration would have been more appropriate provides further support for the new ideal 
type. 
 
Case 15 and Case 16 can not be said to disconfirm the original (fully integrated) 
organizational form. The original ideal type for architectural (and incremental) innovations 
of core components rests on the assumption that systems integrators possess and 
understand the technologies involved, which they exploit and protect by performing these 
projects themselves. In Case 15 and Case 16 this assumption of high ex ante knowledge 
integration did not appear to be true and high integration by the operators therefore 
resulted in disappointing performance because it would have been better (as for instance in 
Case 11 – Case 14) to collaborate with external specialists. We therefore maintain the 
original highly integrated organizational form, which we can expect to be especially 
beneficial if the systems integrator is already highly knowledgeable. Otherwise, i.e. if the 
operator lacks the relevant knowledge and capabilities, collaboration in line with the new 
organizational configuration seems more appropriate.  
  
As an additional conclusion related to the cases that resulted in the monitored, 
collaborative ideal type (Case 11 – Case 14, Case 17, Case 18, and Case 28), we find that 
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transaction costs played only a limited role in these cases. In general, these projects were 
highly specific because the applications involved were tailored to the operator’s network. 
However, instead of highly integrated projects, we found projects with medium task 
integration and possibly even with low ownership integration. For incremental innovations 
of core components we found several explanations for collaboration and for the 
willingness of external actors to become involved in these projects. In Case 11 strong trust 
for instance already existed between the operator and its partner and Case 12, Case 13 and 
Case 14 point to several strategic reasons for the collaboration (see also Sengupta, 1998), 
such as external actors that wanted to exploit complementary products and that hoped to 
gain future business from the operator.  
 
From the perspective of operators, a factor that delimits appropriation concerns is that they 
own the networks to which core applications are tailored. As a result, the operator and its 
partner are both committed to the development project, which reduces hold-up fears. 
However, especially if its core technologies are involved, operators might be hesitant to 
collaborate (i.e. Case 17). Finally, it is especially the combination of uncertainty and 
specificity that can be expected to result in vertical integration (Geyskens et al., 2006), 
which refers to radical component innovations. Again, Case 29 indicates that transaction 
costs were not decisive in the chosen organizational form. Other factors, such as the 
urgency of the operator and its partner resulted in their joint commitment.  
 
For modular component innovation we also found an alternative ideal type. In Case 25 and 
Case 26 network operators partially financed modular component development projects 
and also performed these projects at least in part. In both cases the involvement of the 
operator involved the development of an innovative technology that could be applied as an 
input in future application development projects of external actors, such as a spin-off or 
licensees. Hence, a collaborative (i.e. partly integrated) organizational form for modular 
innovations seems to be especially appropriate if the project involves a technology that the 
operator can use to facilitate further application development by external developers. 
Otherwise, i.e. if the project is limited to only one application only, external innovation 
(i.e. the original, slightly adjusted ideal type) seems more appropriate. 
 
Finally, Case 30 suggests that radical component innovations can be performed 
successfully without any significant operator involvement at all. In this case the systems 
integrator’s role was performed by a knowledgeable IT-firm that positioned itself in 
between mobile operators and third party application developers. This IT-firm did not own 
a mobile network itself, but it did possess an application platform that was interconnected 
to multiple networks. In this way this ‘middleware’ platform became the relevant interface 
for application developers. It can therefore be expected that this organizational form of 
intermediary/downstream systems integration also works for other innovation projects and 
not only for radical component innovation.  
 
The emergence of intermediary systems integrators can be considered a logical move in the 
life cycle of system industries. On the one hand, mobile networks - like many other 
product systems - become more modular over time, which makes such intermediary 
platforms possible in the first place. On the other hand, the sheer number of mobile 
applications, which has exploded in the last decade or so, has made it almost impossible 
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for operators to coordinate them all on their own. Of course standardized and open 
interfaces facilitate autonomous external innovation (e.g. Case 1- Case 8), but our cases 
also illustrate that a large number of innovations still require intense coordination in the 
face of interface changes. Hence, it might be no surprise that the operator in Case 9 for 
instance aimed to delegate systems integration tasks (i.e. monitoring interface changes) to 
application developers. In sum, intermediary systems integration involves an attractive 
opportunity for operators to economize on their systems integration efforts with respect to 
mobile applications. In Case 29 intermediary systems integration refers to low ownership 
integration, low task integration, low knowledge integration, and medium task integration. 
Because the IT firm was itself a very knowledgeable firm, it required only very limited 
coordination integration between this firm and operators to successfully align the 
application (and in this project also the platform itself) to the mobile network in the face of 
new interfaces. 
 
Reflection on the case study methodology 
This study must be seen as the first step in the process to build a configurational theory 
about organizational forms of component development projects. It was neither the 
objective of this study to generate insights about the strength of the association between 
the degree of fit with an ideal profile and project performance nor to provide details about 
the frequency with which different organizational forms occur in practice. Instead, our 
multiple case study provided insights about viable and appropriate organizational forms, 
i.e. it showed how and why different organizational configurations deal with the 
characteristics of different types of innovation and contribute to project performance.  
 
Put differently, the major strength of our case study approach involves its internal validity. 
Space limitations preclude the reporting of detailed within-case analyses, but for each case 
we were able to pinpoint in quite some detail how and why its organizational form 
contributed to project performance. Furthermore, our approach explicitly aimed to increase 
our confidence in the validity of the ideal types by means of replication. For some ideal 
types we were able to substantially increase our confidence in its underlying (middle-
range) theory because we found multiple replications (e.g. Case 1 - Case 8). At the same 
time we explicitly recognized that different cases have different implications for the 
theory. Some cases were for instance perfectly in line with the theory and these cases are 
most-likely to result in high performance (e.g. Case 1 - Case 8). Individually these cases 
therefore add little to our confidence in the theory. In contrast, cases that deviate strongly 
from the ideal type can strongly challenge our confidence in the theory. Our dataset did not 
include extreme misfits however, which means that we were unable to investigate their 
performance implications. It might be that the inconsistency and negative effects of these 
organizational forms prevent them from occurring in practice.  
 
Because we investigated each case in detail we also developed an understanding of the 
specific circumstances in which these projects were performed and of the factors that 
influenced their eventual organizational set-up. In this way we are able to specify scope 
conditions that delimit the boundaries of our configurational theory as such (Firestone, 
1993; Dul and Hak, 2008). This is related to the external validity of our findings. First of 
all, it is important to recognize that our initial and theoretically formulated configurational 
theory is very generic in nature, i.e. it can be said to ambitiously apply to most types of 
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components, products, and systems integrators, across the globe and in any time-period. As 
a general principle, considerable replications in many different parts of the entire 
theoretical domain are required to ever reach such a universal external validity. However, 
given the particular empirical scope of our case studies we must be careful in judging the 
external validity of the refined configurational theory. Below we discuss several important 
delimiting scope conditions. 
 
First and foremost, we must recognize that our findings come from one particular 
empirical setting (application/software development), in one particular industry (the Dutch 
mobile telecommunications industry), and in one particular stage of its life cycle (the 
emergence of mobile data applications, which is a radical shift from traditional voice 
services). Unlike typical physical components that are assembled into products before they 
are shipped to consumers, mobile applications are complementary software parts of the 
mobile telecommunications system. Hence, several collaborative projects involved 
external actors originating from other industries that aimed to exploit their existing 
capabilities and resources by developing a mobile application. For these complementary 
applications a separate market exists, as a result of which the incentives for external actors 
are likely to be greater than for developers of regular components.  
 
Projects with medium or low ownership integration and task integration might be more 
prominent in this setting than in others. For instance, the strategic need for external 
developers to create an installed user base might outweigh appropriation concerns as a 
result of asset specificity. Furthermore, the fact that valuable already exist at various 
external actors makes it more attractive for operators to involve them in application 
development. In other words, resource-based arguments in favor of collaboration for 
component development projects (e.g. Hoetker, 2005) are particularly strong in this setting. 
The fact that mobile applications are complementary products also means that fully 
disintegrated projects (e.g. incremental innovations of peripheral components and modular 
component innovations) typically means that the external innovators commercialize these 
applications themselves in the end user market rather than operators purchasing them. 
 
Another factor that might have influenced our findings is the particular timing of our 
projects. At the time of their execution, most mobile operators were in a state of flux. They 
were in the process of investing huge amounts of money in the deployment of new 
technologies to facilitate higher-capacity mobile data transmission, e.g. GPRS, UMTS, 
MMS, and i-mode. At the same time, they typically had huge debts because of their 
investments in new network licenses (UMTS). This can be argued to promote joint 
investments and task execution in development projects, because operators lacked financial 
resources.  
 
As argued above, this collaboration also allowed operators to benefit from the 
complementary resources and capabilities possessed by third parties. This is important 
because operators were traditionally not involved in application development at all. They 
simply operated telecommunications networks to facilitate voice services only. With the 
introduction of new technologies operators therefore had to master these new technologies 
and to learn how to stimulate and coordinate the development of applications as well as 
their adoption in the market place. In other words, their systems integration capabilities 
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were fairly new and underdeveloped at the time of our study. This explains why we find in 
several cases (e.g. Case 15, Case 16, and Case 29) that operators were not all-round 
knowledgeable firms as they required input from external technology specialists to 
effectively realize interface changes. Hence, this increases the likelihood to find 
collaborative projects. At the same time, the lack of detailed systems integration 
capabilities might explain why we observed extensive knowledge integration in many 
collaborative projects. This helped operators to learn about these projects and to improve 
their systems integration capabilities.  
 
Finally, our cases studies pointed to several other scope conditions and factors that 
influenced whether and how we refined the ideal types. For instance, trust was not 
explicitly included in the initial development of the configurational mode. Trust can be 
expected to reduce appropriation concerns and also makes it less costly to manage 
collaborative projects (Gulati, 1995). This is also what we found in Case 11. For very 
uncertain and specific projects we might expect that operators prefer fully integrated 
projects and that trust plays less of a role (Hoetker, 2005). This is also suggested by our 
case findings for radical component innovation. Another scope conditions identified in the 
above discussion of the ideal types is for instance the involvement of operators in the 
development of modular components if these projects facilitate future external component 
innovations.   
 
Limitations and future research 
Besides the abovementioned limitations in terms of our study’s external validity, there are 
other limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. First of all, our 
dependent variable mainly focused on short-term performance implications of a project’s 
organizational form, e.g. project performance and the consistency of the larger product 
system. Performance can also be considered from a long-term perspective however. The 
operator’s goal in Case 29 was for instance to increase its customer base rather than to 
make sure that the application was optimally aligned. Several projects were in fact 
strategically important to the operator, which indicates a long-term objective rather than 
the operator’s desire to optimize the development project itself. Case 26 was for instance 
performed in the research division of the operator. Arguable, learning played a more 
important role in this project than the need to develop an application within time. To fully 
understand the appropriateness of organizational forms, long-term objectives therefore also 
have to be considered. Hoetker (2005) for instance indicates that the anticipated 
uncertainty of future component development projects should influence the firm’s 
decisions about which organizational forms to pursue, i.e. integrating projects now results 
in better capabilities in the future and therefore in a higher chance to innovate successfully 
in an uncertain future. 
 
Our measures for the four the four dimensions of integration were mainly concerned with 
the extent that they were present or absent, i.e. their quantity. Our case studies also allowed 
us to assess in some detail the quality of for instance the degree of task integration. We for 
instance found that selective task integration, such as basic design and product testing, has 
important implications for the degree of knowledge integration. This indicates that it is 
important to investigate the quality of different organizational forms to fully understand 
the interrelationships among the organizational dimensions. The extent of coordination 
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integration is one thing for instance, but the type and quality of the information that is 
being exchanged is another. We might argue that for instance the degree of knowledge 
integration influences the quality and the level of detail in the exchange of coordinative 
information. To further improve our understanding of the internal consistency of ideal 
types, future research should take this into account. 
 
Future research is needed to increase our confidence in our ideal types. As indicated above, 
this study only provides two first steps in the theory-building process (the theoretical 
process to build the tentative configuration and a first-case study investigation). In this first 
phase it is important to identify equifinal ideal types and to come to understand their inner 
workings in detail. Informed by our study additional cases can be selected on theoretical 
grounds (e.g. Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003; Pettigrew, 1999), for instance by 
searching for instance cases that deviate greatly from an ideal type and to investigate their 
performance implications. Also perfect fits can be analyzed in depth, which are likely to 
increase our understanding of their internal consistency. In addition, future case studies are 
needed to investigate configurations in other empirical settings. This helps to further 
establish the scope of the theory (Bacharach, 1989; Firestone, 1993).  
 
Eventually we not only want to understand how and why organizational forms contribute 
to project performance. To come to a parsimonious model of recurrent and effective 
organizational forms we also want quantitative information about the prevalence of the 
different ideal types and about the strength of their effects on performance. Of course the 
entire theory building and testing process should be highly iterative. New findings change 
the direction of research and suggest which research design is needed to find the most 
pressing questions. In addition, quantitative analysis of data on a large number of projects 
can be used as an alternative theory-building process. It could complement our approach in 
identifying new ideal-typical organizational forms.   
 
Finally, future research could try to extend the configurational model with findings from 
Chapter 4. Whereas a direct comparison with Chapter 4 is difficult, because the model in 
Chapter 4 is more linear in nature than the current configurational model, both models 
seem to complement each other and seem to indicate that project performance and 
commercial performance might be achieved with similar organizational forms. Figure 4.2 
shows that commercial performance for modular complementary product innovations (cell 
bottom right) is highest for low ownership integration. Likewise, we find in the current 
chapter that low ownership integration is part of an appropriate configuration (in terms of 
project performance) for modular innovation (cell top right). Furthermore, the commercial 
performance of incremental innovations (top right in Figure 4.2) seems to benefit from 
limited or medium ownership integration. With respect to (peripheral and core) 
incremental innovations we find in this chapter that low and medium ownership integration 
can certainly facilitate high project performance.   
 
Other findings from the current chapter also seem to fit with the findings of Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 4 we found for instance no support for the claim that more novel applications 
should coincide with higher operator integration for reasons of coordination. An 
explanation might be our finding from Chapter 5 that this integration can be limited if 
interfaces remain stable, i.e. if networks are mature, regardless of the novelty of the 
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application. In addition, we found in Chapter 4 that projects generally performed worse (as 
perceived by their managers) if operators financed a larger part of these projects. We can 
explain this finding based on the qualitative analysis of the underlying data in the current 
chapter. As can be seen from Figure 5.4, a large number of relatively simple incremental 
projects was performed without the involvement of operators. In contrast, operators were 
more heavily involved in the more difficult projects. On average, the relatively simple 
projects were more successful than the relatively difficult projects, i.e. project managers of 
these latter projects were less satisfied.  
 
Managerial relevance 
Albeit tentative in nature, our study provides a framework that guides managers in their 
decisions how to organize component development projects. This is a strategically 
important topic that is relevant for any firm that produces a multi-component product. We 
show how integrative decisions can be made regarding multiple organizational dimensions 
and how this is contingent on the specific characteristics of a variety of component 
innovations. For instance, we show the importance of providing a sufficient amount of 
coordinative information to component development teams if interfaces change 
substantially. Furthermore, we show that firms are able to control alliance projects if they 
maintain and develop detailed knowledge about these projects. In addition, for some types 
of component innovation we indicate multiple organizational forms that might serve as 
alternative organizational solutions depending on a firm’s specific needs and preferences. 
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6. How to Organize the Development of                                                 
Inter-Industry Architectural Innovations?  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study considers the development of new products that are created by combining 
technologies from different industries. Numerous firms will be specialized in the 
individual technologies of these inter-industry architectural innovations, but none of them 
will possess detailed knowledge about how to integrate these previously unconnected 
technologies. In other words, there are no incumbent systems integrators with existing 
architectural knowledge to design the new product architecture and to coordinate 
component providers. In the absence of knowledge overlap between the firms from the 
different industries, and assuming that they will have different structures and cultures, we 
investigate how development projects of inter-industry architectural innovations can be 
organized to increase the likelihood of project success. Based on a comparative case study 
we propose that this type of project benefits from a configuration that includes specialists 
from the different industries (to obtain high-quality component input), that results in high 
information-exchange between them (to generate a detailed architectural understanding), 
and that facilitates timely and effective decision-making to prevent and resolve conflicts. 
We discuss how our inductive findings contribute to the literature on for instance the 
organization of innovation, systems integration, and strategic alliances. We also propose 
various organizational forms that meet our proposition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is co-authored with Jan van den Ende and Andrea Prencipe. We thank 
Geerten van de Kaa for his useful comments and suggestions. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In today’s economy, technologies from different industries are increasingly being 
combined to create new products and services. Mobile payment solutions for instance 
integrate mobile telecommunications technology (e.g. mobile networks, mobile handsets, 
billing systems) with technologies from the financial services industry (e.g. ATMs, credit 
card systems). In another example, nanotechnology creates advanced materials by 
manipulating atoms based on insights from biology and chemistry (Kodama, 1992; 
Business Week, 2005). These products and services can be considered a special type of 
architectural innovation. Whereas architectural innovations are traditionally seen as 
reconfigurations of existing product systems within a single industry (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990), this study focuses on new combinations of technologies from different 
industries. We label this type of innovation ‘inter-industry architectural innovation’. These 
innovations generate additional revenues by exploiting and combining distinct and 
previously unconnected technologies, and in the process they cause industries to converge 
(e.g. Kodama, 1992; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1998). Before these innovations can be 
brought to the market, they first have to be developed however. Based on theoretical 
grounds we expect this development process to be very challenging. This chapter therefore 
addresses the question how development projects of inter-industry architectural 
innovations can be organized to increase the likelihood of project success.  
 
Why do we expect the development of inter-industry architectural innovations to be so 
challenging? This seems surprising given that the building blocks of the new product 
architecture already exist (e.g. Henderson and Clark, 1990). We focus on three 
characteristics that are likely to make it difficult for the innovating firm(s) to successfully 
develop this type of innovation. First, no knowledge exists about how the previously 
unconnected technologies can best be combined to create a new product. This lack of prior 
architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990) means that component 
interdependencies will be highly unpredictable (Brusoni et al., 2001). As a result, 
innovators need to find out how the different technologies interrelate and whether and how 
they have to be adjusted. In other words, a key objective for development projects involves 
the generation of architectural knowledge in order to understand and resolve component 
interdependencies. Given that multiple diverse and interdependent technologies are 
involved, this learning process is likely to involve many problems, such as product 
redesigns and difficult design trade-offs (e.g. Sheremata, 2000).   
 
Secondly, the generation of architectural knowledge is complicated by the fact that the 
various component technologies originate from different industries. Given that the 
technological breadth of firms is inherently limited (Kodama, 1992; Davies et al., 2006) 
and given that many firms tend to focus on their core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1999), individual firms are unlikely to be specialized in all the technologies underlying the 
new product architecture. Development projects therefore first of all need to duplicate 
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missing technologies or need to include specialists from the different industries (such as 
incumbents or technology vendors) to acquire access to their technologies and capabilities.  
 
The absence of prior architectural knowledge and the absence of firms that possess all 
relevant technologies implies that the design and development of inter-industry 
architectural innovations takes place in the absence of an incumbent ‘systems integrator’ 
(Brusoni et al., 2001). For the design and development of many product systems, systems 
integrators exist that possess a detailed understanding of a product’s architecture (Brusoni 
et al., 2001). Based on this expertise these firms coordinate the actions of individual 
component providers (Brusoni et al., 2001; Prencipe et al., 2003). Such an orchestrating 
actor does not exist for the development of inter-industry architectural innovations, since 
no firm will possess a detailed understanding of the various technologies and their 
interrelationships. In contrast, specialists from the different industries will have to integrate 
their respective technologies and need to discover interdependencies without any 
knowledge overlap or joint routines. This is likely to reduce the effectiveness of inter-firm 
knowledge transfer and coordination (e.g. Argote et al., 1998; Darr et al. 1995; Baum and 
Ingram, 1998).  
 
Thirdly, if firms from different industries collaborate to develop an inter-industry 
architectural innovation, these partners will have no prior ties and their organizational 
structures, routines, and cultures will be adapted to their respective technology-base and 
competitive environments (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Gulati and Singh, 1998). As a 
result of these differences, a strong fault line is likely to exist between team members from 
the different collaborating firms (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). This fault line between 
factions from the different firms is likely to result in poor project performance because of 
an increased likelihood of conflicts between them, e.g. due to personal differences and 
different frames of reference with respect to execution of tasks and the resolution of 
problems (Li and Hambrick, 2005; Madhavan and Grover, 1998). Although partners come 
from different industries and although they are no direct competitors, they could be 
reluctant to share information and resources. It might for instance be unclear how partners 
will behave in the new market for the architectural innovation. In sum, we expect that it 
will be difficult to develop a high-quality inter-industry architectural innovation, let alone 
to realize this fast and efficiently.  
 
Based on the principle of contingency theory that different types of innovation require 
different organizational approaches (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Tidd and Bodley, 
2001), the objective of this chapter is to explore how development projects of inter-
industry architectural innovations can be organized to increase the likelihood of project 
success. The theoretical relevance of this study is first of all that it extends the literature 
about architectural innovation. This literature traditionally emphasizes the reconfiguration 
of existing architectures (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001) rather 
than the creation of new architectures from already existing components. Secondly, our 
study complements the systems integration literature (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001; Prencipe et 
al., 2003; Hobday et al., 2005) by showing how product systems and architectural 
knowledge are created in the absence of an incumbent system firm.  
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Thirdly, by studying how development projects of this very specific type of innovation can 
best be organized we contribute to the literature about the organization of innovation (e.g. 
Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996) and to the literature about 
(organizational) success factors for NPD projects (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; 
Henard and Szymanski, 2001). To achieve our theory-building objective we studied and 
compared three differently organized development projects of inter-industry architectural 
innovations. The next section discusses the methodology in greater detail. This is followed 
by the results from the case study analysis. We end with a discussion of the theoretical and 
managerial implications of our findings.  
  
6.2 Methods 
Our analysis is based on a comparative study of three cases. The unit of analysis in each 
case is a development project of an inter-industry architectural innovation. Within each 
case the objective is to find evidence about how and why the organizational set-up of the 
project contributes to project performance. Case studies are particularly suitable for this 
purpose (Yin, 2003), i.e. to trace causal processes and mechanisms (George and Bennett, 
2005). Insights about such causal mechanisms help to increase our confidence in the causal 
effects between concepts (Van de Ven, 2007). In addition to the within-case analyses, a 
cross-case analysis is performed with the objective to generate one or more propositions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The three cases that we studied involve projects that were performed in 
the Netherlands for the development of innovative mobile telecommunications 
applications. In the last decade mobile telecommunications has evolved from an analogue 
into a digital system and from a voice-based service offering into a proposition that 
includes packet-switched data services (Jaspers et al., 2007). These developments spurred 
the fusion of the mobile industry with other industries, such as the financial services 
industry and the broadcasting industry.  
 
The three projects involve the development of (1) a mobile payment application, (2) a 
mobile banking application, and (3) a mobile television solution. The mobile payment 
application made it possible to transfer funds between users and to purchase products and 
services from web stores that adopted this payment method. With this service debit 
payments could be made on-line or using the mobile phone (based on text messaging). In 
both cases users are called on their mobile phones to authorize transactions with a unique 
identification code. In the second case, a mobile banking application was integrated in pre-
configured mobile phones. This application enabled users to pay bills, transfer funds, 
check account balances, and top-up prepaid airtime. These services could be performed 
real-time, using the direct link between the mobile Internet application and the user’s bank 
account. Finally, the mobile television solution makes it possible to broadcast mobile video 
calls live on television, thus turning mobile users into cameramen.  
 
All three projects involve the development of a software application that is partly based on 
mobile telecommunications technology. As a result, the empirical variety of our cases is 
limited. This reduces the external validity of this study, but at the same time it facilitates 
the cross-case analysis by keeping many factors constant. To increase the likelihood to 
generate theoretical insights from the cross-case analysis, the three projects were selected 
because of their different organizational set-ups (Pettigrew, 1999; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). The mobile payment application was developed by an independent start-
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up, the mobile banking application was developed in a contractual alliance between the 
Dutch subsidiary of an international mobile network operator and a Dutch retail bank 
(which is part of a large international financial corporation), and the mobile television 
solution was developed in an informal alliance of a small Dutch IT firm, an international 
television producer, and a large producer of telecommunications equipment. Table 6.1 lists 
several additional project details. 
 
For each project we collected primary data through on-site interviews with key informants. 
In addition, we analyzed publicly available information, such as press releases, company 
information, on-line news articles, and articles in business magazines. The interviews 
typically lasted between one and two hours. In the case of the mobile television application 
we interviewed the four persons who were most knowledgeable of the development 
process: a founder of the IT firm, the solution architect from the IT firm, the project 
manager from the telecom firm, and a sales representative from the telecom firm who was 
involved in the project from the beginning (these interviews took place in 2007). In the 
case of the start-up we interviewed one of the founders (in 2002). The case study of the 
mobile banking alliance is based on interviews with five project members (conducted in 
2003 and 2004): three employees from the bank (one of the project initiators, the bank’s 
project manager, and a project member who was involved in the design of the application 
and who was responsible for the alignment of processes with the operator) and two 
employees from the operator (a business development manager and the manager 
responsible for the security of the application). To gain full cooperation we promised the 
interviewees to keep the names of companies and applications anonymous.  
 
Table 6.1 Description of cases 
 
 
The topics covered in the semi-structured interviews among others included the 
organizational set-up of the project (e.g. the number of investing firms, the number of 
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suppliers, and the division of investments and project workload), characteristics of the 
project tasks (e.g. technological uncertainty, interdependence), elements of project 
management (e.g. communication intensity, decision-making), the proficiency of the 
development process (e.g. product redesigns), and project performance. For each of these 
elements specific questions were formulated in advance. Most of the interviews were 
conducted in the presence of two researchers. Based on our field notes and/or interview 
tapes we extended our case description immediately after the interviews. Some 
interviewees were phoned afterwards to obtain additional information. Some interviewees 
suggested small changes to our reports.  
 
The analysis of the data involved a highly iterative process of within-case analysis and 
cross-case comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989). The analytic strategy of this chapter is founded 
on the principle of contingency theory (see Chapter 2). Based on this ‘metatheory’ 
(Schoonhoven, 1981), which also guided the structure of the interviews, it is our 
assumption that the organizational set-up of a project contributes to project performance to 
the extent that it provides the capability to deal with the specific characteristics of inter-
industry architectural innovations, most notably the challenge to exploit the already 
existing component technologies, the challenge to generate knowledge about how to 
combine these technologies, and the challenge to manage and coordinate the development 
effort in the face of large cultural and structural differences. As the results section will 
show, these challenges were clearly present in our cases and they guided our search for 
high-performing organizational solutions.     
 
6.3 Results 
This section presents the insights that emerged from the cross-case analysis. The first three 
parts address the three organizational challenges for the development of inter-industry 
architectural innovations and provide qualitative evidence about how they were addressed 
by the organizational forms of the three projects. The fourth part integrates the first three 
parts and formulates a proposition about how development projects of inter-industry 
architectural innovations can be organized to increase the likelihood of high project 
performance.    
 
Exploitation of component technologies  
Inter-industry architectural innovations involve first-time combinations of existing 
technologies from different industries. As a consequence, individual firms are unlikely to 
possess all relevant component technologies prior to the development of these innovations. 
This was also true for the three projects in this study. None of the firms in our cases opted 
to develop missing technology internally. Instead, all three projects aimed to develop the 
new product architecture by obtaining the required technologies from specialists in the 
different industries. The two alliances each included as partners the most important 
complementors, whereas the start-up purchased several off-the-shelf components from 
external vendors.  
 
The start-up learned only after the commercialization of the application that it purchased a 
wrong payment system. As a result, alternative payment software had to be bought and 
installed. One of the founders of the start-up stated that this was the major reason for the 
disappointing project costs and project duration. In his view it was a mistake to purchase 
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components without any internal technological knowledge. The start-up was for instance 
incapable to specify in sufficient detail its own software requirements. To obtain the 
required capabilities and expertise, the start-up did seek at the start of the project the 
support of operators and banks, but none of them wanted to participate. According to a 
director of the start-up, these incumbents all felt that the start-up “infiltrated their 
territory”. The absence of incumbents not only complicated the start-up’s purchasing 
process, but it also limited the functionality of its application. Without the support of a 
bank namely, the start-up lacked the permit to process transactions larger than ten Euros.  
 
Unlike the start-up the two alliances included incumbents from the different industries. 
This ensured that both applications were developed from building blocks that were already 
operational and proven within their respective industries. In the case of the mobile banking 
alliance, both a mobile network operator and a retail bank provided access to their systems 
(such as the bank’s payment system and the operator’s mobile network and billing system) 
and allocated specialists to the project. Furthermore, a sister company of the operator was 
also involved in the project. This company provided access to its mobile Internet platform. 
The project also benefited from the active involvement of suppliers. For instance, a handset 
manufacturer and a SIM card producer respectively customized a mobile handset and a 
SIM card (the chip inside the mobile phone that identifies the user to the mobile network). 
 
The mobile television alliance also included experts from the relevant industries, i.e. a 
producer and service provider of telecommunications hardware (the telecom firm), a 
producer of television shows (the television firm), and a small IT firm specialized in 
Internet applications and streaming video (the IT firm). Assisted by its expertise of video 
formats and transcoding technologies, the IT firm developed the core of the application on 
its own. This technology transforms mobile video calls into the format of television studios 
and facilitates the editing of video calls and the synchronization of audio and video signals. 
The IT firm lacked the capabilities however to develop the entire product architecture. It 
for instance lacked a video gateway, which is required to receive video calls, and the 
expertise to design the application in line with the needs of its target customers (television 
studios and broadcasters). The IT firm therefore teamed up with the telecom firm. This 
firm operates a video gateway of its own and also has vast experience with the 
development and hosting of complex applications.  
 
However, neither the IT firm nor the telecom firm had a detailed understanding of the 
television and the multimedia industry. This is why the television firm was included in the 
project. This firm for instance assisted in the design of the editorial tool that enables 
television editors to manage the entire solution and to edit video calls. Collectively, these 
complementary specialists provided the alliance with the necessary inputs to develop a 
high-quality application that could meet the requirements of both the telecommunications 
and the media industry.  
 
In sum, the three cases suggest that a high degree of differentiation and specialization 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Dougherty, 2001) contributes to the performance of 
development projects for inter-industry architectural innovations. The two alliances were 
both set-up by incumbents from the different industries and as a result the development 
process was assured of high-quality, co-specialized (complementary) component inputs 
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(e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004) and of specialist project members. In 
addition, the mobile banking alliance benefited from the expertise of suppliers by actively 
involving them in the project. This seems a valid explanation for the absence of problems 
with individual components in these alliances. The start-up also attempted to include 
specialists, but incumbents refused to participate. In addition, the start-up lacked the 
purchasing capability to fully benefit from the specialized knowledge of its suppliers 
(Araujo et al., 2003; Flowers, 2007). Consequently, the development process as well as the 
quality of the application suffered.  
 
Generation of architectural knowledge 
Whereas development projects can benefit from the existing capabilities of incumbents and 
upstream technology suppliers, the projects themselves have to generate the architectural 
knowledge about how these (component) technologies can best be interconnected. Given 
that these building blocks have never been combined before, it is no surprise that it was a 
difficult task in all three projects to specify and develop component interfaces. Little was 
known up front about how components would interact and about how they could be 
adapted to create a coherent system. The cases indicate that frequent and rich 
communication between component providers contributes to the identification and the 
resolution of interdependencies.  
 
The mobile television alliance is a case in point. The objective of this project was to 
develop a centrally hosted application that would be scalable, highly reliable, as well as 
easy to implement and use. Such a high-quality total solution was seen as an imperative to 
‘productize’ the application worldwide. To develop a mutual understanding of each other’s 
systems and to fine-tune the basic product architecture, project members from the different 
firms had very frequent and rich contact. This particularly involved the members from the 
IT firm and the telecom firm. Each firm for instance appointed a solution architect to align 
the systems from both firms. The solution architects had daily contact by phone and met in 
person once a week. Furthermore, a test manager from the telecom firm tested changes that 
were made by the programmers of the IT firm and provided detailed feedback to the 
solution architects. The development process resulted in a considerable number of 
architectural changes and component adjustments, such as tools that were developed to 
monitor the quality of video calls and interconnections that were adjusted to increase 
reliability. According to our informants the development process resulted in a high-quality 
solution. A large international broadcaster for instance tested rival solutions, but selected 
this solution because of its quality.  
 
The other two cases show that the generation of architectural knowledge can be difficult 
when communication between component providers is limited and problematic. In the 
mobile banking alliance, the architecture of the application was developed by the bank and 
the mobile Internet company. The operator was not involved in this design phase, because 
it was expected that the application could be easily connected to the mobile network. The 
intention of the design effort therefore was to specify tasks that could be performed 
independently by the bank and the operator. Reflecting this modular design, the project 
was organized with a separate structure, i.e. with sub teams from each firm each with its 
own manager. During product development it soon became clear however that the level of 
interdependence was considerably underestimated. For instance, it appeared to be very 
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complex to establish a secure connection between the mobile network and the banking 
system to realize the envisaged direct link to bank accounts (i.e. to facilitate real-time 
transactions and topping-up of prepaid balance). This required adjustments to numerous 
components. 
  
In order to identify and address all interdependencies, many meetings were organized. 
However, information-exchange and collaboration between the bank and the operator was 
very problematic, for instance because meetings were very detailed and involved a large 
number of attendants. In addition, there were so many meetings that the team members 
could not attend all the meetings that they were expected to attend. In principle, 
collaboration was facilitated because the alliance operated from a joint office in a location 
separate from the partners’ offices. Whereas project members from the bank operated from 
within this office, members from the operator often only came to this dedicated site to 
attend meetings. According to the bank’s project manager this made it difficult to keep 
people from the operator up to date.  
 
At the same time, due to its strict security regulations, the bank did not allow direct contact 
between specialists from both firms outside of the formal meetings. Coupled with its 
urgency (the bank had a deadline to offer the application (and a mobile phone) as its yearly 
gift), the limited opportunities for direct and informal communication resulted in conflicts 
between the bank and the operator. For several tasks it was unclear, for instance, how 
responsibilities were defined and how processes were aligned. In sum, the development 
process was highly problematic due to the absence of the operator from the design stage 
and due to communication difficulties in the development stage. The project for instance 
failed to meet most of its milestones.  
 
The development of the mobile payment application by the start-up was also characterized 
by high interface uncertainty. According to the start-up’s founder this mainly involved the 
customized protocols to interconnect both a voice response system and a text messaging 
platform to the payment system. The start-up hired an external project manager to 
coordinate the protocol development process together with its subsystem vendors. 
However, this manager did not possess a detailed technical knowledge of the new product 
system, and according to the founder this project manager failed to organize sufficient 
direct contact between the component vendors. This complicated the integration of the 
payment system. In hindsight the founder of the start-up stated that it would have been 
better to have an internal project manager with the relevant technological know-how. On 
the one hand, this would have helped to more actively involve the vendors in the alignment 
of their respective subsystems. On the other hand, this also would have made it easier to 
achieve coordination within the start-up. In the chosen set-up, coordination between the 
external, hired project manager and the start-up team was limited. Next to problems with 
the suggesting that it was difficult within the start-up to coordinate effectively with the 
project manager. In addition, the founder admitted that the commitment of external 
vendors was limited because of the start-up’s limited financial resources. This also 
hampered the effective alignment of the various subsystems. Negative publicity illustrates 
the architectural difficulties faced by the start-up. After its commercialization system 
failures were for instance reported in the media about person-to-person transfers and on-
line purchases.  
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In sum, all three projects were characterized by unpredictable interdependencies, i.e. they 
can be considered ‘systemic innovations’ (Teece, 1996). Consistent with information-
processing theory (e.g. Tushman and Nadler, 1978) the cases indicate that mutual 
adjustment and frequent information exchange between component providers contributes 
to the identification of interdependencies (Sosa et al., 2004) and helps to achieve unity of 
effort (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1976). Without such tight ‘coordination 
integration’ (Robertson and Langlois, 1995) interdependencies might not be discovered 
until architectural problems arise in later stages of the development process (Sosa et al., 
2004). Furthermore, the start-up project illustrates that internal coordination is needed to 
effectively coordinate supplier relationships (Takeishi, 2001).  
 
Project control and decision-making 
Without a deep understanding of component interactions and in the absence of a mutual 
understanding of each other’s technologies, it might be difficult for partnering firms to 
agree upon component trade-offs and on the design of a joint product architecture. 
Furthermore, disputes might arise because of different interests or honest differences of 
opinion as a result of divergent frames of reference (Hitt et al., 1993; Li and Hambrick, 
2005; Gulati et al., 2005).  
 
In the mobile banking alliance a strong difference existed between the bank and the 
operator that reflects a fundamental difference between the financial services industry and 
the telecommunications industry. Unlike the operator, the bank was very concerned about 
the security and the reliability of the application. Whereas the bank’s IT policy was based 
on detailed planning and security checks, the operator used to make ad hoc changes to its 
IT systems. The operator’s IT specialists - or ‘cowboys’ in the words of the bank’s project 
manager - for instance wanted to test the application on live servers. Due to this fault line, 
the bank restricted and monitored information flows between both firms in order to protect 
its systems. Communication between project members was for instance only possible 
during formal meetings and team members from the bank were supervised by senior 
employees from within the bank. Although these mechanisms allowed the bank to monitor 
the project, as we have seen above they also hampered the generation of architectural 
knowledge.  
 
Furthermore, decision-making was often time-consuming because both firms shared 
formal decision-making power. Project management was for instance in the hands of a 
manager from the bank and a manager from the operator. This meant that neither of them 
had the authority to make decisions and to resolve conflicts by means of fiat. Problems 
therefore had to be passed on to the boards of both firms. However, these boards did not 
communicate with each other directly (there was for instance no joint steering group), 
which meant that the two project managers had to reach consensus based on the sometimes 
conflicting directives they received from top management. Because of these difficulties, 
compounded by the bank’s urgency, the bank hired additional consultants to perform 
several tasks that were originally assigned to the operator. In this way the need for 
coordination and decision-making with the operator was reduced. In hindsight, one of the 
bank’s initiators of the project argued that the bank should have been more involved in the 
project with a more direct role of its board of directors. In his view this would have 
increased the speed of decision-making and conflict resolution.  
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The three partners in the mobile television alliance each financed their own expenses and 
their top managers together formed the project’s steering committee. This committee was 
closely involved in the development process, but its main responsibility was to negotiate 
the business model for the commercialization of the application. It was informally agreed 
that the telecom firm – based on its technological capabilities and its project management 
expertise – would be responsible for day-to-day project management and would have the 
final say about the design of the application. Hence, a representative from the telecom firm 
implemented the telecom firm’s project management approach and managed the project on 
a daily basis. This project manager collaborated intensively with project members from all 
three firms, but if needed he could make operational decisions on his own. He reported to 
the steering committee, which made all major decisions. Decision-making in this 
committee was facilitated because the collaboration in this team resulted in some strong 
personal relationships. 
 
Because of its limited resources it was easy for the small IT firm to accept the telecom firm 
as the project leader, even though the IT firm invented the application and developed its 
technological core. The television producer was also happy to conform to the development 
approach of the telecom firm, because it was not a technology developing company itself. 
Although the team members from the IT firm were not used to follow rules and 
procedures, they quickly learned to see the benefits of clearly specifying roles and 
responsibilities and of formalizing and standardizing (to a certain extent) inter-firm 
information exchange. Coupled with the close involvement of top management, this 
contributed to a smooth development process without major disagreements or time-
consuming negotiations. 
  
The two alliances show that decision-making is likely to be faster and more effective if top 
managers are closely involved. Differentiation as a result of the participation of specialists 
from the various industries means that fault lines will exist between these interdependent 
partners and that it will be difficult to achieve unity of effort (Li and Hambrick, 2005; 
Gulati et al., 2005). The mobile banking alliance clearly illustrates that problems and 
important architectural decisions might not be readily addressed in the absence of top 
management involvement. The mobile television alliance shows that effective cooperation 
can be achieved if top managers from the different specialists are involved in the project 
and if they communicate directly. In this way conflicts might even be prevented as 
managers learn about each other’s firms and industries and develop personal ties. 
 
In addition, the mobile television alliance shows that many operational issues can be 
effectively dealt with by a single project manager from one of the firms. In contrast, the 
mobile banking alliance showed the difficulty to reach consensus among two equally 
powerful project managers. Hence, we expect that decision-making and problem-solving 
between interdependent specialists for the creation of a new product architecture are more 
likely to be timely and effective if one of these specialists is dominant. Such a leading firm 
will be able to specify procedures, to prevent costly and time-consuming disputes, and to 
realize cooperation ‘by fiat’ (Tadelis, 2002). With a dominant actor we do not mean that 
one of the partners should be highly autocratic. On the contrary, each specialist should be 
most powerful in its specific area of expertise and should be actively involved in important 
decision-making processes. Should it be impossible however to make decisions based on 
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consensus, then the dominant actor is able to make qualified decisions that are likely to be 
accepted by the rest of the team and that help the development effort to move forward 
(Eisenhardt et al., 1997).  
 
Formally, the case of the start-up clearly involved a dominant actor. The start-up had full 
‘ownership integration’ (Robertson and Langlois, 1995) over the development of the 
mobile payment application. However, despite its formal control, the start-up was highly 
dependent on its suppliers because it lacked any assets and expertise of its own. To 
increase the commitment of suppliers, the start-up selected small-sized suppliers. However, 
because of its limited financial resources and its inability to specify detailed contracts, the 
start-up had no choice but to trust its vendors. Especially since the hired project manager 
did not actively involve the suppliers in the development effort, the start-up in fact only 
maintained arm’s length relationships with its suppliers. Hence, although the start-up had 
full decision-making power, this authority could not be applied to increase supplier 
integration and to facilitate project decision-making. Finally, the mobile television alliance 
shows that project control is not necessarily based on legal ownership. In this case the 
authority of the telecom firm was based on non-ownership mechanisms (Mohr et al., 1996; 
Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005), namely its project management capabilities and expertise. 
 
Cross-case comparison: an ideal-typical organizational configuration  
Above we have identified three organizational elements that help development projects to 
deal with the characteristics of inter-industry architectural innovations. Table 6.2 provides 
a brief overview of our findings. When considered jointly, the three projects show that 
these organizational elements operate collectively rather than independently. First of all, 
development projects of inter-industry architectural innovations benefit from 
differentiation. Differentiation results if incumbents from the relevant industries provide 
access to their existing systems and/or allocate specialized employees to the projects (the 
two alliances). Furthermore, differentiation can result from the active involvement of 
specialized component suppliers (the mobile banking alliance). Alliances such as these 
allow the partners to access each other’s knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). 
Without the input from specialized incumbents or suppliers, development projects face the 
difficulty to purchase components without any deep technological knowledge of the 
different industries (the start-up case). 
 
Whereas differentiation helps to develop an architecture that consists of high-quality 
components, this benefit can only be fully exploited if these components are also 
successfully integrated. Prior to the development effort no architectural knowledge exists 
about how this should be done. Frequent and rich information-exchange between 
component specialists was shown to contribute to the generation of a joint architectural 
understanding and to successful component alignment (the mobile television alliance). 
Without such a high degree of coordination integration (Robertson and Langlois, 1995) 
interdependencies are likely to remain undiscovered and the alignment of components is 
likely to be suboptimal (the start-up and the mobile banking alliance). Hence, the 
development process is likely to benefit from a combination of differentiation and 
coordination integration between component specialists (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Brusoni et al., 2001; Gulati et al., 2005) as this helps to build a coherent product system 
from high-quality components.  
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Table 6.2 Key organizational elements of the three projects 
 
 
Especially the start-up shows the difficulty to develop an inter-industry architectural 
innovation without both differentiation and coordination integration. Of course the start-up 
lacked the direct capabilities to develop the required component technologies itself, but in 
the absence of a clear understanding about which components to purchase (Flowers, 2007), 
and without effective internal coordination (Takeishi, 2001), the start-up also lacked the 
indirect capabilities to gain access to external capabilities (Loasby, 1998; Araujo et al., 
2003). Put differently (see Chapter 3), the start-up lacked the systems integration 
capabilities to organize and integrate its suppliers in a loosely coupled network that would 
benefit from both differentiation and coordination (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001a).  
 
The two alliances indicate that extensive coordination integration is insufficient to achieve 
effective collaboration between specialist partners. The primary purpose of coordination 
integration is to generate architectural knowledge, but actual decisions about how to design 
the architecture of the new product system might still be very difficult and uncertain, 
especially given the differences that are likely to exist between specialists from different 
industries. In this respect, the mobile banking alliance shows decision-making and conflict-
resolution difficulties in the absence of top management involvement and a clear project 
leader. In contrast, the mobile television alliance illustrates how top management 
involvement from all specialists, in combination with a clear project leader, contributes to 
timely and effective decision-making. 
 
In sum, although differentiation, coordination integration, and project control are each 
important in the development of inter-industry architectural innovations, our analysis 
suggests that it is especially their combination that contributes to project performance. Put 
differently, these three organizational capabilities are far from independent. For instance, 
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without coordination integration between specialists it seems worthless to have access to 
high-quality component technologies. In addition, projects could still fail in the presence of 
high-quality components and a detailed architectural understanding, if project participants 
fail to reach agreements and resolve conflicts about the design of the product architecture. 
Hence, our understanding of different organizational elements increases substantially when 
we consider them simultaneously rather than in isolation. In other words, the three 
organizational capabilities can be considered the building blocks of an ideal-typical 
organizational configuration (e.g. Doty and Glick, 1994; Miller, 1996; see also Chapter 2). 
This results in the following tentative proposition: 
 
Proposition. The development of inter-industry architectural innovations is more  
likely to be successful to the extent that its organizational form facilitates (1) high  
differentiation (by actively involving specialists from the different industries) as well  
as (2) high coordination integration and (3) timely and effective decision-making. 
 
6.4 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter complements existing literature about architectural innovations (e.g. 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001) as it focuses on the 
development of a specific type of architectural innovation, i.e. inter-industry architectural 
innovation. These innovations create new product systems by integrating previously 
unconnected technologies from different industries. They bring together firms from 
different industries with different capabilities and with no prior ties. Based on a 
comparative case study we formulated the proposition that development projects of inter-
industry architectural innovations are more likely to be successful to the extent that their 
organizational form facilitates (1) high differentiation (by actively involving specialists 
from the different industries) as well as (2) high coordination integration and (3) timely 
and effective decision-making. 
 
Different organizational forms meet the characteristics of this general proposition. 
Differentiation can for instance result from many different organizational set-ups, such as a 
joint-venture between firms from different industries, an acquisition of a firm from another 
industry, a contract with a supplier from another industry, or ‘simply’ a temporary NPD 
alliance between firms from the different industries. Our results suggest that these 
organizational forms have to be set up in such a way that coordination between the 
different specialists is intense. The acquired unit for instance needs to be tightly integrated 
in the acquiring firm, or the partners in the joint-venture or the alliance need to be heavily 
involved in the development process and need to collaborate very closely (e.g. mixed 
teams, co-location, etc.).  
 
Moreover, we indicate that it is important to make sure that the organizational arrangement 
facilitates timely and effective decision-making and conflict resolution. This is crucial in 
the development of inter-industry architectural innovations, because this type of innovation 
is likely to involve difficult and complex architectural decisions and trade-offs. The 
different background of partners increases the likelihood of lengthy negotiations and 
conflicts. Obviously, decision-making authority will be relatively clear in buyer-supplier 
relationships or in unequal joint-ventures, i.e. when one firm is clearly dominant.  
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In fifty-fifty joint-ventures, or in alliances on an equal basis, decision-making will be more 
difficult. Which firm will for instance appoint the project manager? Or will decisions be 
made using team consensus (e.g. Gerwin and Ferris, 2004)? The mobile banking alliance 
shows that consensus decision-making between lightweight managers without strong top 
management involvement causes serious problems. We therefore suggest that top 
managers are heavily involved in the development process, for instance by participating in 
a steering group. This worked well in the mobile television alliance. In addition, it seems 
wise to specify clear decision-making and conflict-resolution rules. This might involve 
third-party arbitration (e.g. Oxley, 1997), but a relatively effective and fast approach is to 
have one dominant actor among the actively involved partners. In the absence of 
consensus, this actor is able to make fast and qualified decisions that are often perceived as 
fair by the other participants (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Tadelis, 2002) 
  
It has to be stressed that our results indicate that it is especially the interplay of the three 
organizational characteristics that contributes to project performance rather than each 
organizational element individually. As such, our findings contribute to the literature about 
new product development and its (organizational) success factors (e.g. Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Henard and Szymanski, 2001). This literature typically investigates the 
individual effects of success factors rather than their holistic effect.  
 
This study also complements the literature that focuses on the combination of integration 
and differentiation (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Orton and Weick, 1990; Sheremata, 
2000; Gulati et al., 2005), which also includes the literature about systems integration. The 
systems integration literature takes the perspective of firms producing complex product 
systems, i.e. multi-component, multi-technology products (e.g. Hobday, 1998; Brusoni et 
al., 2001; see also Chapter 3). Because of the complexity of their products, these firms can 
not develop and produce all components themselves, i.e. they have to make use of external 
specialists (differentiation). At the same time, these firms are faced with the need to 
coordinate their network of component and subsystem suppliers to ensure the integrity of 
their products (coordination integration). For this purpose these ‘systems integrators’ need 
detailed architectural knowledge (Brusoni et al., 2001; Hobday et al., 2005). The 
coordination of component providers and the creation of a coherent product system are 
also key challenges for inter-industry architectural innovations, but as our cases illustrate 
this takes place without the leadership of an incumbent systems integrator that already 
possesses detailed architectural understanding.  
 
Whereas Brusoni et al. (2001) consider systems integration as an organizational form that 
combines the benefits of differentiation and (coordination) integration, our analysis also 
includes issues of control. In the absence of prior architectural knowledge and without 
knowledge overlap between collaborating specialists, project-decision making should 
preferably facilitate negotiations and conflict-resolution. In this regard, having a dominant 
firm with authority over the development process complements coordination and decision-
making that is based on less formal mechanisms, such as mutual adjustment and teamwork 
(Mintzberg, 1979; Radner, 1992). Hence, systems integration is seen here not only as a 
combination of differentiation and coordination, but as a configuration of differentiation, 
coordination, and control.  
 
136
 126 
Our findings also have relevance for the literature about transaction cost economics and 
strategic alliances. In development projects of inter-industry architectural innovations 
asset-specificity tends to be high, because project investments are likely to be valuable 
only in this specific product architecture. Especially in the absence of prior ties between 
partners, this results in the expectation to find organizational solutions that provide strong 
transactional safeguards, such as full integration or equity joint-ventures (e.g. Williamson, 
1985; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Geyskens et al., 2007). Furthermore, appropriation concerns 
can result from learning asymmetries between partners (Gerwin and Ferris, 2004). In the 
development of inter-industry architectural innovations learning opportunities involve both 
the architectural knowledge that is generated in the project as well as co-specialized skills 
from partners (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
 
In our cases transaction costs appeared to play a limited role however, as it appeared that 
strategic considerations and task characteristics (i.e. architectural uncertainty and task 
interdependence) governed the design of the organizational form rather than concerns over 
opportunistic behavior and appropriation (e.g. Casciaro, 2003; Gulati et al., 2005). The 
start-up involves a highly integrated organizational solution of course, but this was not the 
result of transaction costs. The start-up preferred to collaborate with incumbents, but these 
actors did not want to collaborate because of strategic rather than transaction-cost 
concerns. In the mobile banking alliance the bank did aim to protect its part of the project, 
but this was mainly as it feared security problems rather than opportunism.  
 
Furthermore, the mobile television alliance started as an informal alliance with no 
contractual basis. The three partners committed themselves to the project and trust seemed 
to exist right from the start of the alliance. In addition, the telecom firm and the television 
firm were large firms for which it was important to maintain their reputation of being a 
trustworthy partner. The entrepreneurial nature and the dependence of the small IT firm 
meant that it entered the alliance without any hesitation. Furthermore, even in the presence 
of behavioral uncertainty, investments by partners from the different industries are likely to 
create a situation of a mutual hostage which prevents hold-ups (Williamson, 1985). More 
in general, appropriation concerns regarding each other’s co-specialized skills will be 
difficult to realize in development projects of inter-industry architectural innovations. 
Given that the partners come from different industries, their absorptive capacity is likely to 
be limited (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The telecom firm and the television firm for 
instance possessed completely different capabilities, as did the bank and the mobile 
operator.   
 
Limitations and future research 
Several characteristics of this chapter have to be kept in mind when interpreting its results. 
First, it has to be noted that we mainly focused on explaining the short-term performance 
of the three development projects. We did not explicitly consider any long-term effects. 
The mobile television alliance shows however that asymmetric learning of the new 
architectural knowledge does affect the evolution of the project in the long-term. This 
mobile television application was designed as a total solution that could be sold to many 
companies and that would have to be continuously upgraded in the future. The telecom 
firm had a big say in the design of the application and also absorbed the new architectural 
knowledge because of its heavy involvement and monitoring. Hence, the telecom firm 
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positioned itself as the systems integrator for this application and its future evolution. This 
became all the more apparent, as the telecom firm - after the successful completion of the 
development project - obtained the property rights of the application. In other words, the 
organization of the development project and the way in which architectural knowledge is 
created and absorbed by the project participants can have a strong impact on the division of 
future profits from the application. An opportunity for future research is therefore to 
explicitly consider strategies to obtain a leading position as a systems integrator (e.g. 
Adner, 2006). 
 
Secondly, to facilitate cross-case comparison, the three cases all come from one particular 
empirical setting as they all included mobile telecommunications technology as part of the 
product architecture. As a result, limited evidence exists about the domain of our tentative 
proposition. External validity was not the main purpose of this study however, as our main 
objective was to generate a better understanding about how inter-industry architectural 
innovations can best be developed. For this purpose, we selected differently organized 
development projects from the same empirical context. Informed by our findings and our 
tentative proposition, future studies are therefore needed to refine and test this proposition 
in different empirical settings. One opportunity for future research would be to investigate 
organizational forms that comply with our proposition, including joint ventures or 
acquisitions. In addition, replications are needed of projects that deviate (preferably to a 
great extent) from the proposition. An interesting setting would be to investigate extreme 
cases such as incumbents that go it alone or acquisitions. In such cases it would be 
interesting to study how the highly complementary but very distinct capabilities are 
organized within a single administrative framework. Richardson (1972) for instance argued 
that coordination will be very difficult under these circumstances. Strategic alliances might 
therefore be more efficient for the purpose of bringing together and integrating inter-
industry architectural innovations (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). Finally, large-sample 
studies are of course needed to draw conclusions about the extent that (fit with) the 
proposed configuration explains project performance.7 
                                                          
7
 Another limitation of our study is - of course - that other factors might drive a project’s 
organizational form than the three characteristics of inter-industry architectural innovations that we 
focused on in this chapter. In this regard, Chapter 4 pointed to the novelty of the mobile network (in 
terms of interfaces) and the novelty of the mobile application (in terms of functionality) as 
determinants of operator involvement. In this chapter, based on principles of information-processing, 
coordination and integration by a mobile operator was expected to be beneficial for project (and also 
market) performance when network interfaces are new. In this chapter, the mobile payment alliance 
involved relatively new, yet standardized WAP interfaces. A mobile operator was involved in this 
project, but coordination intensity was limited. In line with what we might expect based on Chapter 
4, we find that this negatively influenced project performance as a result of difficulties to resolve 
interdependencies. Furthermore, Chapter 4 discussed application novelty in relation to the 
commercial performance of the application. It was hypothesized that external application developers 
- to the extent that the application provides new functionality - need to take on a larger part of the 
investments in a development project. This would bring additional incentives to the project. 
Although commercial performance is not the prime interest in this chapter, all three applications 
provided considerably new functionality at the time of their development. Consistent with the view 
of Chapter 4, we observe in all three cases that non-mobile operators take on all of the project 
investments (the mobile payment start-up and the mobile television alliance) or half of the project 
investments (the mobile banking alliance). 
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Managerial implications 
Despite these limitations, this chapter sheds light on the specifics of inter-industry 
architectural innovations, which are becoming more prominent in the recent times of 
industry convergence. For managers this study first of all illustrates the challenges to 
develop inter-industry architectural innovations. The relevant technological building 
blocks will be dispersed across firms from different industries and the processes to design 
and develop a new architecture and to resolve interdependencies are likely to be 
problematic due to the lack of existing architectural knowledge and the lack of prior ties 
among participants. This chapter proposes a practically relevant organizational form for 
this type of development effort, i.e. an organizational form that (1) provides access to high-
quality capabilities related to the technologies from which to create the new product; (2) 
that facilitates rich and frequent information exchange between the different specialized 
technology providers; and (3) that makes it possible to make timely and effective 
decisions. Key to our argument is that all three elements need to be present in order to be 
effective, i.e. the likelihood of a successful project decreases in the absence of one of the 
elements. For example, the presence of a dominant actor does not reduce the need for 
information-exchange to develop architectural knowledge. Neither will the presence of 
such a leading firm be effective for projects that have no access to strong component 
capabilities. 
  
As indicated above, our proposition leaves room for many different practical 
interpretations to organize this type of development project. The proposition offers 
managers a basic tool that they can use to organize development projects in line with their 
own preferences. For instance, if the firm has a strong desire to control the project, or if 
trustworthy partners do not exist, it could be decided to acquire a company or to hire 
experts. Because inter-industry architectural innovations tend to involve the first-time 
collaboration of firms, managers could be inclined to equally share investments and 
decision-making power (e.g. the mobile banking alliance). Difficult architectural decisions 
are likely to be required however and consensus decision-making is likely to be difficult 
given the lack of a prior history and the different backgrounds of these firms. We therefore 
argue that this type of innovation calls for arrangements that help to prevent and resolve 
conflicts, e.g. by involving top management, by specifying clear decision-making 
procedures, and/or by having one actor that takes the formal lead in the project.  
 
In addition, managers must be aware that it is very important for partnering firms to 
closely collaborate given the need for the joint creation of architectural knowledge. This 
should be considered in the selection of a partner and in the set-up of the partnership itself. 
Another important criterion in the selection of a partner from another industry involves its 
technological capabilities related to that specific industry (for the purpose of 
differentiation). Conversely, our proposition suggests that some organizational solutions 
will be inappropriate for this type of innovation. It will for instance be very difficult for a 
single firm to go it alone, especially if it involves a relatively small firm, such as a start-up. 
Finally, it is important to note that the proposition does not suggest that the ideal-typical 
organizational form makes it easy to develop this type of innovation. It does provide an 
organizational setting however that is tailored to the characteristics and the challenges of 
this particular type of development effort, and that therefore increases the likelihood to 
achieve high project performance.  
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PART 3. 
 
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING 
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7. The Effect of NPD Project Organization on Problem-
Solving Proficiency: The Moderating Role of Systemic 
Problems 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Given the importance of new product development (NPD) in the quest for competitive 
advantage, it is of great importance to understand what organizational characteristics of 
NPD projects contribute to project performance. However, little quantitative evidence 
exists about the causal mechanisms that bring about project outcomes. This chapter 
contributes to our understanding of this ‘black box’ by investigating the extent that several 
integration and differentiation mechanisms determine the capability to solve technical 
problems fast, cost-efficiently, and effectively. More specifically, we hypothesize that 
different types of problems require a different organizational approach. On the one hand, 
autonomous problems, i.e. problems with individual components, generally require 
differentiation to acquire deep component knowledge. On the other hand, systemic 
problems, i.e. problems affecting multiple components, generally require extensive 
integration to realize coordination and generate detailed architectural knowledge. The 
results from a survey of web application development projects indicate that the effects of 
decentralization and reach (differentiation mechanisms) and of project-manager influence 
and connectedness (integration mechanisms) on problem-solving proficiency are 
moderated by the extent that a project’s problems are systemic rather than autonomous. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Reflecting the inherent uncertainty of new product development (NPD), NPD projects are 
often characterized by unexpected technical and operational problems (e.g. Wheelwright 
and Clark, 1992; Clark and Fujimoto, 1990; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Sheremata, 
2000; Gouel and Fixson, 2006). These problems can have enormous consequences for 
project outcomes. The development of the Airbus A380 was for example delayed by more 
than a year because the cabin wiring (100,000 wires and more than 40,000 connectors) of 
the first batch of airplanes had to be substantially adjusted. For managers a key issue 
involves how they can organize NPD teams to increase their capability to solve problems 
fast, cost-efficiently and with high-quality solutions, for instance in terms of team 
composition, the type of project leader, and the degree and type of project control (e.g. 
Henard and Szymanski, 2001; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1995). 
 
According to Sheremata (2000) proficient problem solving requires ambidextrous 
organizational forms that make project teams act creatively as well as collectively. More 
specifically, she proposed that project teams require differentiation as well as integration 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Daft and Lengel, 1986; Tushman 
and Nadler, 1978). Differentiation mechanisms mainly “increase the quality and quantity 
of ideas, knowledge, and information an organization can access” (Sheremata, 2000; 
p.395), whereas integration mechanisms predominantly “integrate dispersed information, 
knowledge, and ideas into collective action” (Sheremata, 2000, p.398). User involvement 
and decentralization can for instance be considered differentiation mechanisms, because 
their main effect seems to be to increase a project team’s knowledge reservoir (Sheremata, 
2000). In contrast, heavyweight managers can be considered integration mechanisms, since 
they are able increase the team’s unity of effort (Sheremata, 2000).  
 
Atuahene-Gima (2003) put Sheremata’s model to a first empirical test and he found that 
several differentiation and integration mechanisms predicted one or more dimensions of a 
team’s problem-solving proficiency (e.g. problem-solving speed, solution quality). In 
addition, he found that problem-solving proficiency partly mediates the effects of some 
organizational characteristics on overall project performance (e.g. development speed and 
product quality). Despite these initial theoretical and empirical insights, additional research 
is required to replicate and refine these findings. For instance, little evidence exists about 
whether the effects of differentiation and integration on a team’s problem-solving 
proficiency hold for all types of problems.  
 
In the development of complex products, i.e. products consisting of multiple 
interdependent and technologically distinct components, a distinction can be made between 
two types of problems: autonomous problems and systemic problems. Autonomous 
problems are problems related to the ‘hidden design rules’ (Baldwin and Clark, 1997) of 
individual components with no implications for other components, i.e. they are stand-alone 
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problems. In the design and development of a mobile phone for instance, the phone 
manufacturer might find that the phone prototype malfunctions because the application 
processor has insufficient capacity to fully support the functionality incorporated in the 
mobile phone (e.g. mobile Internet, a video/photo camera, etc.). This would be an 
autonomous problem if the processor could be easily replaced however by a higher-
capacity processor without requiring any rework on other components, such as the phone’s 
operating system. 
 
In contrast, systemic problems are related to multiple components and possibly affect the 
entire product architecture (e.g. Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). Consider again the case of a 
mobile phone development project. The phone manufacturer might want to incorporate a 
digital camera unit into an existing mobile phone design. This may have huge implications 
however for the existing product architecture. It might not only mean the relatively simple 
adjustment of the phone’s exterior design to integrate the lens and to include a button to 
shoot pictures, as it could also mean a total reshuffling, resizing, and reprogramming of 
existing components as well as including one or more new components, such as a better 
processor, new software, etc. In addition, it is likely that trade-offs are required in this 
process, i.e. do we include a better processor or do we settle for the old processor by 
including a less advanced operating system? Hence, the systemic problem in this case 
requires consideration of and changes to multiple parts of the product.   
 
In this chapter we argue that each type of problem has its own organizational requirements 
to facilitate proficient problem solving. First of all, autonomous problems can be expected 
to benefit especially from the presence and the generation of detailed component 
knowledge, since these problems are related to individual components and since they do 
not affect other component in the product system. From the product modularity literature 
we learn that specialization and differentiation are particularly beneficial in the case of 
stand-alone problems (e.g. Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000; Brusoni et al., 
2001). We can for instance expect that specialist team members are able to solve 
autonomous problems on their own, without much involvement of project management or 
coordination with other team members.  
 
Secondly, in order to solve systemic problems proficiently, development teams can be 
expected to require not only deep component knowledge, but especially knowledge about 
how components interrelate, i.e. architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
Systemic problems are likely to require decisions from project management and system 
engineers to resolve design trade-offs as well as extensive coordination with and between 
team members to resolve interdependencies (e.g. Teece, 1996). Hence, if project problems 
are predominantly systemic in nature, our general expectation is that project teams will be 
better able to solve problems when they are tightly coupled, i.e. when their organizational 
forms facilitate coordination and integration among the project members responsible for 
different parts of the new product (e.g. Weick, 1976; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Brusoni 
et al., 2001).  
 
In sum, based on the fundamental differences between both autonomous and systemic 
problems, we expect that NPD project teams need to be organized differently in terms of 
differentiation and integration dependent on the extent that the project’s problems are 
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systemic rather than autonomous. In this chapter we develop a set of hypotheses about 
specific differentiation mechanisms (e.g. decentralization and external search for 
information) and integration mechanisms (e.g. team connectedness and project manager 
influence) and how their effects on problem-solving proficiency (i.e. in terms of cost 
efficiency, speed, and solution quality) are moderated by the extent that projects are 
confronted with one type of problem or the other. We test our hypotheses using stepwise 
regression analysis based on survey data about web application development projects. 
 
Two theoretical contributions of this chapter are the following. First of all, we contribute to 
the literature about the development of complex product systems (e.g. Hobday et al., 2005; 
Prencipe et al., 2003) by shifting the unit of analysis from the level of the firm to the level 
of the NPD project team. Typically, this literature considers the boundary of an 
orchestrating firm (i.e. a systems integrator) with respect to the design and development of 
a product architecture and its individual components and subsystems. Brusoni et al. (2001) 
for instance propose that the decision to integrate detailed component design and 
development depends on the need for differentiation and integration as determined by the 
technical characteristics and dynamics of component technologies and interfaces. Here, we 
apply these ideas at a lower level of analysis by studying the organization of project teams 
for the development and the integration of a product system. 
 
Secondly, we add to the literature about NPD success factors by providing further insights 
about the ‘black box’ of the NPD process (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). More 
specifically, we add to the literature that treats NPD as a problem-solving process (e.g. 
Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-Gima, 2003) by investigating how the organization of the 
NPD project as a problem-solving capability is contingent upon different types of 
problems. Below we first of all provide a theoretical background on the organization of 
NPD projects and formulate hypotheses. Subsequently, we outline our methodology to test 
these hypotheses. Next, we present our results. This chapter ends with a discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
7.2 Theory 
Literature reviews have shown that organizational characteristics (e.g. decentralization, 
communication, and project leadership) constitute an important group of NPD success 
factors (e.g. Henard and Szymanski, 2001; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995), but far less 
evidence exists about the processes that mediate the causal effects of these success factors 
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Sheremata (2000) directly addressed this ‘black box’ 
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995) as she proposed that the effects of a project’s organizational 
characteristics on project performance are mediated by the extent that these organizational 
factors help the team to solve technical problems proficiently, i.e. fast, cost-efficiently, and 
effectively.  
 
The capabilities of project teams to solve problems fast, cost-efficiently, and with high-
quality can be seen as “intangible, higher-order capabilities that enable a firm to perform 
critical product development activities better than its competition” (Atuahene-Gima, 2003, 
p.363). Proficient problem solving for instance means that project teams absorb and 
generate new knowledge, e.g. about specific technologies, user needs, or task 
interdependencies, and apply this knowledge to meet project goals in terms of budget, 
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time-to-market, and quality (Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-Gima, 2003). Prior studies have 
rarely considered however whether and how this effect is contingent upon different types 
of technical and operational problems. This chapter aims to address this gap.  
 
Autonomous problems and systemic problems 
Given that many products consist of multiple components or subsystems (Hobday, 1998; 
Dvir et al., 1998; Sosa et al., 2004), we make a distinction between autonomous problems 
and systemic problems. Autonomous problems are technical and operational problems that 
are related to individual components and that have no implications for other components. 
Systemic problems, on the other hand, are problems that have implications for multiple, 
interdependent components (e.g. Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). Autonomous problems 
and systemic problems have different demands in terms of proficient problem solving. 
Autonomous problems mainly require technical knowledge about individual components 
(e.g. Baldwin and Clark, 1997), whereas systemic problems also require deep expertise 
about component interrelationships. Such architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 
1990) is required to optimize the joint quality of the components that are affected by 
systemic problems.  
 
In general, we expect that differentiation mechanisms are especially important in the case 
of autonomous problems, because they tend to increase the team’s specialized expertise 
about individual components. On the other hand, integration mechanisms will be especially 
important for the fast and efficient generation of high-quality solutions for systemic 
problems, as they help to achieve unity of effort (Tushman and Nadler, 1978; Thompson, 
1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). More specifically, integration mechanisms facilitate 
the generation of architectural knowledge and the coordination of project members 
working on and responsible for different components, i.e. integration mechanisms provide 
the team with a systems integration capability (cf. Brusoni et al., 2001). Autonomous 
problems are unlikely to benefit from integration mechanisms, because they can be solved 
by specialists on their own and because coordination with other project members might 
bring irrelevant information to the problem-solving process. This might even result in 
ineffective compromises.  
 
Hypotheses  
In this chapter we focus on five organizational characteristics of NPD projects. 
Decentralization and reach can be classified as differentiation mechanisms, whereas 
connectedness, project manager influence and free flow of information can be regarded 
integration mechanisms (Sheremata, 2000). In this section we formulate hypotheses about 
how the effects of these mechanisms on problem-solving proficiency are moderated by the 
extent that project problems are systemic rather than autonomous (Figure 7.1). As 
dependent variables we consider solution quality, problem-solving speed, and problem-
solving efficiency. Solution quality refers to the extent that solutions contribute to the 
quality of the new product. Problem-solving speed and efficiency refer to the time and cost 
required to find and implement solutions. These dimensions will often be related (e.g. 
Sheremata, 2002). Fast problem-solving might for instance mean that fewer resources are 
used (e.g. man hours) and high-quality solutions might increase problem-solving speed and 
efficiency as it prevents rework (Gouel and Fixson, 2006).  
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Figure 7.1 Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
Decentralization exploits the component knowledge that is present within teams by giving 
project members the freedom to solve problems that are related to the components they are 
working on (Sheremata, 2000). Component specialists will be comparatively less effective 
to make decisions that are in the interest of the product as a whole, such as decisions about 
trade-offs between components. This is more likely to be done effectively by central 
leaders who are responsible for the product as a whole (e.g. Adner, 2006; Brusoni et al., 
2001). Decentralization will therefore have a weaker effect on solution quality for systemic 
problems than for autonomous problems. Furthermore, decentralization generally makes it 
more difficult to reach consensus among project members (Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-
Gima, 2003). This especially increases the time and resources required for solving 
systemic problems, but this effect might be absent for autonomous problems, since these 
problems do not require joint decision-making. Hence, in the case of systemic problems 
decentralization will also have a comparatively weak effect on problem-solving efficiency 
and speed. This results in the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Decentralization contributes less to solution quality for projects  
with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous 
problems. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. Decentralization contributes less to problem-solving speed for  
projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous 
problems. 
 
Hypothesis 1c. Decentralization contributes less to problem-solving efficiency for  
projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous 
problems. 
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Reach refers to the extent that a project team searches for ideas and information at external 
specialists, such as suppliers, i.e. it refers to the breadth of search (Brusoni et al., 2007). In 
more general terms, the use of external sources in the innovation process is also referred to 
as open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). According to Chesbrough (2003) the main 
rationale for open innovation is the presence of ‘abundant knowledge’ in the environment 
of firms. This especially holds for specialist knowledge about individual technologies 
though, since architectural knowledge is in general highly tacit and product-specific (e.g. 
Henderson and Clark, 1990). Deep architectural knowledge is therefore more likely to be 
generated within projects. In sum, reach provides a means to acquire high-quality 
component knowledge faster than would be possible based on internal knowledge only 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1990; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987; Atuahene-Gima, 2003). In the 
case of systemic problems, smaller reach means that teams can focus their time and 
resources on the internal creation of architectural knowledge. Hence, the following 
hypotheses can be formulated.  
 
Hypothesis 2a. Reach contributes less to solution quality for projects with mostly  
systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous problems. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. Reach contributes less to problem-solving speed for projects with  
mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous problems. 
 
Hypothesis 2c. Reach contributes less to problem-solving efficiency for projects  
with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous 
problems. 
 
Connectedness refers to the extent of direct contact among team members in for instance 
meetings and team work (Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-Gima, 2003). Connectedness 
therefore brings people together and allows for the integration of diverse fields of expertise 
and provides opportunities for feedback and mutual adjustment (Ancona and Caldwell, 
1992; Clark and Fujimoto, 1990; Daft and Lengel, 1986; Tushman and Nadler, 1978; Van 
de Ven et al., 1976). Hence, connectedness is likely to contribute to the team’s 
understanding of component interrelationships and to its capability to solve and implement 
systemic problems fast, cost-efficiently and effectively. In contrast, connectedness will be 
less important for solving autonomous problem-solving, because these problems require 
less coordination with project members working on other components. Here, contact with 
project members not directly relevant to the problem-solving process might delay this 
process and result in ineffective compromises. Hence, the following hypotheses can be 
formulated.  
 
Hypothesis 3a. Connectedness contributes more to solution quality for projects  
with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous 
problems. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. Connectedness contributes more to problem-solving speed for  
projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous 
problems. 
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Hypothesis 3c. Connectedness contributes more to problem-solving efficiency for  
projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous 
problems. 
 
Project management influence refers to the authority and expertise of the project 
management (Atuahene-Gima, 2003). Influential and skilled leaders generally enjoy great 
freedom and they are likely to motivate a team for collective action (Clark and Fujimoto, 
1990). They also tend to possess A-shaped skills, which allow them to integrate different 
disciplines (Madhavan and Grover, 1999). Hence, strong leaders seem especially relevant 
in the case of systemic problems. Furthermore, strong project managers are thought to 
increase the speed of problem-solving, because they can use their influence to prevent 
lengthy negotiations and their expertise to speed-up the design and implementation of 
solutions (Atuahene-Gima, 2003; Clark and Fujimoto, 1990). This effect will be especially 
strong for systemic problems, which involve multiple actors and might therefore suffer 
from goal differences and honest differences of opinion (Gulati et al., 2005).  
 
Hypothesis 4a. Project management influence contributes more to solution 
quality  
for projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly 
autonomous problems. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. Project management influence contributes more to problem- 
solving speed for projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with 
mostly autonomous problems. 
 
Hypothesis 4c. Project management influence contributes more to problem- 
solving efficiency for projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects 
with mostly autonomous problems. 
 
Free flow of information was classified by Sheremata (2000) as a differentiation 
mechanism, but she indicates that organizational factors can have multiple effects. This 
seems true for free flow of information, because this mechanism can be expected to have 
an important integrative effect. By facilitating unrestricted information exchange between 
project members, free flow of information is likely to improve the T-shaped skills of team 
members, which allows them to understand the systemic impact of their tasks (Iansiti, 
1993; Madhavan and Grover, 1999). It also reduces the likelihood of misunderstandings 
between different team members as a result of fast feedback (Atuahene-Gima, 2003; 
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Free flow of information will therefore help to generate 
high-quality architectural knowledge fast and efficiently. In contrast, autonomous 
problems will benefit comparatively less from a free flow of information among team 
members, because the resolution of this type of problem typically requires information 
from component specialists. In this case, team-wide information flows can be excessive, 
which reduces problem-solving speed and efficiency.  
 
Hypothesis 5a. Free flow of information contributes more to solution quality for  
projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous 
problems. 
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Hypothesis 5b. Free flow of information contributes more to problem-solving  
speed for projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly 
autonomous problems. 
 
Hypothesis 5c. Free flow of information contributes more to problem-solving  
efficiency for projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly 
autonomous problems. 
 
Table 7.1 provides an overview of the predicted moderating effects of the extent that 
project problems are systemic rather than autonomous. Decentralization and reach 
(differentiation mechanisms) are comparatively beneficial in terms solving autonomous 
problems, because of their capability to provide fast and cost-efficient access to high-
quality component knowledge. Free flow of information, connectedness, and project 
management influence (integration mechanisms) are especially important for solving 
systemic problems. This is because of their benefits in terms of architectural knowledge 
creation and achieving unity of effort among project members.  
 
Table 7.1 Overview of hypothesized moderating effects*  
 
* A positive (negative) sign means that the independent variable contributes more (less) to the dependent variable 
for projects with mostly systemic problems than for projects with mostly autonomous problems. 
 
7.3 Method 
We tested our hypotheses using survey data on development projects of web applications 
that were performed in the Netherlands. Development projects of web applications 
constitute a suitable empirical context. Firstly, problem solving is likely to be a crucial 
element in these projects, because software development in general is problem-prone 
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(Faraj and Sproull, 2000; Sheremata, 2000). Secondly, with the increased availability of 
broadband Internet connections, web applications - in areas as diverse as health care, 
education, entertainment, and e-business - have become more advanced and increasingly 
complex in recent years. Despite the use of standardized communication protocols and 
object-oriented programming, the development of many ‘Rich Internet’ or ‘Web 2.0’ 
applications involve customized software programming, extensive fine-tuning, and 
possibly even hardware adjustments, thus increasing the likelihood of systemic problems. 
 
Furthermore, the Dutch market is a suitable empirical setting for our study, because the 
wide availability and rapid growth of broadband Internet in the Netherlands promotes the 
development of web applications. The adoption of broadband connections in the Dutch 
market is among the highest in the world (more than 25 subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
[OECD, 2005]) and in the Netherlands unique competition exists at the infrastructural level 
between the traditional telecommunications infrastructure (using DSL technologies) and 
the cable, which covers over ninety percent of Dutch households.  
 
In the absence of an encompassing population of Dutch web application development 
projects, we established our target population as follows. First, we approached 74 projects 
that were performed as part of a government program called ‘Kenniswijk’ to promote the 
development of broadband services. We obtained data on 39 of these projects (53%). 
Secondly, we compiled a list of 43 Internet bureaus made up of members of an association 
of Dutch Internet bureaus and of Internet bureaus mentioned in a list of top ICT companies 
in 2005 (published by a leading Dutch ICT magazine). We asked a director of these firms 
to complete our survey for a recently finished project that was relatively complex for their 
firm. This increased the likely variation in our dataset in terms of the extent that problems 
are systemic rather than autonomous. In some cases the directors themselves were the 
project manager of these projects. In other cases the directors provided us with the name of 
the project manager. From this list 27 firms completed the survey (63%). Finally, we 
compiled a list of new applications mentioned on an ICT news site (Planet Multimedia) in 
2006 and 2007. Of these 36 projects we got response on 26 projects (72%).  
 
A comparison of the three subpopulations in terms of our variables of interest (see Figure 
7.1) as well as several control variables (see below) revealed that these three groups are 
very similar8. In sum, our overall population consists of 153 projects and our dataset 
consists of 92 projects, which is a response rate of sixty percent. With respect to all of the 
variables that we included in our analysis, we compared the group of responses that we 
obtained after the first contact (63 respondents) and the group of responses that we 
obtained after sending out a reminder e-mail (29 respondents). We found no significant 
differences between these two groups (Oneway ANOVA), which is typically seen as 
evidence for the absence of nonresponse bias (Wright and Overton, 2008).  
                                                          
8
 Of the variables included in our analysis One-way ANOVA revealed different means for team size, 
connectedness, and reach. Subsequent Tukey tests revealed only two significant mean differences 
(p<0.05), i.e. Kenniswijk projects are smaller-sized than Planet Multimedia projects and Kenniswijk 
projects on average reach out more to their environment than the projects performed by Internet 
bureaus.    
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The average project duration from start to completion was nine months. In general, the 
web applications were considerably new (3.8 on a five-point scale ranging from not new at 
all to very new) and they were developed under considerable time pressure (with an 
average value of 3.7 on a five-point scale ranging from minimal to huge time pressure). In 
general, the teams in our dataset were small. For instance, 54% of the project teams 
consisted of 2-5 full-time project members. Another thirty percent of the teams consisted 
of 6-25 full-time team members. In terms of firm size the number of employees in about 
one third of the firms was in the range of 1 to 5. Another one third of the firms had more 
than one hundred employees. Finally, about one third of the firms existed for more than 
twenty years, while another one third of the firms existed five years or less.  
 
Data collection and measurement 
To collect data we used an on-line questionnaire. We pretested our questionnaire with 
colleagues and the self-completion of the on-line questionnaire was pretested in on-site 
think-aloud interviews with two managers of web application development projects (Hak 
et al., 2004). With our questionnaire we targeted project managers as single informants, 
because they are generally the most knowledgeable actors. For most cases we found the 
names of project managers or company directors and their telephone numbers on the 
Internet. We first approached respondents by phone and invited them to participate. If they 
agreed we sent them an e-mail with a link to the questionnaire.  
 
Our approach of single respondents might have introduced a common variance problem 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). We think that this threat is limited in our case, since it is unlikely 
that the ratings of respondents were structured by implicit theories they might have had 
that resembled our moderation hypotheses (e.g. Doty et al., 1993; Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Further evidence for the absence of common method bias is provided by the Harman’s 
single-factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Principal component analyses on the variables 
for each of the six regression models reported in Table 7.3 revealed multiple factors. We 
would expect one factor to emerge should strong common method bias exist. In the case of 
multiple factors we would expect the largest factor to account for a large degree of the 
covariation among the variables. The explained variation of the largest variable is limited 
however (less than 24 percent), which reduces concerns of common method bias. 
 
We measured most of our concepts using (5-point Likert) scales that were validated in 
prior research. Some items were adapted to reflect the characteristics of our particular 
empirical context. Appendix A provides a detailed overview of the measures used and their 
sources. In the Appendix we also provide the results from the exploratory factor analysis 
(Varimax rotated principal axis factoring) we used to validate the scales. All scales point to 
a one-factor model. They all have an eigenvalue greater than 1 and all but one explain 
more than 70% of the variance in the data. Appendix A also presents the Cronbach’s alpha 
values. One of these coefficient reliabilities (connectedness) is slightly below the common 
threshold value of 0.70. All other scales are (well) above this value. Table 7.2 presents 
descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and correlations).  
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Table 7.2 Correlations and descriptive statistics 
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7.4 Results from hierarchical regression analyses 
For each of the three dependent variables (problem-solving efficiency, solution quality, 
and problem-solving speed) we performed a hierarchical regression analysis. In Model 1 
we entered several control variables as well as the five independent variables. In Model 2 
we added the five interaction terms to test our hypotheses. We also controlled for time 
pressure and firm size, but we excluded them because they failed to reach significance. 
Table 7.3 presents the results. Multicollinearity is of no concern in the analyses, since the 
values of the Variance Inflation Factor are all below 2.0. Overall, we find significant 
regression models that explain more than twenty percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable (up to 31 percent adjusted R2). In addition, in all three analyses the addition of the 
interaction terms involves a significant step that improves the explained variance with 
about ten percent. In addition to several significant main effects, we find five significant 
interaction effects. Three effects support their corresponding hypothesis (Hypotheses 2a, 
3a, and 4b), whereas two of them show a positive sign instead of an expected negative sign 
(Hypotheses 1c and 2c).  
 
Table 7.3 Results of the hierarchical regression analyses  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Team size 0.23* 0.17* -0,06 -0,17 -0,14 -0.18*
Application novelty -0,09 -0,11 -0.22* -0.21* -0,06 -0,07
Extent that problems are systemic -0.19* -0.17* -0,09 -0,07 -0,06 0,00
Decentralization 0.24** 0.22* 0.21* 0.23* -0,02 -0,10
Reach 0,11 0,11 -0,06 -0,04 -0,08 -0,04
Free flow of information 0.37*** 0.31** 0.30** 0.30** 0.45*** 0.45**
Connectedness -0.21* -0.21* -0.26* -0.28** -0,16 -0.25*
Project management influence 0,09 0,03 -0,12 -0,13 -0,04 -0,07
Decentralization * Systemic -0,10 0.33* -0,19
Reach * Systemic -0.23** 0.18* -0,11
Free flow of information * Systemic -0,01 -0,20 0,17
Connectedness * Systemic 0.22* 0,06 0,04
Project management influence * Systemic 0,07 0,05 0.33***
Incremental R^2 0,10 0,09 0,13
Partial F 2.55* 2.08* 3.19**
R^2 0,31 0,41 0,24 0,33 0,22 0,35
Adjusted R^2 0,25 0,31 0,17 0,22 0,14 0,24
F 4.75*** 4.17*** 3.22** 2.98*** 2.87** 3.23***
n 92 92 92 92 92 92
Problem-solving EfficiencySolution Quality Problem-solving Speed
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standardized coefficients are reported for a 1-sided test. 
 
Below we investigate the statistically significant interaction effects in greater detail using 
simple slope analyses. Based on the coefficients reported in Table 7.3, these analyses 
compare the mean values of the dependent variables for values of one standard deviation 
above and one standard deviation below the mean values of the independent variable and 
the interaction variable. After the presentation of the results from these simple slope 
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analyses we report the findings of additional (polynomial) regression analyses to further 
investigate the robustness of the interaction effects. 
 
Moderation of integration mechanisms: connectedness and project manager influence 
Our general expectation was that integration mechanisms are moderated positively by the 
extent that project problems are systemic rather than autonomous (see Table 7.1). We find 
two significant interaction effects involving integration mechanisms and both support this 
view. First, this involves the relationship between connectedness and solution quality 
(Hypothesis 3a). Slope analysis reveals that the relationship between connectedness and 
solution quality is marginally positive under conditions of systemic problems, but that a 
statistically significant (p<0.001) negative association exists under conditions of 
autonomous problems (see Figure 7.2). Figure 7.2 reveals that a high degree of 
connectedness will on average result in solutions of about the same quality regardless of 
the type of problems. For low values of connectedness however, solution quality is on 
average much higher for autonomous problems than for systemic problems.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Moderation of the effect of connectedness on solution quality 
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In line with hypothesis 4b we find that project management influence contributes stronger 
to problem-solving speed under conditions of mostly systemic problems than under 
conditions of mostly autonomous problems (see Figure 7.3). If projects are confronted with 
mostly systemic problems, the effect of project management influence is significantly 
positive (p<0.05), but for predominantly autonomous problems the presence of an 
influential project manager or project management team is associated with lower problem-
solving speed (p<0.10).  
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Figure 7.3 Moderation of the effect of PM influence on problem-solving speed 
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Moderation of differentiation mechanisms: reach and decentralization 
Our general expectation for differentiation mechanisms holds that they are comparatively 
more beneficial for problem-solving proficiency when projects are confronted with mostly 
autonomous problems. The regression analysis supports this view regarding the effect of 
reach on solution quality (Hypothesis 2a). Figure 7.4 takes a more detailed look at this 
finding and shows that a significantly positive association exists for projects with mostly 
autonomous problems (p<0.05) and that a negative association exists (insignificant) 
between reach and solution quality for projects that are confronted with mostly systemic 
problems. On average, low reach results in roughly the same quality of the solution 
regardless of the type of problem. For high values of reach, solution quality is on average 
much higher for systemic problems than for autonomous problems.  
 
Contrary to our expectations (Hypotheses 1c and 2c), we find that the effects of reach and 
decentralization on problem-solving efficiency are positively moderated by the extent that 
problems are systemic rather than autonomous. In the case of reach (Figure 7.5), a positive 
effect exists for projects with mostly systemic problems. In addition, a negative effect 
exists for projects with mostly autonomous problems. Hence, when we compare Figure 7.4 
and Figure 7.5, a trade-off exists in terms of reach: it appears very difficult to solve 
problems (of either type) efficiently and with a high quality. We discuss this effect in 
greater detail in the discussion section.  
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Figure 7.4 Moderation of the effect of reach on solution quality 
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Figure 7.5 Moderation of the effect of reach on problem-solving efficiency 
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Finally, simple slope analysis (Figure 7.6) reveals that decentralization has a slightly 
negative effect on problem-solving efficiency if problems are autonomous. If projects are 
confronted with predominantly systemic problems a positive, statistically significant 
relationship exists (p<0.01). We discuss also this effect in greater detail in the next section.  
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Figure 7.6 Moderation of the effect of decentralization on problem-solving efficiency 
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7.5 Additional polynomial regression analyses 
In this section we present the results from additional analyses that complement the step-
wise regression analyses reported above. These prior analyses only report main effects and 
interaction effects. As discussed earlier (Chapter 2) this provides only a partial and 
constrained picture of the fit between the independent variables and the interaction variable 
(e.g. Edwards, 1993). Polynomial regression relaxes these constraints and is therefore able 
to investigate the robustness of the significant interaction effects that we found earlier. 
These effects might namely be confounded with nonlinear effects in terms of the 
independent variable and or the interaction variable.  
 
In adopting this approach we first of all scale-centered the independent variables and the 
interaction variable by subtracting the mean from each rating. These scales therefore run 
from -2 to 2 with a value of 0 as their midpoint. This helps to mitigate problems due to 
multicollinearity and - when presented graphically in 3-D plots - makes interpretation of 
the results easier (Edwards and Parry, 1993). In the first step of each regression analysis 
(see Table 7.4) we entered the control variables, the independent variables, and the 
interaction variable. In the second step we entered the squared terms of the independent 
variables and the interaction variable. This step increases the explained variance with 8 to 
10 percent. This step is significant only for problem-solving speed.  
 
In the final step we entered the significant interaction effects that we found in the prior 
analyses. Because of concerns about the power of the test we did not include the other 
interaction terms. This last step helps to explain an additional 5 to 6 percent of variance in 
the dependent variable. All interaction variables turn out to be significant in these new 
analyses. Hence, our original findings do not appear to be confounded by the effects of 
squared terms. Furthermore, this final step is significant in all three analyses. 
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Table 7.4 Results from polynomial regression analysis 
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For each dependent variable the full model is significant at p<0.001 with the percentage of 
variance explained ranging from 23 percent up to 30 percent (Adjusted R²). 
Multicollinearity is of limited concern in these additional analyses. Except for 
connectedness and free flow of information, all VIF values are below 2.5. Connectedness 
and free flow of information are only slightly above this strict rule of thumb (VIF = 2.7).  
 
To increase our understanding of the findings in Table 7.4, we used the unstandardized 
regression coefficients to plot the effects for each significant interaction as a three-
dimensional surface. These plots also take into account the direct effects and the squared 
terms of the two variables that make up the significant interaction effect. In these analyses 
we assume that the other variables take on the mean value of 0. Below we discuss the 
results from these additional analyses for each of the three dependent variables, starting 
with solution quality. 
 
Solution Quality 
Whereas our original results reported an insignificant effect from reach (see Table 7.3), 
our additional polynomial analysis (see Table 7.4) indicates that reach has a positive main 
effect and that its squared term has a significant negative value (which indicates an 
inversed U-shape effect). The interaction term between reach and systemic problems has a 
significant negative value, which is in line with our original findings. These effects are 
visualized in three-dimensional space in Figure 7.7.  
 
This figure presents a concave surface.9 From this figure we learn that the positive main 
effect holds under conditions of autonomous problems. In other words, reach is especially 
likely to result in high-quality solutions for autonomous problems (in fact, solution quality 
reaches its peak in the corner where reach is high and systemic problems are low). 
Conversely, autonomous problems will be of a significantly lower quality if the project 
team aims to solve autonomous problems on its own without the help of external 
specialists (see also Figure 7.4). 
 
In Figure 7.7 it is also apparent that the inversed U-shape relationship especially holds for 
situations of systemic problems. In other words, if teams are confronted with mostly 
systemic problems, then it appears that a moderately open approach is most likely to result 
in high-quality solutions. In this way the team might obtain relevant information from 
external sources, but at the same time balance this with internal effort to integrate this 
information in high-quality architectural knowledge. This effect went unnoticed in the 
original analysis. This effect also indicates that teams might ‘over-search’ (Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002) for relevant ideas and solutions. Prior studies also found and explained these 
limits of Open Innovation (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2006). Traditional explanations are 
related to the limits of a firm’s resources and attention to successfully search for external 
ideas, i.e. firms face the difficulty to absorb and choose between the many ideas and 
solutions; ideas may come at the wrong time; and ideas may be too many to implement 
each of them (Koput, 1997). Since we find that the inversed U-shaped effect especially 
                                                          
9
 Concave surfaces are those surfaces for which any line connecting two points on the surface lies on 
or below that surface. In contrast, a surface is convex if any line connecting two surface points lies 
on or above the surface (Edwards and Parry [1993] referring to Chiang [1974, p.255]). 
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holds under conditions of systemic problems, we add to this literature by suggesting that 
over-search is more likely if a firm’s open search activities are aimed at finding high-
quality architectural knowledge. This knowledge tends to be scarce as well as highly 
specific and tacit and therefore difficult to absorb (e.g. Reagans and McEvily, 2003). At 
least some internal knowledge generation is therefore required to reach high-quality 
solutions for systemic problems. 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Effects of reach and systemic problems on solution quality 
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The second significant interaction term in the explanation of solution quality involves 
connectedness (see Table 7.3). Table 7.4 reveals that the main and squared terms for 
connectedness are insignificant. Supporting our initial findings, the interaction term is also 
significant in Table 7.4. Figure 7.8 plots the effects of connectedness and systemic 
problems. In this saddle-shaped figure connectedness is associated slightly positively with 
solution quality if problems are highly systemic. In contrast, higher values of 
connectedness tend to be associated with solutions of lower quality in situations of mainly 
autonomous problems. This latter effect is statistically significant as judged by the simple 
slope analysis presented above. Given the absence of significant main and squared terms, 
this figure adds little to the effects already visualized in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.8 Effects of connectedness and systemic problems on solution quality 
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Problem-solving efficiency 
In the case of problem-solving efficiency the additional analyses (Table 7.4) first of all 
reveal a significantly negative association with the extent that problems are systemic 
(indicating that systemic problems are in general more difficult to solve efficiently). The 
results also indicate a significantly positive effect for the squared term of the extent that 
problems are systemic (indicating a U-shaped relationship). This analysis therefore refines 
our prior analysis. Finally, the interaction terms involving decentralization and reach are 
also significant in our additional analysis, which supports our original findings. Figure 7.9 
and Figure 7.10 illustrate the effects for decentralization and reach.  
 
Both figures present more or less the same surface. First of all, both illustrate the negative 
main effect of systemic problems and its positive squared term. These effects appear to be 
contingent upon the degree of decentralization and reach: for low values of reach and 
(especially) decentralization problem-solving efficiency tends to decrease if problems 
become more systemic (reflecting the main effect). For high values of decentralization and 
reach the U-shaped association becomes visible. This U-shaped relationship indicates that 
reach and decentralization are especially likely to result in efficient problem solving if the 
projects are confronted with only systemic problems or only autonomous problems. To the 
extent that a project is confronted with problems of both types, problem solving tends to 
become less efficient. The explanation for this finding might be specialization: if teams are 
only confronted with systemic problems or only with autonomous problems, this means 
that the team’s external search effort can focus on finding architectural knowledge or 
component knowledge. Similarly, in the case of autonomous problems, empowered team 
members can fully specialize with respect to their own component. In the case of systemic 
problems, individual team members learn how to accomplish their tasks while being 
sensitive to the tasks of other team members.  
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Figure 7.9 Effects of decentralization and systemic problems on problem-solving 
efficiency 
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Figure 7.10 Effects of reach and systemic problems on problem-solving efficiency 
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Figure 7.9 and 7.10 also visualize the interaction effects: decentralization and reach are 
associated somewhat negatively with problem-solving efficiency under conditions of 
autonomous problems. In contrast, both organizational characteristics (especially 
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decentralization) appear to be positively associated with problem-solving efficiency in case 
of systemic problems. This is in line with Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 above. 
 
Problem-solving speed 
Regarding problem-solving speed we find that the extent that problems are systemic has a 
negative main effect and a positive effect of its squared term (just as for problem-solving 
efficiency). We also find that the interaction term between project management influence 
and the extent that problems are systemic is significant. This supports our initial finding. 
The saddle-shaped surface in Figure 7.11 clearly visualizes this interaction effect.  
 
Figure 7.11 Effects of PMI and systemic problems on problem-solving speed 
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7.6 Discussion and conclusions 
This study meets the call to generate a better understanding of the new product 
development process (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). In particular, this chapter improves 
our understanding of NPD as a problem-solving process (e.g. Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-
Gima, 2003). As far as we know, this study is the first that looks into the moderating effect 
of different types of problems. We argue that NPD projects - for the purpose of proficient 
problem solving - need to be organized differently dependent on the extent that problems 
during the NPD process are systemic rather than autonomous. Our results indicate that 
problem solving is far from a universal NPD capability.  
 
First of all, we found that connectedness and project management influence (i.e. two 
integration mechanisms) contribute significantly more to respectively solution quality and 
problem-solving speed when project problems are systemic rather than autonomous. This 
is in line with our expectation that integration mechanisms are especially helpful for 
solving systemic problems, as they help to generate architectural knowledge and to achieve 
unity of effort. We also found that reach (i.e. a differentiation mechanism) contributes 
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more to solution quality for projects that are confronted with mostly autonomous problems 
than for projects that are confronted with mostly systemic problems. This is in line with 
our expectation that differentiation mechanisms are especially useful for autonomous 
problems, as they promote the development and exploitation of detailed expertise about 
individual components. 
 
In contrast to our expectations, we find that reach and decentralization (i.e. differentiation 
mechanisms) are particularly helpful for problem-solving efficiency when projects are 
confronted with predominantly systemic problems. Given the strong positive correlation 
between problem-solving efficiency and problem-solving speed (ρ=0.56; p<0.001; Table 
7.2), we also might expect to find similar interaction effects for the relationships between 
these differentiation mechanisms and problem-solving speed. We find no (directional) 
support for such relationships however (see Table 7.3), which might reflect the conceptual 
difference between problem-solving speed and problem-solving efficiency (in spite of the 
strong correlation still considerable unexplained variance exists between the two).  
 
How can we explain these unexpected interaction effects? Regarding decentralization this 
effect might be explained by its benefits in terms of the implementation of solutions. In the 
case of systemic problems, decentralization was expected to be comparatively costly 
because of the difficulty to reach consensus among the affected team members. However, 
decentralization might be a particularly efficient way to implement solutions for systemic 
problems once they have been decided upon. Imagine the time and resources it would 
require for a central actor to specify in detail how project members have to make local 
changes to all the components that are affected by a systemic problem. Instead, it seems 
more efficient to provide general specifications and design information within which 
empowered specialists are able to optimize their components. Future research should 
attempt to distinguish between the generation and the implementation of solutions. 
 
When we investigate Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 it becomes apparent that a strong trade-off 
exists in terms of reach. In the case of autonomous problems, problem-solving based on 
extensive reach appears to be a less efficient problem-solving tactic than limited reach. 
Whereas relevant specialized component knowledge is likely to exist in a firm’s 
environment (which is indicated by the positive association with the quality of solutions 
for autonomous problems), this might be comparatively costly as a result of for instance 
licensing fees, supplier contracting, or knowledge absorption.  
 
In the case of projects with mostly systemic problems, reach is an efficient problem-
solving approach, but at the same time it is likely to result in solutions of significantly 
lower quality. Above we have already seen that extensive external search is unlikely to 
provide the team with the architectural knowledge that is required for high-quality 
solutions. Such external search obviously requires resources, but we expect that this is 
considerably less expensive than the internal investments that are required to generate 
detailed architectural knowledge. This is likely to be a lengthy process that demands large 
investments in for instance people, training, and integration mechanisms. In other words, 
the development of a systems integration capability is costly, but crucial for the 
development of high-quality product architectures (Adner, 2006; Brusoni et al., 2001).  
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Although not the main focus of our chapter, we also find several direct effects. First, free 
flow of information (for which we found no moderating effect) has an overall positive 
effect on problem-solving proficiency. Hence, project teams whose members communicate 
without any restrictions are likely to be more proficient in problem solving than teams 
whose members communicate less easily, e.g. as a result of geographical dispersion or 
political issues. In terms of solution quality and problem-solving speed these findings are 
in line with prior research (Sheremata, 2000; Atuahene-Gima, 2003). Sheremata (2000) 
proposed a negative effect however of free flow of information on problem-solving 
efficiency, because extensive use of information exchange requires additional resources 
(e.g. communication channels and increased labor costs). We find a positive effect on 
problem-solving efficiency however. Possibly, free flow of information results in more 
efficient problem solving because of its positive effects on problem-solving speed and 
solution quality. A faster process might mean that fewer resources are used (e.g. man 
hours) and better solutions might mean that less rework is required. 
 
Secondly, connectedness has a consistently negative effect on problem-solving 
proficiency. Contrary to the proposition formulated by Sheremata (2000) we therefore 
found that frequent contact between team members delays the problem-solving process. 
Although Atuahene-Gima (2003) expected a positive effect of connectedness on solution 
quality, we find that solution quality suffers from frequent meetings. An explanation might 
be that ‘forced’ meetings might result in solutions as compromises that include input from 
project members that are not directly relevant to the specific problem at hand.  
 
Considered jointly, the opposing effects of free flow of information and connectedness are 
intriguing. In Table 7.2 we find a significant positive association between both factors (ρ = 
0.41; p<0.001), but factor analysis clearly separates the items of both factors. It might well 
be that team meetings are an important way to freely exchange information or to promote 
information-exchange when communication barriers are present. Information can be 
exchanged in many other ways though, such as through file sharing, phone calls, e-mails, 
and informal face-to-face deliberations. Especially in small teams we might expect these 
mechanisms to be more important than meetings. This view is supported in Table 7.2 by a 
significant correlation between team size and connectedness (ρ = 0.27; p<0.05). Since 
most of the surveyed project teams are small, direct contact through meetings might delay 
the problem-solving process, because other communication mechanisms are less time-
consuming in such settings.  
 
Another explanation is that connectedness forms a suppressor effect (Maassen and Bakker, 
2001). Free flow of information is significantly correlated with the three dependent 
variables. It is therefore no surprise to find significant regression coefficients for this 
variable. Connectedness however is hardly correlated with the three dependent variables, 
but it is significantly correlated with free flow of information, e.g. the more people meet, 
the more they will exchange information. Regression models without connectedness still 
show strong and significant regression coefficients for free flow of information, but they 
are significantly increased if connectedness is entered into these models. For solution 
quality and problem-solving efficiency this step is statistically significant. This indicates a 
suppressor effect, i.e. even though connectedness is not related to the dependent variable, 
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its correlation with free flow of information suppresses irrelevant variation from free flow 
of information, thus increasing the explanatory power of this variable.  
 
Two other direct effects were the relationships between decentralization and respectively 
problem-solving efficiency and solution quality. The positive effect on problem-solving 
efficiency is not in line with the expectation formulated by Sheremata (2000), who 
proposed that autonomous specialists might push problem-solving too far (thus reducing 
efficiency). A possible explanation is that the allocation of discretion to specialists 
increases their commitment and results in a better use of their expertise. Hence, 
decentralization might help to solve problems once and for all with high-quality solutions. 
This is likely to prevent costly rework and additional problem-solving expenditures. The 
positive effect that we found between decentralization and solution quality supports this 
view. This latter finding supports the proposition as formulated by Sheremata (2000) and is 
also in line with the empirical findings from Atuahene-Gima (2003).   
 
The additional polynomial analyses explored whether new insights would emerge based on 
the findings of less-constrained and more comprehensive regression models. For this 
purpose we took the significant interaction effects from the original analyses and we 
included in their regression models the squared terms of the moderating variable and of the 
five independent variables. Several interesting insights emerged from these additional 
analyses. Most importantly, all five interaction effects remained significant in these new 
analyses. This indicates that the original findings were not confounded by curvilinear 
effects. Furthermore, their inclusion in the regression models involved significant steps.  
 
In addition, the polynomial analyses did result in several new insights. First, we found that 
reach – in combination with the extent that problems are systemic – has a more complex 
effect on solution quality than previously recognized. Whereas our original analysis did not 
reveal a significant main effect of reach on solution quality, by including its squared term 
we find a significant main effect as well as a significant squared term. The resulting three-
dimensional surface (Figure 7.7) supports our earlier finding that the quality of solutions to 
autonomous problems benefits from increasing levels of reach (although this effect 
diminishes as the value of reach increases). In addition, a new insight indicates that as 
problems become more systemic it becomes important to gradually decrease the team’s 
reach until a medium degree of reach, which seems optimal for projects with mostly 
systemic problems. Consistent with our theory this indicates that it is important to gather 
component knowledge from external sources under these circumstances, but that 
significant attention and resources are also required to integrate and combine (internally) 
the different component-level insights into deep architectural knowledge. This finding 
shows the limits of Open Innovation, which is based on the premise that firms operate in ‘a 
landscape of abundant knowledge’ (Chesbrough, 2003). Our results indicate that – as far a 
architectural knowledge is required – this is more likely to be generated internally than that 
it can be found externally. A moderate extent of external search for component knowledge 
might be appropriate, but subsequently this needs to be applied internally to develop an 
understanding of their interrelationships. Typically, architectural knowledge is very 
product-specific and highly tacit, which makes it much more suitable to develop internally. 
As we have seen, this internal development is likely to be a very expensive effort though. 
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Secondly, for the models explaining problem-solving efficiency, we found that the extent 
that problems are systemic has a significantly negative main effect and a significantly 
positive squared term (indicating a U-shaped relationship). In our original models we did 
not find a significant direct effect. In combination with the three significant interaction 
effects (between systemic problems and respectively decentralization and reach) we found 
two surfaces of roughly the same shape (Figures 7.9 and 7.10). Whether the extent that 
problems are systemic has a negative main effect or the U-shape effect appeared to be 
contingent upon the value of decentralization or reach. For low values of these 
organizational characteristics autonomous problems can be solved more efficiently (this 
reflects the negative main effect of systemic problems), whereas for high values of the 
organizational characteristics especially systemic problems can be solved efficiently. This 
latter effect diminishes as problems become less systemic and thereafter increases again as 
problems become mainly autonomous. 
 
This U-shaped effect not only indicates that decentralization and reach are especially 
relevant for systemic problem-solving, but it also shows that these organizational 
characteristics can be beneficial to solve autonomous problems, albeit less significantly 
than in the case of systemic problems. This U-shaped relationship indicates that – for high 
values of decentralization and reach – it is difficult to deal with projects that are confronted 
with both systemic and autonomous problems. If one of the two types of problems 
dominates then the organizational factors become more effective, possibly because the 
team can switch to a specific problem-solving mode, whereas the best of both worlds have 
to be combined for projects with mixed problems, thus causing efficiency problems. 
  
Limitations and future research 
Our study has several limitations. First, the size of our dataset is limited. Although a larger 
dataset increases the power of the test, the current study provides sufficient possibility to 
detect the strongest – and therefore the most relevant – effects. Secondly, common method 
bias might have influenced our results. We do not expect though that respondents have 
completed the questionnaire based on an implicit theory that resembles our conceptual 
model (e.g. Podsakoff et al., 2003). Third, we used project managers as single respondents 
because they are generally the most knowledgeable respondents in our context. Although 
the use of multiple respondents often results in higher validity, single-respondent designs 
are justified in certain situations (Pagell and Krause, 2008). We targeted project managers 
since we expected that our respondents had a good understanding of the characteristics and 
the efforts of the generally small-sized teams. For instance, project managers can be 
considered the most appropriate respondents to judge on the creativity and the quality of 
solutions (e.g. Shalley and Gilson, 2004). Interviews and survey pretests confirmed this 
expectation. Furthermore, we only asked for issues related to the team itself, i.e. issues the 
respondent was directly responsible for. We did not focus on constructs outside of the 
project team. By contacting respondents by phone, we ensured as much as possible that the 
right person completed the questionnaire. Finally, it was difficult to collect data from 
multiple respondents in our empirical context. For instance, it was impossible to gather 
data from CEOs and project managers, because this was in many cases one and the same 
person. 
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Fourth, we used subjective ratings because objective data is difficult to collect for NPD 
projects. Hence, the extent that a project’s problems are systemic rather than autonomous 
is not determined by the technical characteristics of problems. Instead the type of problem 
heavily depends on the perceptions and choices of project managers and their team 
members. Managers and teams can namely influence whether a problem is systemic or 
autonomous, because the solutions that they pursue may or may not have systemic 
consequences. Consider the development of a mobile phone and assume that its processor 
turns out to provide insufficient capacity for the phone to perform as intended. One 
solution may be to simply replace the processor by a better one. If the implementation of 
this new processor requires no adjustments to other components or interfaces, then the 
problem can be considered autonomous. Another solution to this same problem might 
however be to maintain the original processor and to opt for the redesign of the mobile 
phone itself, e.g. less or ‘downsized’ software applications and more basic hardware 
elements, such as the screen and the camera. This solution therefore requires decisions, 
trade-offs, and redesigns for multiple components, which makes this same problem a 
systemic problem. Following the basic assumptions of this study, teams need 
organizational forms that match the systemic consequences that are implied by the 
solutions they implement.  
 
In this respect is that the chosen solution might be determined by the organizational form 
of the project team, which points to the possibility of reversed causality. Very 
differentiated project teams can be expected to perceive problems as being autonomous 
and might tend to prefer autonomous solutions. At the same time, this might mean that 
such teams fail to recognize the systemic nature of problems. Such a mismatch provides a 
potential rival explanation of the effects that we found in this chapter. Consider for 
instance the negative effect of project management influence on problem-solving speed 
under conditions of autonomous problems (see Figure 7.3). It might well be that a 
respondent defines problems as autonomous and manages the problem-solving process 
accordingly, whereas problems are in fact highly systemic. In this case the speed of a 
project might especially suffer from the presence of a strong leader, because these leaders 
might be less inclined to adapt the problem-solving process when interdependencies 
become apparent. In contrast, project members might enjoy more freedom to meet the 
needs of these systemic problems when a relatively weak leader heads the project. This 
potential explanation points to the importance for future research to develop a better 
understanding of the process of problem finding and of problem definition in project 
teams. There is only very limited research about this topic (Sheremata, 2002).  
 
In terms of the extent that our findings are generalizable to the population as a whole we 
concluded in the methods section that there were no statistically significant differences 
between the first wave of respondents and the second wave of respondents. This is what 
many studies report as evidence for the absence of nonresponse bias. However, given the 
relatively small size of the two groups we are likely to lack the power to detect group 
differences (Wright and Overton, 2008). Finally, the external validity of our results has 
clear limits. It is for instance important to note that our study focused on software-based 
products. Furthermore, the size of most project teams was small (i.e. 54% of the projects 
consisted of 2-5 full-time team members). Hence, additional studies in different empirical 
settings are required to replicate our findings and to increase our confidence in them. The 
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investigated effects might for instance be different for larger project teams, e.g. larger 
projects might benefit more strongly from integration mechanisms in case of systemic 
problems (since it is typically more difficult to achieve unity of effort among a larger 
number of individuals) and from differentiation mechanisms in case of autonomous 
problems (since more specialist expertise is likely to be present in larger projects).  
 
Besides replications in theoretically selected populations to increase our confidence in the 
validity of the current conceptual framework (Figure 7.1), another opportunity would be to 
study which configurations of specific organizational characteristics contribute to problem-
solving proficiency. For instance, which specific combinations of differentiation and 
integration mechanisms are especially beneficial under which contingencies? Sheremata 
(2000) also indicated that the organization of the NPD process can be considered as a 
balanced mix of organizational and managerial elements. Limited research exists however 
that explicitly adopts configurationalism (Doty et al., 1994). 
 
Managerial implications 
Given the strategic importance of NPD it is important that managers aim to increase its 
chances of success. NPD is inherently risky and uncertain, and therefore very much a 
problem-solving process (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Our results provide further 
support for the view that the organizational design of the NPD process contributes to the 
teams’ problem-solving proficiency. This chapter shows that problem solving is a complex 
capability that needs to be sensitive to the type of problems encountered during the 
development process. Systemic problems and autonomous problems are two different 
types of problems and have very different requirements. This needs to be accounted for in 
the organization of the NPD process to increase the chance of successful problem-solving. 
This finding seems all the more relevant given that products in many industries are 
becoming more complex (which increases the likelihood of systemic problems).  
 
A strong and important finding is the trade-off that exists in terms of reach, i.e. the extent 
that teams adopt an external perspective. Active search for information from for instance 
users and technology suppliers is likely to help improve the efficiency of problem-solving 
in case of systemic problems, but it might work completely the opposite way in case of 
autonomous problems. Reach has exactly the opposite effect on solution quality: in the 
case of systemic problems reach decreases the likelihood to generate high-quality 
solutions, whereas high-quality solutions are likely in case of autonomous problems. 
Managers therefore need to trade-off both effects. Managers must realize that frequent 
contact and consultation with external sources must not prevent the project team from 
integrating these acquired insights to be able to deal with systemic problems. Conversely, 
managers must be aware that autonomous problems are likely to be efficiently solved using 
internal knowledge, but that the quality of solutions (at the expense of decreasing 
efficiency) can be improved by engaging with external actors.  
 
The direct effects indicate that free flow of information contributes to faster, better, and 
less costly problem-solving. This implies that it is important to facilitate communication 
between project members as much as possible and to remove any barriers. Furthermore, if 
high-quality and cost-efficient solutions are required it seems important that team members 
have the authority to make their own decisions in the problem-solving process. 
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To act upon our findings, managers must of course know the extent that their products will 
be confronted with autonomous or systemic problems. In general, projects are more likely 
to be confronted with technical problems if the innovation is technologically new to the 
project team. Novelty means that project tasks will be more uncertain and more 
unpredictable for the project team and that more problems have to be solved to generate 
the knowledge that is needed to complete the project. More specifically, problems are more 
likely to be systemic in nature to the extent that the innovation involves new architectural 
knowledge, i.e. if new combinations of components are involved and/or adjusted or new 
interface protocols. On the other hand, problems are more likely to affect individual 
components if existing interfaces are reinforced. Hence, systemic problems can be 
expected to occur especially in new, integral product designs, whereas autonomous 
problems are more likely to occur in stable, modular product architectures. 
 
Finally, it should also be noted - as mentioned in the limitations - that managers 
themselves can often decide whether a problem is systemic or autonomous, because the 
solutions that they pursue may or may not have systemic consequences. Dependent on the 
solutions selected by managers, this chapter provides clues about how they can 
subsequently organize their teams for the proficient realization and implementation of 
‘autonomous solutions’ or ‘systemic solutions’. 
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APPENDIX A. Measures and Factor Analysis Results 
 
 
 
Almost every development project faces technical or operational problems that threaten the 
goals of the project, for instance in terms of project costs, quality, or speed. To what extent do 
you agree or disagree with the following statements about the way problems were solved 
during this project? (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
In italics: results from varimax rotated principal axis factoring and the Cronbach’s Alpha 
reliability statistic. 
 
Problem-solving speed; scale based on Atuahene-Gima (2003) 
• Problem-solving took a lot of time during this project. (reverse-coded) 
• Solutions found for problems we faced were not timely. (reverse-coded) 
• The project team was very slow in finding and implementing solutions to the problems we 
encountered. (reverse-coded) 
• Ideas for solving the problems encountered were discovered rather late to be implemented 
successfully. (reverse-coded)  
Factor loadings are respectively 0.79; 0.92; 0.78; 0.68. Eigenvalue: 2.89. Variance 
explained: 72% . Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.87. 
 
Solution quality; new scale developed for this research 
• The solutions found solved the problems effectively. 
• The solutions found were of high quality. 
• The solutions found were based on detailed knowledge of the nature of the problems. 
• The solutions found did not result in new problems. 
Factor loadings are respectively 0.83; 0.81; 0.77; 0.69. Eigenvalue: 2.81. Variance 
explained: 70% . Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.85. 
 
Problem-solving efficiency; new scale developed for this research 
• Problem-solving in this project was very expensive. (reverse-coded) 
• During this project a lot of financial resources were expended on problem-solving. 
(reverse-coded) 
• The implementation of solutions found was very expensive. (reverse-coded) 
• The costs of problem-solving formed a substantial part of the total development costs. 
(reverse-coded) 
Factor loadings are respectively 0.88; 0.83; 0.88; 0.72. Eigenvalue: 3.05. Variance 
explained: 73% . Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.89. 
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Indicate your agreement with these statements regarding the project team’s product 
development activities: 
 
Decentralization; Adapted from Atuahene-Gima (2003); Ayers, Dahlstrom, Skinner (1997) 
• Project members had great freedom to make decisions of their own. 
• Project members hardly had to ask permission of a higher manager to take action. 
• Project members to a large extent determined how they realized their tasks. 
Factor loadings are respectively 0.84; 0.86; 0.80. Eigenvalue: 2.38. Variance explained: 
79% . Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.87. 
Free flow of information; Based on Atuahene-Gima (2003) and Hyatt and Rudy (1997). 
• Access to information from team members was quick and easy. 
• Project team members engaged in open and honest communication. 
• Team members willingly kept each other informed at all times. 
Factor loadings are respectively 0.76; 0.90; 0.82. Eigenvalue: 2.38. Variance explained: 
79%. Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.87. 
 
Reach; Based on Atuahene-Gima (2003) 
• The project team collected a lot of information about new market developments. 
• Technological developments were monitored very closely by the project team. 
The factor loadings for this two-item scale have a value of 0.82. Eigenvalue: 1.66. 
Variance explained: 83%; Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.80. 
 
Connectedness; Based on Sheremata (2002) and Van de Ven, Delbecq, Koenig (1976) 
• Project members had frequent, informal interactions with other team members 
• Project members frequently met in planned meetings 
• Project members often met in informal meetings. 
• Project members often collaborated in teams. 
Factor loadings are respectively 0.47; 0.44; 0.71; 0.67. Eigenvalue: 2.22. Variance 
explained: 50%. Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.66. 
 
Project management influence; Adapted from Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss (2001) 
• Project management was free to determine interim schedule targets. 
• Project management was free to adapt the technical design of the web application. 
• Project management was free to adapt the functionality of the web application. 
• Project management was free to choose the format of progress reviews. 
Factor loadings are respectively 0.58; 0.78; 0.64; 0.55. Eigenvalue: 2.22. Variance 
explained: 55%. Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.73. 
 
The extent that problems are systemic rather than autonomous; New scale.  
• Technical problems were often the result of problems with interfaces between components. 
• Solving technical problems often involved the adjustment of multiple components. 
The factor loadings for this two-item scale have a value of 0.81. Eigenvalue: 1.66. 
Variance explained: 83%; Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.79. 
 
Application novelty (1 = not new at all; 5 = very new) 
• How new was the software code of this web application? 
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8. More on Problem Solving: Does Problem-solving 
Proficiency Mediate and Does Problem Frequency 
Moderate? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The previous chapter has investigated how the organization of NPD projects influences the 
project team’s problem-solving proficiency. This chapter uses the dataset of the previous 
chapter to investigate to what extent problem-solving proficiency itself predicts project 
performance and whether problem-solving proficiency in this way mediates the effects 
from project organization on project performance. We also ask the question how the 
relationship between problem-solving proficiency and project performance is contingent 
upon the frequency of problems during the NPD project. We find that especially problem-
solving efficiency contributes to project performance. We also find that project efficiency 
suffers strongly if a large number of problems are solved fast. Furthermore, a limited 
number of mediated effects is present. Particularly the effects from free flow of 
information on project performance are mediated by problem-solving efficiency. 
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8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 7 we have investigated how the organization of NPD projects influences the 
capability of NPD teams to solve problems proficiently. We found that this relationship is 
contingent upon the type of problems a project team is confronted with. In this way we 
complemented Sheremata (2000), who focused on the direct effects of a project’s 
organizational form on problem-solving proficiency. In addition to this direct effect, 
Sheremata (2000) also proposed that problem-solving proficiency can be seen as a 
capability that mediates the effect of the project’s organizational form on project 
performance (i.e. project speed, new product quality, and project cost efficiency). In this 
chapter we focus on this mediating effect. 
 
In a first empirical test of Sheremata’s mediating effect, Atuahene-Gima (2003) found that 
problem-solving proficiency partially mediates the effect of several NPD process 
characteristics on project outcomes. This means that a project’s differentiation and 
integration mechanisms influence project performance directly as well as indirectly 
through its effect on problem-solving proficiency. In this study we first of all replicate the 
test as performed by Atuahene-Gima (2003) in an attempt to further increase our 
confidence in the validity of the mediating effect. In part, we also provide a first empirical 
test of Sheremata’s original model, because we also include in our analysis problem-
solving cost efficiency and project cost efficiency, which Atuahene-Gima (2003) did not 
include in his analysis.  
 
Key to the existence of a mediating effect is that a relationship exists between problem-
solving proficiency and project performance. We aim to increase our understanding of this 
relationship by investigating how its effect on project performance is moderated by the 
frequency with which a project team is confronted with problems. In general, Sheremata 
and Atuahene-Gima suggest positive effects in this regard, because problem-solving 
involves a critical capability that allows teams to achieve their objectives. On the other 
hand, the more that a project team is asked to apply its problem-solving capabilities the 
more that this might for instance delay the project irrespective of the speed of the problem-
solving process. Problems are an inherent part of new product development projects, but 
more problematic projects with a larger number of problems might on average perform 
worse than less problematic projects irrespective of a team’s problem-solving capability. In 
the next section we elaborate on the theory underlying this study and we formulate 
hypotheses. Subsequently we briefly discuss the method used to test these hypotheses. 
After that we present the results from our analysis and we end with a discussion and with 
several concluding remarks. 
 
8.2 Theory and hypotheses 
Sheremata (2000) proposed that problem-solving proficiency can be seen as an 
intermediate goal of NPD projects that mediates the effect of the project’s differentiation 
and integration mechanisms on the project’s overall performance. Atuahene-Gima (2003) 
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discussed this proposition from the perspective of the input-process-output model of group 
effectiveness (McGrath, 1984). Seen from this theoretical perspective, the organization of 
the NPD project (i.e. the differentiation and integration mechanisms) constitutes the input 
to the NPD project team’s problem-solving process, which in turn determines the team’s 
output in terms of project performance.   
 
Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm (e.g. Barney, 1991), Atuahene-Gima 
argues that the structure and the managerial processes within NPD teams reflect 
organizational capabilities that can provide the basis for competitive advantage. These 
company-specific capabilities collectively play a critical role in helping the firm to create 
attractive new products that contribute to the firm’s competitiveness. These organizational 
process characteristics of NPD projects are widely regarded as an important group of 
determinants of NPD performance (e.g. Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995; Henard and 
Szymanski, 2001), thus suggesting that these process characteristics influence project 
performance directly. This apparent explanatory strength of the project’s organizational 
characteristics prompted Atuahene-Gima to investigate whether the effects of the 
differentiation and integration mechanisms are indeed fully mediated (as implied by 
Sheremata’s model) or whether they are actually partially mediated, which assumes the 
existence of a direct effect on project performance as well (see Figure 8.1).  
 
Figure 8.1 Problem-solving as a mediator and problem frequency as a moderator 
 
 
The direct effect of problem-solving proficiency on project outcomes 
A prerequisite for any mediating effect through problem-solving proficiency is that 
problem-solving proficiency is strongly related to project performance. Atuahene-Gima 
(2003) again cites the resource-based view of the firm as the theoretical basis for the effect 
that problem-solving proficiency has on project outcomes. Problem-solving processes are 
“intangible, higher-order capabilities that enable a firm to perform critical product 
development activities better than its competition” (Atuahene-Gima, 2003, p.363). 
Atuahene-Gima found that problem-solving speed is related positively with the speed of 
the development project and with the quality of the new product and that solution quality is 
associated positively with the quality of the new product. This is in line with his 
expectations. Fast problem-solving means that teams are able to learn and to generate new 
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knowledge and solutions fast. This indicates is likely to contribute to the speed of the 
development project and to the quality of the product. Similarly, high-quality solutions 
mean that project teams are able to solve problems in line with the requirements of 
customers in terms of for instance durability and reliability (Atuahene-Gima, 2003). 
 
Atuahene-Gima found no strong effect however of solution quality on project speed. 
Whereas he expected a positive effect, he actually found a (modest) negative effect (Beta = 
-0.12; n.s.). This suggests that high-quality solutions in general increase the duration of the 
project. This makes intuitive sense, because it can be expected to take time to understand 
problems in detail and to develop, test, and revise solutions in order to solve problems 
optimally.  
 
Atuahene-Gima did not include as a dependent variable project cost efficiency. This raises 
the question how this dimension of project performance is affected by problem-solving 
speed and solution quality. In general we expect negative relationships in this regard, 
because it is likely to take considerable resources to generate and implement solutions of 
high quality and in a short amount of time. This for instance involves getting the opinion 
and input from experienced and highly-trained employees or external specialists, 
simultaneous investments in the generation of alternative solutions, and increasing project 
staffing to implement and test solutions.  
 
Neither did Atuahene-Gima include in his analysis the cost-efficiency of the problem-
solving process itself. How does this relate to the three dimensions of project performance, 
i.e. product quality, project speed, and project cost efficiency? First of all, cost-efficient 
problem-solving might positively influence the budget performance of projects, because it 
results in comparatively little expenditures on problem-solving. Furthermore, cost-efficient 
problem-solving might mean that relatively few resources are needed, such as man hours, 
and that the required resources and equipment are readily accessible to the firm and that 
they do not have to be obtained from external sources. In addition, it might indicate that 
the implementation of the solution requires fairly limited adjustments to the product. This 
could all mean that cost-efficient problem solving is associated positively with the project 
meeting its time schedule.  
  
In a similar vein, cost-efficient problem solving might indicate that limited resources are 
needed to solve problems in line with product requirements. If not, we can expect project 
teams to invest substantially more to meet the demands of customers. Hence, problem-
solving cost-efficiency can be expected to contribute positively to product quality. Based 
on the above, we can formulate the following hypotheses regarding the direct effects of 
problem-solving proficiency on project performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Problem-solving speed is related positively to (a) project speed and 
to (b) product quality, but related negatively to (c) project cost efficiency.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Solution quality is related negatively to (a) project speed; positively 
to (b) product quality; and negatively to (c) project cost efficiency.  
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Hypothesis 3. Problem-solving cost efficiency is related positively to (a) project 
speed, (b) to product quality, and (c) project cost efficiency.  
 
The moderating effect of problem frequency 
Problems are an inherent element of new product development projects. Some projects are 
confronted with problems more often than other projects however, for instance because of 
the difficulty of project tasks or because of a lack of expertise of project team members. 
Above we have formulated claims about how problem-solving proficiency influences 
project performance on average, without taking into account how frequently a project team 
is confronted with problems.  
 
Let us first of all consider problem-solving speed. Although fast problem solving can on 
average be expected to contribute to project speed and product quality, this effect might be 
substantially less if projects are confronted with a large number of problems. A very 
problematic project that is confronted with a large number of problems might easily fail to 
meet the project schedule and the project budget even though the team is very proficient in 
solving problems fast. Hence, it is more likely that problem-solving speed positively 
influences project speed and product quality if a limited number of problems occurs. In 
general, project frequency therefore negatively moderates the effect of problem-solving 
speed on project performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Problem frequency negatively moderates the relationships between 
problem-solving speed and (a) project speed, (b) project cost efficiency, and (c) 
product quality.  
  
How can problem frequency be expected to moderate the relationship between solution 
quality and project performance? First of all, solution quality was expected to contribute to 
product quality (Atuahene-Gima, 2003). It is difficult to see whether this becomes stronger 
or weaker if the number of problems varies. If the quality of the solution stays the same for 
each problem, we would not expect any particular moderating effect. In addition, solution 
quality was expected to contribute negatively to project speed and project cost efficiency 
because the generation of high-quality solutions takes time and resources. If problems 
occur frequently we would expect this effect to be particularly strong. For a limited 
number of problems project speed and project cost efficiency might be influenced 
substantially less. This results in the following hypotheses. 
  
Hypothesis 5. Problem frequency (a) does not moderate the relationships between 
solution quality and product quality, and it negatively moderates the relationship 
between solution quality and (b) project speed and (c) between solution quality 
and project cost efficiency.  
 
Finally, we expect that problem frequency negatively moderates the effects of problem-
solving cost efficiency on project performance. Even though problems are solved-cost 
efficiently, the fact that a large number of problems has to be solved means that it is more 
likely that budget and schedule objectives are met. Furthermore, especially in the case of a 
large number of problems, problem-solving cost efficiency might indicate that the average 
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number of resources available for each problem is limited, which might compromise the 
quality of the product.   
 
Hypothesis 6. Problem frequency negatively moderates the relationships between 
problem-solving cost efficiency and (a) product quality, (b) project speed, and (c) 
project cost efficiency.  
 
The mediating effect of problem-solving proficiency 
In the previous chapter we have seen that several differentiation and integration 
mechanisms strongly explain problem-solving proficiency. Subsequently, we have 
predicted above that problem-solving proficiency is directly related to project outcomes. 
This suggests that the effects of the organizational mechanisms effect project outcomes 
completely through problem-solving processes, i.e. full mediation (Atuahene-Gima, 2003). 
For several effects Atuahene-Gima found partial mediation however, with several 
organizational factors also influencing project performance directly. To be more precise, 
he for instance found that problem-solving speed partially mediates the effect of reach on 
development speed and the effect of free flow of information on product quality. 
Atuahene-Gima did not include in his analysis problem-solving cost efficiency and project 
cost efficiency. We therefore replicate and extend his study by testing the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7. The effects of differentiation and integration mechanisms on project 
performance (cost efficiency, speed, product quality) are partially mediated by 
problem-solving proficiency (speed, cost efficiency, solution quality). 
 
8.3 Method 
We tested the above hypotheses based on the same dataset as the one described in Chapter 
7. Two new variables in this particular study involve project performance and problem 
frequency. We conceptualized project performance in terms of three different dimensions: 
project cost efficiency, project speed, and product quality. Following Tatikonda and 
Montoya-Weiss (2001) we measured each dimension with a single item asking for the 
extent that the project manager at the end of the development project was satisfied with 
([1] very dissatisfied – [5] very satisfied): the costs to develop the web application; the 
time that was required to develop the web application; and the quality of the web 
application. In terms of project frequency we asked respondents the following question: 
how frequently was this project confronted with technical problems? On a five-point scale 
the answer categories for this question ranged from (1) ‘rarely’ to (5) ‘very frequently’. 
Another response category was ‘never’, but none of the respondents selected this option. 
Table 7.2 in the previous chapter presents descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 
To test our hypotheses we use regression analysis. To test the mediating effect using 
regression analysis we apply the procedure as proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). This 
approach was also applied by Atuahene-Gima (2003) in his first empirical test of 
Sheremata’s conceptual framework. This procedure works as follows. Suppose we are 
interested in the following mediated relationship: XMY. Here, X denotes the 
independent variable, M the mediating variable, and Y the ultimate dependent variable. To 
test whether a mediating effect exists, it is first of all necessary to assess whether there is 
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any direct effect of X on Y if we take M out of the equation (Step 1). If no direct effect is 
found, than we can safely assume that there is no mediation. If we do find a direct effect of 
X on Y, then the next step is to investigate whether there is a direct effect of X on M (Step 
2). If this is not the case, then we can assume that M does not act as a mediator.  
 
However, if we do find that X is strongly related to M, then the possibility exists that the 
direct effect of X on Y is mediated by M (Step 3). This final step is executed by means of a 
step-wise regression analysis, i.e. include X (and possibly several control variables) in the 
first step of the regression analysis and subsequently add M to the model in the second 
step. We already know that the first step of this regression analysis will reveal a direct 
effect of X on Y. If we find that M is significant if we add this to the first model and if this 
results in a significant effect and in substantially reduced effect size for X, than we can 
assume that the effect of X on Y is at least partially mediated by M. The effect of X on Y 
appears to be fully mediated if its direct effect becomes insignificant after including M.  
 
8.4 Results 
First of all we present the results to test the mediating effect of problem-solving 
proficiency (Hypothesis 3). Part of this analysis is to test the direct effect of problem-
solving proficiency on project outcomes. Hence, we automatically test Hypothesis 1 as 
well. Secondly, we present the results from regression analysis to test Hypothesis 2 about 
the moderating effect of problem frequency.  
 
Table 8.1 Results of regression analysis: project outcomes as dependent variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Team size -0,03 -0,03 -0.26** -0.21** -0,15 -0,11
Application novelty -0,05 0,04 0,09 0.18* -0,13 -0,07
Extent tof systemic problems 0,02 0,07 -0,15 -0.14* -0,08 -0,06
Decentralization -0,04 -0,15 0.31** 0.24** 0,18 0,13
Reach 0,12 0,12 0,06 0,10 0,06 0,08
Free flow of information 0.25* 0,09 0.24* 0.21* 0.23* 0,14
Connectedness -0,13 -0,01 -0,08 0,00 -0,17 -0,10
Project manager influence 0,04 0,07 -0,03 0,05 -0,03 0,01
Solution Quality 0,13 -0.17* -0,05
Problem-solving efficiency 0.35** 0.53*** 0.27*
Problem-solving speed 0,02 -0,13 0,06
Incremental R^2 0,11 0,19 0,07
Partial F 3.52** 11,19*** 2.62*
R^2 0,08 0,18 0,37 0,57 0,18 0,25
Adjusted R^2 -0,01 0,07 0,31 0,51 0,10 0,15
F 0,84 1,63 6,10*** 9,43*** 2,25* 2.45*
n 92 92 92 92 92 92
Product Quality Project Cost Efficiency Project Speed
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standardized coefficients are reported for a 1-sided test. 
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The mediating effect of problem-solving proficiency 
Table 8.1 presents the results from regression analyses with project outcomes as the 
dependent variables. Model 1 contains as most important explanatory variables the 
project’s differentiation and integration mechanisms. Only those direct effects on project 
outcomes can possibly be mediated by problem-solving proficiency. Regarding these direct 
effects we find only few strong direct effects. Just as for problem-solving proficiency in 
the previous chapter, we find that free flow of information has a strong overall effect on 
project performance. Hence, easy and rich communication between team members has a 
positive effect on product quality, project cost efficiency, and project speed. The only 
additional substantial effect involves the positive relationship between decentralization and 
project cost efficiency. In sum, we find only few potentially mediated effects. 
 
Table 8.2 (which is similar to Models 1 in Table 7.3 of Chapter 7) presents the results from 
regression analyses with problem-solving proficiency as the dependent variables. Next to 
several control variables these models contain as explanatory variables the project’s 
differentiation and integration mechanisms. Mediation can only exist for those mechanisms 
that significantly predict one or more dimensions of project outcomes as well as one or 
more dimensions of problem-solving proficiency. As we found earlier, free flow of 
information has strong overall effect on problem-solving proficiency. Hence, the direct 
effects of free flow of information on project performance can possibly be mediated by the 
three dimensions of problem-solving proficiency.  
 
Table 8.2 Results of regression analysis: problem-solving as dependent variables 
Solution Quality Problem-solving Efficiency Problem-solving Speed
Team size 0.23* -0,06 -0,14
Application novelty -0,09 -0,22 -0,06
Extent of systemic problems -0.19* -0,09 -0,06
Decentralization 0.24** 0.21* -0,02
Reach 0,11 -0,06 -0,08
Free flow of information 0.37*** 0.30** 0.45***
Connectedness -0.21* -0.26* -0,16
Project management influence 0,09 -0,12 -0,04
R^2 0,31 0,24 0,22
Adjusted R^2 0,25 0,17 0,14
F 4.75*** 3.32** 2.87**
n 92 92 92
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standardized coefficients are reported for a 1-sided test. 
 
We also find that decentralization is positive related to solution quality and problem-
solving efficiency. Hence, the effect of decentralization on project cost efficiency is 
possibly mediated by solution quality and/or problem-solving efficiency. The other direct 
effects resulting from Table 8.2, i.e. the strong negative effects of connectedness do not 
involve effects that are potentially mediated, because connectedness is not directly related 
to project outcomes (see Table 8.1). 
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Now let us return to Table 8.1. To investigate whether any mediating effect exists, we 
should investigate the transition from Model 1 to Model 2 for each dimension of project 
performance. This transition involves the inclusion of the problem-solving proficiency 
indicators. In order for any mediating effect to exist we first of all need to assess whether 
problem-solving proficiency has a direct effect on project performance. We find that 
Problem-solving efficiency is strongly related (positively) to each of the three project 
outcomes. This means that the effects of free flow of information on all three project 
outcomes are possibly mediated by problem-solving efficiency, because free flow of 
information is directly related to both the project outcomes and problem-solving 
efficiency. In addition, the direct effect of decentralization on project cost efficiency is also 
potentially mediated by problem-solving efficiency. We also find that solution quality 
directly related (negatively) to project cost efficiency. Solution quality therefore also 
possibly mediates the effect of decentralization and free flow of information on project 
cost efficiency.  
 
Finally, to find whether any mediating effect exists, we need to investigate how the direct 
effect of the potentially mediated mechanisms changes with the change from Model 1 to 
Model 2. The effects of free flow of information on product quality and on project speed 
become insignificant as a result from this change. This indicates that these effects are fully 
mediated by problem-solving efficiency. The effects of free flow of information and 
decentralization on project cost efficiency are somewhat reduced in absolute terms, but 
both remain statistically significant. This indicates that both effects are partially mediated. 
In this case it is unclear however which variable acts as the mediator, since it can be either 
problem-solving efficiency or solution quality or both. To investigate this mediating effect 
in greater detail we performed two additional regression analyses: one without problem-
solving efficiency and the other without solution quality.  
 
In the analysis without problem-solving efficiency we find that solution quality remains 
significant and that decentralization and free flow of information remain significant with 
roughly the same effect size as reported in Table 8.1. This suggests that solution quality 
does not act as a mediator. In the analysis without solution quality we find that problem-
solving efficiency remains significant. We also find that the effect sizes for 
decentralization and free flow of information are substantially reduced. For 
decentralization Beta changed from 0.31 (p<0.01) in Model 1 to 0.20 (p<0.05) in Model 2. 
For free flow of information Beta changed from 0.24 (p<005) in Model 1 to 0.14 (n.s.) in 
Model 2.  
 
This suggests that problem-solving efficiency acts a mediator variable for these two 
variables. Translated back to our original findings in Table 8.1, this indicates that problem-
solving efficiency can be regarded as the factor that partially mediates the effect of 
decentralization and free flow of information on project cost efficiency. Graphically our 
results can be depicted as in Figure 8.2. The partially mediated effect of free flow of 
information on project cost efficiency provides support for Hypothesis 3, but the other four 
mediating effects suggest that problem-solving cost efficiency is a strong full mediator. 
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Figure 8.2 Problem-solving cost efficiency as a mediator 
 
All effects are positive. 
 
The moderating effect of problem frequency 
Above we have already seen that problem-solving efficiency is a strong and significant 
predictor of project performance. This supports Hypothesis 1. However, we also found that 
solution quality has a negative effect on project cost efficiency (see Table 8.1). This 
disconfirms Hypothesis 1. In this section we consider the relationship between problem-
solving proficiency and project performance in some greater detail. Table 8.3 present the 
results from regression analysis with the three project performance dimensions as 
dependent variables. Besides several control variables the first regression model (Model 1) 
also includes problem frequency and the three dimensions of problem-solving proficiency.  
 
Table 8.3 Results of regression analysis: problem frequency as a moderator 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Team size -0,03 -0,04 -26** -0.25** -0,15 -0,15
Application novelty 0,04 0,01 0.26** 0.25** 0,01 -0,01
Solution Quality 0,14 0,15 0,02 0,03 0,06 0,04
Problem-solving efficiency 0.31** 0.30* 0.55*** 0.48*** 0.28* 0.28*
Problem-solving speed 0,09 0,08 -0,15 -0,09 -0,01 0,01
Problem frequency 0,07 0,18 -0,17 -0,09 -0,20 -0,01
Solution quality * Problem freq 0,02 -0,01 -0,17
Problem-solving efficiency * Problem freq -0,18 0,10 -0,14
Problem-solving speed * Problem freq -0,06 -0.24* -0,04
Incremental R^2 0,04 0,03 0,05
Partial F 1,22 1,64 1,78
R^2 0,14 0,18 0,46 4,94 0,24 0,28
Adjusted R^2 0,08 0,09 0,43 0,44 0,18 0,21
F 2.30* 1.95* 12.25*** 8.90*** 4.41*** 3.62***
n 92 92 92 92 92 92
Product Quality Project Cost Efficiency Project Speed
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standardized coefficients are reported for a 1-sided test. 
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In all three models we find that problem-solving cost efficiency has a strong positive 
association with project cost efficiency, project speed, and product quality. This is also 
what we found in Table 8.1. All other factors are fairly limited compared to this direct 
effect. This also means that the negative effect of solution quality on project cost efficiency 
(Table 8.1) disappeared in this model, suggesting that this effect is unstable. A possible 
explanation is multicollinearity, but according to the VIF values this was of no concern. 
However, relationships between the independent variables might still have affected the 
outcomes. From the correlation matrix (Table 7.2 in the previous chapter) we learn that 
several of the independent variables are strongly correlated with each other and also with 
the dependent variables. It is therefore surprising that we find only one strong predictor of 
project performance, i.e. problem-solving cost efficiency. It may well be that this factor 
suppresses (Maassen and Bakker, 2001) the effects of the other independent variables. 
 
To investigate this possibility, an analysis without problem-solving efficiency indicates 
that problem frequency reduces strongly (and statistically significantly) both project cost 
efficiency (β=-0.31; p<0.01) and project speed (β=-0.20; p<0.05). In the original analysis 
(Table 2) these effects were already substantial, but they failed to reach statistical 
significance. In addition, if we also eliminate problem frequency from the analysis, then it 
appears that problem-solving speed substantially increases the project managers’ 
satisfaction with project cost efficiency (β=0.23; p<0.05) and project speed (β=0.25; 
p<0.01). As a result, we can conclude that other factors besides problem-solving cost 
efficiency strongly influence project performance as well (e.g. problem frequency, 
problem-solving speed), but that our multivariate analysis makes it difficult to disentangle 
these effects. 
 
In the regression analyses (Table 8.3) we were not only interested in the main effects of 
problem-solving proficiency and problem frequency. In Model 2 we investigate whether 
moderating effects exist if we combine problem frequency with the three elements of 
problem-solving proficiency. The variables in this model were mean-centered. Again the 
VIF values indicated the absence of multicollinearity. From Table 8.3 we can see that none 
of the three steps substantially improves the explanation of the dependent variables. We do 
find one statistically significant moderating effect for the relationship between satisfaction 
with the cost efficiency of the project and the interaction between problem-solving speed 
and problem frequency. This negative interaction effect suggests that it is especially 
detrimental to a project manager’s satisfaction with project cost efficiency if the project 
team attempts to solve a large number of problems in a very short amount of time. This 
makes sense, since this is likely to require many resources, such as an increase in the 
number (senior) employees that has to be allocated to the project. Overall this single 
interaction effect provides very limited support for Hypothesis 2.  
 
Finally, two noteworthy direct effects are the negative effect of team size on satisfaction 
with project cost efficiency and the positive effect of application novelty on this same 
outcome variable. Apparently, larger teams are perceived to be less efficient by project 
managers. This seems to make sense, because larger teams require more expenses as a 
result of larger personnel costs, more meetings, more extensive control mechanisms and 
larger overhead costs. The second effect is somewhat surprising: newer applications - in 
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terms of the novelty of the software code underlying these applications - are associated 
positively with the project managers’ satisfaction with project cost efficiency.  
 
One might expect that newer applications are more problem-prone, which is supported by 
a substantial correlation between application novelty and problem frequency (ρ=0.24; 
p<0.05). Consequently, the development of novel applications can be considered to result 
less easily in high satisfaction with project cost efficiency. An explanation for our finding 
of a positive effect might be that older applications have to deal with legacy systems, 
which are typically costly to adjust and change. Another explanation involves the way that 
project managers develop their expectations: maybe managers expect very novel projects 
to be disappointing, which increases the likelihood relative to incrementally new products 
that one’s expectations for novel products are met or exceeded. Another explanation could 
be that newer applications make use of newer and easier programming protocols, which 
increases the development efficiency.  
 
8.5 Discussion and conclusions 
This study contributes to the literature about problem-solving in new product development. 
Our findings are important complements to existing literature. Atuahene-Gima (2003) 
provided the first empirical test of problem-solving proficiency as a mediator of the effect 
between the project’s organizational structure and project performance. However, he did 
not include in his analysis problem-solving efficiency. We find that it is especially this 
variable that acts as a mediator. Furthermore, we find both partially mediated effects and 
fully mediated effects. We therefore find evidence in support of Sheremata’s original fully 
mediated model as well evidence that supports Atuahene-Gima’s partially mediated model.  
We also provided the first empirical test with project cost efficiency as the dependent 
variable. Just as for project speed and product quality, we found that problem-solving 
efficiency is a very strong predictor of project cost efficiency. We also found that this 
performance indicator is positively influenced by decentralization and free flow of 
information and that both effects are mediated by problem-solving efficiency. For 
decentralization this involves a fully mediated effect and for free flow of information this 
involves a partially mediated effect. Free flow of information therefore increases project 
cost efficiency directly as well as indirectly through its effect on problem-solving 
efficiency. The positive effects of free flow of information on product quality and project 
speed are also mediated by problem-solving efficiency. These two effects are fully 
mediated. 
 
Finally, we contribute to the literature by considering the frequency with which projects 
are confronted with problems. Problem frequency hardly appears to moderate the 
relationship between problem-solving proficiency and project performance. We did find 
however that problem frequency substantially reduces the effect of problem-solving speed 
on project cost efficiency. This suggests that project cost efficiency tends to be especially 
disappointing if project teams solve a large number of problems in a short amount of time. 
This might be because of the resources that are required to solve problems, such as man 
hours and additional equipment.  
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Limitations and future research 
An important finding of this study is that problem-solving cost efficiency acts as a strong 
mediator. This is partly due to the strong effect of problem-solving cost efficiency on all 
three dimensions of project performance (product quality, project speed, and project cost 
efficiency). We have to nuance this finding however, because other factors also explain 
project performance, including problem frequency (negatively) and problem-solving speed 
(positively). Suppressor effects preclude the accurate detection of these effects however 
(Maassen and Bakker, 2001). This effect might have also influenced our findings regarding 
the mediating effects of problem-solving proficiency and of the moderating role of 
problem frequency. This has to be investigated in future research. An important 
opportunity for future research is to integrate the mediating effect (this chapter) and 
moderating effects (this chapter and the previous chapter) in a single integrative 
framework. Recent analytical advances offer opportunities to do so using moderated path 
analysis (Edwards and Lambert, 2007). 
 
Consistent with the apparent interrelatedness of problem-solving proficiency dimensions, 
Sheremata (2000) argues that the interaction of these dimensions influences the project’s 
goal attainment. In other words, it is especially if problems are solved fast, cost-efficiently, 
and with high-quality solutions that projects succeed. Without either slow problem-
solving, expensive problem-solving, or ineffective solutions project might fail altogether 
(Sheremata, 2000). As a result, future research could adopt a configurational approach to 
the study of problem-solving in new product development (see Chapter 2).  
 
Suppressor effects might also explain the different findings between our study and the 
empirical study of Atuahene-Gima (2003). The relationships between the independent 
variables might have blown up the effect sizes of problem-solving cost efficiency, thus 
artificially reducing the effect size of other explanatory variables. Atuahene-Gima did not 
include this variable in his analysis however, and therefore comes to different conclusions. 
For instance, he found only partially mediated effects, whereas we find mostly full 
mediation through problem-solving cost efficiency. Other explanations for the divergent 
findings are the differences between project teams in the Netherlands (our study) and 
teams in Hong Kong (Atuahene-Gima). The latter are for instance well-known for their use 
of consensus decision making, which might be less prevalent in the Netherlands. On the 
other hand, both studies are roughly similar in terms of their industrial settings, i.e. both 
investigated project teams in ICT-related industries. Our projects involve only software 
development projects however, whereas Atuahene-Gima studied both software projects (46 
percent) and hardware projects (54 percent). 
 
Furthermore, we used measures that are in large part based on the study performed by 
Atuahene-Gima. Unlike Atuahene-Gima we did not use multiple respondents, which 
possibly caused common method bias in our study. We did not find higher correlations 
between our variables however, which suggests that this is of limited concern. 
Furthermore, we might speculate that our respondents are unlikely to know the mediation 
and moderation models of our interest. Hence, it is unlikely that they have consistently 
influenced their ratings in such a way as to substantially influence our results (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). In addition, any differences between the two studies are unlikely to be attributes 
to differences in statistical power. The datasets in both studies are almost of the same size. 
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One possible explanation of different effects involves omitted variable bias (Shaver, 2005). 
In the previous study we have for instance seen that the extent of systemic versus 
autonomous problems influences relationships in our model. This might have differed 
across the two studies. 
 
As another limitation, our measures are self-scored perceptual measures. For project 
performance it should for instance be kept in mind that its indicators reflect the project 
manager’s self-scored satisfaction with the various project performance dimensions. In 
addition, we measured each dimension with a single item. From the perspective of classical 
test theory this might be dangerous as the use of multiple items might cancel out error 
(Nunnally, 1978). However, a manager’s satisfaction with for instance project cost and 
project speed can be considered to be fairly concrete, which makes it appropriate to assess 
these concepts with single items (Rossiter, 2002). In this way we follow Tatikonda and 
Montoya-Weiss (2001). 
 
Managerial implications 
We conclude with the most important managerial implication from our study. Keeping in 
mind the limitations of this study, we find that teams report an overall better performance 
if they are able to solve problems cost-efficiently. For managers it is important to note that 
our study indicates that the structure and processes within the team strongly influence 
problem-solving cost efficiency. For instance, project team members with greater freedom 
over their activities and decisions are more likely to solve problems cost-efficiently and 
they are therefore more likely to contribute in high project performance. Similarly, 
unrestricted and rich communication and information exchange between team members 
improves the cost-efficiency with which problems are solved and therefore contribute to 
project performance. 
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9. Multiple Levels in the Organization of Innovation:
 Ownership Integration and Project Organization 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Studies about how the organization of NPD projects influences project performance 
typically investigate this in single-firm projects, i.e. projects with high ownership 
integration. However, NPD projects are often performed by two or more partnering firms 
(low ownership integration). In this chapter we investigate whether the project-level 
differentiation and integration mechanisms as discussed in the previous two chapters have 
different performance effects in single-firm projects than in multi-firm projects. We expect 
that integration mechanisms are especially helpful in multi-firm projects to integrate and 
align members and factions from the different firms. Conversely, we expect that 
differentiation mechanisms are especially useful to single-firm projects, which lack the 
differentiation potential of multi-firm projects. Using the same data as the previous two 
chapters, the interaction of ownership integration and project-level organizational 
mechanisms especially appears to explain a project’s problem-solving proficiency. In line 
with our expectations, project-level integration mechanisms contribute more strongly to the 
speed of problem solving in alliance projects than in single-firm projects.  
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9.1 Introduction 
The management and organization of innovation is a complex and a multi-level 
phenomenon (Gerwin and Ferris, 2004; Gupta et al., 2007; Tiwana, 2008). Chapter 5 for 
instance investigated the extent that a systems integrator integrates component 
development projects as judged by four dimensions of integration. There we already 
pointed out that such project-level studies are few in number relative to the number of 
studies that investigate issues of integration at the level of the firm, such as the breadth and 
the depth of a firm’s knowledge base (knowledge integration) and the extent that a firm 
buys, makes, or allies for its new components and technologies (ownership integration). In 
this chapter we aim to increase our understanding of the performance of NPD projects by 
explicitly studying the complementarities between a project’s firm-level organizational 
form and its project-level organizational form.  
  
In Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 we have seen how project performance and the project team’s 
problem-solving proficiency are influenced by the way the NPD process is organized, 
structured, and executed. To be more precise, these organizational elements of NPD 
projects involved differentiation and integration mechanisms such as free flow of 
information, project manager influence, and decentralization. Earlier in this thesis (Chapter 
4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6) we considered other organizational characteristics of the way 
NPD projects are organized, such as ownership integration and task integration. These 
organizational elements operate at a different level of analysis than the differentiation and 
integration mechanisms. Ownership integration and task integration determine the 
organizational set-up of a project at the firm-level. These factors for instance determine 
how many firms are involved in the project, how investments are divided, and how tasks 
are allocated to the partnering firms and suppliers. Within a particular firm-level setup (e.g. 
a single innovator with multiple suppliers or a fifty-fifty alliance project with no supplier 
involvement) the NPD process is subsequently executed in a way that is managed and 
structured based on the project-level differentiation and integration mechanisms.  
 
In this chapter we investigate the interplay of a project’s firm-level organizational 
characteristics and its project-level organizational form. In other words, this chapter 
centers on the research question whether, and if so how and to what extent, a project’s 
firm-level organizational form interacts with project-level organizational characteristics in 
its effect on the team’s problem-solving proficiency as well as on project performance. 
Such multi-level innovation research is scarce and important opportunities therefore exist 
to generate a more comprehensive understanding of the management of innovation 
(Gerwin and Ferris, 2004; Gupta et al., 2007; Tiwana, 2008).  
 
In terms of the firm-level organizational variable this chapter focuses on the degree of 
ownership integration. Ownership integration was also discussed as one of the four 
dimensions of integration in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 and this chapter use different definitions 
however. Ownership integration as used in Chapter 5 takes the perspective of a systems 
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integrator as it refers to the extent that this firm invests in a new product (component) 
development project. In this chapter we consider a project’s degree of ownership 
integration without adopting the perspective of any particular firm. Here we define 
ownership integration as the number of firms that invests in a project. In general, 
ownership integration increases if fewer firms invest in a new product development 
project, i.e. ownership integration is high for single-firm projects, and it is considered to be 
low for multi-firm/alliance projects. Below we first of all formulate hypotheses. After that 
we present the methodology that will be used to test these hypotheses, which is followed 
by our results. We end this chapter with a discussion and conclusions. 
 
9.2 Theory 
As already outlined in Chapter 1, innovation is a phenomenon that is influenced by factors 
that operate at many levels of analysis, such as the level of individuals, the level of groups 
or teams, the level of organizations, and the level of industries (Gopalakrishnan and 
Damanpour, 1997; Gupta et al., 2007). Most innovation studies focus on only one level of 
analysis, whereas multi-level theory has the potential to explain a phenomenon more 
precisely by generating a better understanding of the ways in which different levels of 
analysis are related (Klein et al., 1994; Gupta et al., 2007). Recently some innovation 
studies have explicitly taken into account multiple levels of analysis, but mostly these 
studies aim to explain firm-level performance, i.e. in terms of patenting, rather than project 
performance (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Somaya et al., 2007).  
 
The literature about new product development success factors (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1995) has mostly proceeded without taking into account multiple levels of analysis. For 
instance, this literature typically considers projects that are financed and executed by 
individual firms on their own. As a result, most of the literature about success factors 
related to issues of project management falls into this category. Shenhar and Dvir (1996) 
recognized that research is needed that explicitly consider the role of organizational 
boundaries. 
 
Gerwin and Ferris (2004) met this call as they investigated theoretically the costs and 
benefits of alternative ways to organize NPD projects in strategic alliances (as opposed to 
projects in single firms). For instance, one or both of the partners in an alliance project 
might actually perform project tasks, i.e. ‘single participation projects’ or ‘dual 
participation projects’. If both firms choose to perform part of the workload, then several 
project-level organizational decisions have to be made about whether and how to perform 
tasks separately or in an integrated approach with collaborating team members from both 
firms, i.e. ‘dual separate’ or ‘dual integrated’. In addition, for dual integrated alliance 
projects, project management can be organized in different ways, such as by means of a 
single project manager or by means of a team that takes decisions based on consensus.  
 
In a recent empirical study, Tiwana (2008) aimed to explain the performance of alliance 
projects by means of ‘bridging ties’ and ‘strong ties’. Alliances involve a bridging 
mechanism to bring together the expertise and capabilities of different firms (i.e. structural 
holes). In order to fully realize the potential that is created by this differentiation at the 
level of the firm, projects need to be structured in such a way that they are able to 
effectively integrate and combine the capabilities from the different firms, i.e. strong ties. 
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In other words, Tiwana (2008) argues and also finds empirical support that differentiation 
brought about by alliances of diverse partners (bridging ties) complements integration 
mechanisms at the project level (strong ties) in the explanation of alliance project 
performance. This shows that multiple levels of analysis interact in their effect on the 
outcome, i.e. cross-level moderators (Klein et al., 1994; Gupta et al., 2007).   
 
Figure 9.1 Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like Tiwana we are also interested in the cross-level moderating effects of the project-
level and the firm-level on project performance. Whereas Tiwana - at the firm-level - 
considers variation in terms of the type of alliances (i.e. the extent that partners have 
different capabilities, or bridging ties), we consider a different type of firm-level variation. 
We namely take into account that projects can be performed in alliances or not, i.e. alliance 
projects or single-firm projects. At the project-level our study also differs from and 
complements Tiwana’s study. Whereas Tiwana focuses on the extent that the project’s 
organizational structure provides integration mechanisms (the strength of ties), we not only 
focus on integration mechanisms, but also on project-level differentiation mechanisms (i.e. 
reach and decentralization, see Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). Figure 9.1 represents the 
theoretical relationships we are interested in. Next we formulate hypotheses. 
 
Hypotheses 
The extent of ownership integration, i.e. the decision to finance a project alone or to ally 
with one or more external parties, is an important decision for innovating firms. Partnering 
of course reduces the required financial resources and allows risks to be shared. At the 
same time, partnering could mean that different capabilities are allocated to the project, 
which is likely to increase the chance of success (Tiwana, 2008). As potential drawbacks, 
partnering is likely to result in reduced project control and decision-making power and in 
the risk that a partner acts opportunistically (Gulati et al., 2005). Next to these behavioral 
and appropriation uncertainties, information-exchange and coordination between partners 
might be problematic as a result of structural and cultural barriers (Li and Hambrick, 
2005). Furthermore, partners might develop honest differences of opinion and conflicts 
(Gulati et al., 2005).  
Project-level organization 
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Hence, at the level of the firm, the fact that multiple firms are brought together in an 
alliance means that opportunities are generated for novel ideas and creativity. In terms of 
the project problem-solving, multi-firm projects might for instance be comparatively 
faster, more efficient, and more effective if the partners possess complementary 
information and capabilities. At the same time, the fact that multiple routines, interests, and 
frames of reference are involved complicates the realization and exploitation of this 
potential (Tiwana, 2008). Hence, at the project-level, integration mechanisms are needed to 
facilitate communication, collaboration, and decision-making across the fault line that 
might exist between team members from different firms (Li and Hambrick, 2005).  
 
In the previous section and also in the previous two chapters we have distinguished 
between project-level differentiation and integration mechanisms. In Chapter 7 we 
considered decentralization and reach as differentiation mechanisms to provide the project 
team with a greater quantity and quality of specialized expertise (Sheremata, 2000). In 
contrast, free flow of information, connectedness, and project management influence help 
the project team to integrate knowledge and to align activities (Sheremata, 2000). Hence, 
these mechanisms provide the team with an integrative capability.  
 
Also firm-level organizational decisions influence a project’s integration and 
differentiation capabilities. Brusoni et al. (2001) for instance define different firm-level 
organizational forms (i.e. make, buy, and systems integration) as different combinations of 
differentiation and integration (see also Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). In principle, single-firm 
projects (‘make’) can be characterized as scoring high on integration and low on 
differentiation (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001). The single investing firm has formal authority 
over the project and is able to exert extensive control if needed. At the same time, the 
differentiation benefits of this organizational form are limited, because there are no 
partnering firms that bring incentives and unique capabilities to the project. In contrast, 
multi-firm projects typically indicate that decision-making and project control is executed 
by multiple firms. In principle, such projects are therefore less integrated than single-firm 
projects. At the same time, multi-firm projects have a larger potential to benefit from 
differentiation because of the involvement of multiple distinct and committed parties.  
 
Based on the same logic as in Tiwana (2008) we argue that project-level integration 
mechanisms are especially beneficial in multi-firm projects to help realize their 
differentiation potential. These mechanisms can for instance help to achieve unity of effort 
among the multiple investing firms. In a similar vein, differentiation mechanisms might be 
less effective in multi-firm projects than in single-firm projects. For single-firm projects it 
will be comparatively easy to align incentives and to coordinate effectively, because 
people will know each other and because they are likely to have the same routines and 
goals. At the same time, differentiation mechanisms, when compared to their potential in 
multi-firm projects, can be expected to be particularly useful in single-firm projects. Since 
these projects lack the diversity that often characterizes alliances, differentiation 
mechanisms might compensate for this by exploiting as much as possible the incentives, 
specialization, and diversity from within the firm. We expect that these moderating effects 
hold for project performance as well as for problem-solving proficiency. Hence, we can 
formulate the following general hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1a. Project-level differentiation mechanisms (decentralization and 
reach) contribute more to project performance (project speed, project cost-
efficiency, and product quality) in single-firm projects (high ownership 
integration) than in multi-firm projects (low ownership integration). 
 
Hypothesis 1b. Project-level integration mechanisms (free flow of information, 
connectedness, and project management influence) contribute less to project 
performance (project speed, project cost-efficiency, and product quality) in 
single-firm projects (high ownership integration) than in multi-firm projects (low 
ownership integration). 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Project-level differentiation mechanisms (decentralization and 
reach) contribute more to problem-solving proficiency (problem-solving speed, 
problem-solving cost-efficiency, and solution quality) in single-firm projects 
(high ownership integration) than in multi-firm projects (low ownership 
integration). 
 
Hypothesis 2b. Project-level integration mechanisms (free flow of information, 
connectedness, and project management influence) contribute less to problem-
solving proficiency (problem-solving speed, problem-solving cost-efficiency, and 
solution quality) in single-firm projects (high ownership integration) than in 
multi-firm projects (low ownership integration). 
 
9.3 Method 
We tested the above hypotheses based on the same dataset as the one described in Chapter 
7. In sum, this dataset contains data on 92 Dutch web application development projects. 
This dataset was obtained by means of an on-line questionnaire with the project manager 
as the single respondent. If multiple firms were involved in the project, our respondent was 
typically the project manager from the leading firm in the project. For more details about 
this dataset and about how we collected the data we refer the interested reader to Chapter 
7. Here we delimit ourselves to the notable differences with Chapter 7. This chapter for 
instance includes the ownership integration variable. 
 
Ownership integration is operationalized in two different ways. First of all, we use a 
dummy variable. A value of 1 indicates development projects that were financed by a 
single firm. This reflects a high (maximum) value of ownership integration. A value of 0 
indicates a low degree of ownership integration. This reflects that two or more firms 
financed the total expenses to complete the development project, i.e. multi-firm or alliance 
projects. Secondly, we consider ownership integration in terms of the absolute number of 
investing firms. Table 9.1 provides an overview of the frequency of the number of 
investing firms. It appears that 43 projects were financed by a single firm and 49 projects 
were financed by two or more firms. Most of the alliances involved two or three investing 
partners (seventeen projects and sixteen projects respectively). Eight projects were 
financed by four firms and the remaining eight projects had five or more investing firms. 
Ownership integration is high if a single firm invests in the project, and ownership 
integration by any single firm generally decreases as the number of investing firms 
increases. Note that this treatment of ownership integration in terms of the number of 
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investing firms includes no data about the actual division of investments between the 
investing firms.  
 
 
Table 9.1 Frequency of the number of investing firms 
 
 
 
For all other measures, such as those for the differentiation and the integration 
mechanisms, we refer to Chapter 7. In this regard it is important to stress that we asked 
respondents to complete these questions for all the project members working on the project 
from all the firms involved. Although the project manager might for instance not know the 
details of the way that a partner organizes its separate workload, we expect that this actor is 
the most knowledge single respondent regarding these matters. Table 7.2 in Chapter 7 
presents a correlation matrix together with descriptive statistics. This table not only 
includes the ownership integration dummy, but also (and both of them reverse-scored) the 
absolute number of investing firms and the absolute number of investing firms for all 
multi-firm projects.  
 
To test our hypotheses we use hierarchical regression analysis. Multicollinearity was of no 
concern in these analyses. We used mean-centered variables (except for the ownership 
integration dummy) and the VIF values were below 2.5 for most factors. The maximum 
VIF value was still very limited with a value of 3.6. This also suggests that there is no 
particular direct effect of ownership integration on the way projects are organized. This is 
also the picture that emerges if we investigate the correlation coefficients in Table 7.2 
between the five organizational project characteristics and the absolute number of 
investing firms (both in the dataset as a whole and in the multi-firm subset, i.e. variables 
15 and 16 in Table 7.2). 
 
Neither do we find much differences if we compare the average values of the 
differentiation and integration mechanisms across the two sub groups of the ownership 
integration dummy (i.e. single-firm projects and alliance/multi-firm projects). The results 
from a one-sided t-test indicate that in our dataset only one factor substantially differs 
across the two groups. Reach is on average higher for alliance projects than for single-firm 
projects. This mean difference is 0.38 on a five-point scale (p<0.05). The other four 
project-level organizational factors do not differ significantly for the two types of 
ownership integration (see Table 9.2). 
 
 
 Frequency (no. of projects) 
1 investing firm 43 
2 investing firms 17 
3 investing firms 16 
4 investing firms 8 
5 investing firms or more 8 
Total 92 
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Table 9.2 Means in the two sub groups of high and low ownership integration 
 Ownership integration Mean (on a 1-5 scale)
Decentralization High (one investing firm) 3,29
Low (two or more investing firms) 3,32
Reach* High (one investing firm) 3,44
Low (two or more investing firms) 3,82
Free flow of information High (one investing firm) 3,62
Low (two or more investing firms) 3,52
Connectedness High (one investing firm) 3,42
Low (two or more investing firms) 3,36
Project management influence High (one investing firm) 3,68
Low (two or more investing firms) 3,40
 
* Statistically significant one-sided t-test (p<0.05). 
 
9.4 Results 
 
Do the moderating effects contribute to the explanation of project performance? 
Table 9.3 presents the results from regression analyses for project speed, product quality, 
and project cost efficiency. In each of these three analyses, Model 1 includes two control 
variables, the five project-level characteristics and the ownership integration dummy. In 
absolute sense the largest standardized regression coefficient for the ownership integration 
dummy in these six models is -0.12. This suggests that projects with high ownership 
integration (one investing firm) are in general somewhat less successful than projects with 
low ownership integration (two or more investing firms). This is however a small effect 
size (and statistically not significant). Furthermore, the effect of the ownership integration 
dummy as reported in Table 9.3 (Model 1) remains limited if we run these same regression 
models without the five project-level organizational factors. The largest regression 
coefficient in these models is still -0.12 (this result also holds for the regression analyses 
reported in Table 9.4, which we discuss below). The absence of a strong direct effect in 
these limited regression models allows us to rule out the possibility that ownership 
integration does have an effect on one or more of the performance indicators, but that this 
effect is (at least partially) mediated by one or more of the project-level organizational 
factors (Baron and Kenny, 1986; see also Chapter 8). 
 
In Table 9.3 the shift from Model 1 to Model 2 involves the inclusion of the five 
moderating effects. We find that this step adds very little to the explanation of the three 
dimensions of project performance. We find just one significant moderating effect: reach 
appears to contribute comparatively less to project speed in single-firm projects than in 
alliance projects (β=-0.31). This is the opposite of what we would expect based on 
Hypothesis 1a. Also noteworthy is the joint effect of connectedness and ownership 
integration on product quality (β=-0.32; n.s.). This substantial effect suggests that 
connectedness (a project-level integration mechanism) complements multi-firm projects by 
contributing to (greater satisfaction with) product quality. This is in line with our 
hypothesis. 
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Table 9.3 Results of regression analyses – project performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Team size -0,02 -0,03 -0.30** -0.27** -0,17 -0,10
Application novelty -0,05 -0,04 0,08 0,06 -0,13 -0.19*
Decentralization -0,04 -0,04 0.28** 0.32* 0,16 0.33*
Reach 0,13 0,16 0,01 -0,05 0,02 -0,15
Free flow of information 0.25* 0.33* 0.28** 0.32* 0.25* 0.27*
Connectedness -0,12 -0.29* -0,08 -0,12 -0,17 -0,17
Project manager influence 0,03 -0,11 0,04 -0,07 -0,04 0,01
Ownership integration (OI) 0,03 0,13 -0,12 -0,01 -0,09 0,03
Decentralization * OI 0,03 0,02 0,20
Reach * OI 0,01 -0,14 -0.31*
Free flow of information * OI 0,21 0,08 0,03
Connectedness * OI -0,32 -0,06 -0,04
Project manager influence * OI -0,18 -0,12 -0,02
Incremental R^2 0,04 0,02 0,05
Partial F 0,72 0,36 1,03
R^2 0,08 0,12 0,36 0,37 0,17 0,23
Adjusted R^2 -0,02 -0,04 0,29 0,26 0,09 0,09
F 0,82 0,77 5.58*** 3.43*** 2.08* 1.68*
n 92 92 92 92 92 92
Project Cost EfficiencyProduct Quality Project Speed
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standardized coefficients are reported for a 1-sided test. 
 
In additional analyses we used the absolute number of investing firms (reverse-scored and 
as a standardized variable) as the moderator instead of the dummy variable. Also in these 
analyses we found no significant steps from Model 1 to Model 2. Similar to the results 
with the ownership integration dummy (Table 9.3) we found a strong moderating effect 
involving reach in its effect on project speed (β=-0.27; p<0.05; one-sided test). 
Additionally, we found in this model that ownership integration positively moderates the 
relationship between decentralization and project speed if ownership integration increases 
(β=0.25; p<0.05; one-sided test). This positive moderating effect is in line with what we 
would expect based on Hypothesis 1a. Just as for Model 1 in Table 9.3 we found no 
particular direct effect of ownership integration on project performance.  
 
Finally, we also performed the regression analyses in the subset of multi-firm projects with 
the absolute number of investing firms (i.e. two or more) as a proxy for ownership 
integration. This was to investigate whether it matters whether one allies with one or more 
partners. In this small dataset (N=49; see Table 9.1) we found no strong predictors of any 
of the three project performance indicators. Overall, we find little support for the claim that 
ownership integration and project-level differentiation and integration mechanisms interact 
in their effect on project performance. The steps have little explanatory power and the 
moderating effect involving reach disconfirms our hypothesis. The findings involving 
connectedness and decentralization do provide some support for our hypothesis however.  
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Do the moderating effects contribute to problem-solving proficiency? 
Unlike the results for project performance, the inclusion of the moderating effects results 
in a substantially improved explanation of problem-solving proficiency (see Table 9.4). 
For all three dimensions of problem-solving proficiency the step from Model 1 to Model 2 
explains about ten percent additional variation (and is statistically significant; p<0.05). We 
find strong (negative) regression coefficients for the interaction effects involving the three 
integration mechanisms (free flow of information, connectedness, and project management 
influence). This is in line with what we would expect based on Hypothesis 2b. Particularly 
connectedness and project management influence appear to be negatively moderated by the 
ownership integration dummy in their effect on problem-solving speed (p<0.05).  
 
Table 9.4 Results of regression analyses – problem-solving proficiency 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Team size 0.21* 0,17 -0,09 -0,06 -0,17 -0.20*
Application novelty -0,13 -0,07 -0.23* -0.25** -0,07 -0,03
Decentralization 0.21* 0,10 0,18 0,21 -0,05 -0,07
Reach 0,10 0.24* -0,09 -0,15 -0,09 0,04
Free flow of information 0.42*** 0.28* 0.33** 0.25* 0.46*** 0.39**
Connectedness -0.23* -0.43** -0.25* -0.42** -0,13 -0.36**
Project management influence 0,11 -0,10 -0,11 -0.30* -0,04 -0.32*
Ownership integration (OI) -0,02 0,18 -0,08 0.26* -0,02 0,20
Decentralization * OI -0,07 0,02 0,04
Reach * OI 0,18 -0,21 0,14
Free flow of information * OI -0,21 -0,10 -0,06
Connectedness * OI -0,24 -0,22 -0.36*
Project management influence * OI -0,21 -0,27 -0.31*
Incremental R^2 0,09 0,09 0,10
Partial F 1.97* 2.00* 2.09*
R^2 0,28 0,37 0,24 0,33 0,22 0,31
Adjusted R^2 0,21 0,26 0,16 0,21 0,13 0,19
F 3.76*** 3.22*** 3.09** 2.79** 2.66** 2.56**
n 92 92 92 92 92 92
Solution Quality Problem-solving Efficiency Problem-solving Speed
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standardized coefficients are reported for a 1-sided test. 
 
We should note however that the results in Table 9.4 also indicate that the inclusion of the 
moderating effects substantially reduces the main effects of the integration mechanisms. 
For illustrative purposes we plotted the overall effects of connectedness and project 
management influence on problem-solving speed in Figure 9.2. For both factors the effects 
are almost identical. That is why we report only one figure. In general low values of these 
integration mechanisms seem to work best for both single-firm projects and alliance 
projects. If these mechanisms are extensively applied however, then it appears that they 
work much better (in terms of problem-solving speed) in alliance projects than in single-
firm projects. 
 
Another result from the inclusion of the moderating effects in Model 2 is the increase in 
the regression coefficient for the ownership integration dummy for each dependent 
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variable. This indicates that problems on average are solved more proficiently in single-
firm projects than in multi-firm projects. This especially holds for problem-solving 
efficiency (β=0.26; p<0.05). However, if judged by Figure 9.2 (which also incorporates the 
main effect of the ownership integration dummy), then alliance projects on average tend to 
perform better than single-firm projects. This supports the view that it is better to interpret 
the results from Model 1 regarding the direct effects of the interacting variables (Carte and 
Russell, 2003). Hence, ownership integration does not have a direct effect on problem-
solving proficiency. 
 
Figure 9.2 Contingent effects of connectedness and PM influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also for problem-solving proficiency we performed additional analyses with ownership 
integration as measured by the absolute number of investing firms. In neither of these 
analyses the step from Model 1 to Model 2 was significant. This indicates that especially 
the distinction between single-firm projects or multi-firm projects (as captured by our 
dummy variable) matters. We also performed the additional analyses with the absolute 
number of investing firms in the small subset of alliance projects. In these analyses again 
none of the steps from Model 1 to Model 2 was significant, although we did find one 
significant moderating effect in this subset: connectedness has a relatively weak effect on 
problem-solving speed if the number of investing firms increases (β=-0.30; p<0.01; one-
sided). In these additional analyses we found no strong direct effects from the absolute 
number of investing firms on problem-solving proficiency (both in the entire dataset and in 
the multi-firm subset). This also means that we found no particular effects on problem-
solving speed, despite their substantial bivariate correlations (respectively ρ=0.21; p<0.05 
and ρ=0.34; p<0.01; see Table 7.2). In sum, we can conclude that we find strong support 
for Hypothesis 2b that ownership integration (single-firm projects vs. multi-firm projects) 
interacts with project-level integration mechanisms in the explanation of problem-solving 
proficiency. 
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9.5 Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter we investigated how the multiple levels of a NPD project’s organizational 
form influence problem-solving proficiency and ultimately project performance. More 
specifically we studied five project-level organizational factors and ownership integration 
as the firm-level organizational factor, i.e. single-firm projects versus multi-firm projects. 
Our findings first of all indicate that ownership integration hardly moderates the 
relationships between project-level mechanisms and project performance.  
 
We found one significant moderating effect though, which involves reach. We found that 
the search for external information tends to contribute substantially more to project speed 
in multi-firm projects than in single-firm projects. In terms of Open Innovation, this 
suggests that firm-level Open Innovation contributes relatively strongly to project speed if 
it is complemented with project-level Open Innovation. This negative moderating effect is 
not in line with our expectation that project-level differentiation mechanisms complement 
an integrated firm-level organizational form, i.e. single firm projects. This indicates that 
firms are not always in need of a balance between differentiation and integration 
mechanisms, which is the fundamental assumption underlying our expectations. This is not 
uncommon though, since several authors for instance argue that very uncertain and 
complex innovations might best be performed within a highly integrated organizational 
setting (Pisano, 2006; Hoetker, 2005).  
 
With respect to reach, we must also note that the single-firm projects in our dataset tend to 
make less use of external sources of information than multi-firm projects. In other words, 
projects that are closed at the firm-level (single-firm) also tend to be closed at the project-
level (limited external search). Conversely, when Open Innovation is applied at the firm-
level (partnerships), it also tends to be applied at the project-level (i.e. extensive search for 
external information). We can not exclude the possibility however, for alliance projects, 
that respondents assigned a higher score to reach because of the fact that an external firm 
acted as a partner in the project. This would suggest that reach and the ownership 
integration dummy partially capture the same phenomenon. 
 
Besides investigating as dependent variables project outcomes (project speed, project cost 
efficiency, and product quality), we also investigated how our models explained problem-
solving proficiency (problem-solving speed, problem-solving cost efficiency, and solution 
quality). For these models we found that ownership integration strongly interacts with the 
project-level mechanisms. Hence, although the moderating effect does not influence 
project performance directly, it does tend to affect a team’s problem-solving proficiency. 
An explanation might be that a project’s organizational set-up is much more closely related 
to the processes within projects, such as the problem-solving process, than to the eventual 
performance of the project. Project performance is likely to depend on a larger number of 
factors than the proficiency of project processes, which decreases the relative effect of a 
project’s organizational form.  
 
More specifically, and in line with our expectations, we find that project-level integration 
mechanisms complement differentiated firm-level organizational forms, i.e. alliance 
projects. This holds for problem-solving cost efficiency and for solution quality, but it 
especially holds for the speed of problem-solving. Two strong interaction effects in this 
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regard involve the integration mechanisms connectedness and project management 
influence. These moderating effects suggest that the speed of problem-solving in alliance 
projects benefits strongly from the integration of team members from the different firms. 
This is in line with our expectations and this is similar to our conclusion in Chapter 6, 
where we concluded that strong leadership is needed to prevent and resolve conflicts in 
alliances of firms from different industries. This finding is also in line with the view that 
project-level integration is needed to realize the creative potential of alliances (Tiwana, 
2008). 
 
However, as indicated in Figure 9.2, irrespective of the extent of connectedness and the 
influence of the project’s management, the speed of problem solving in general tends to be 
higher in alliance projects than in single-firm projects. Reflecting the moderating effect, 
this difference in terms of problem-solving speed is especially strong if team members are 
highly connectedness and if the project’s management is highly influential. In single-firm 
projects, the extensive presence of these integration mechanisms appears to reduce 
comparatively strongly the speed of problem solving. An explanation is that the goals of 
project members tend to be more aligned in single-firm projects than in multi-firm projects 
and that project members in single firm project tend to have a better mutual understanding 
than the members of multi-firm projects. Hence, in single-firm projects the effectiveness of 
team meetings and of an influential project manager tend to be limited, whereas these 
project-level integration mechanisms are especially useful in multi-firm projects, for 
instance to define problems, to swiftly decide upon which solution to implement, and to 
coordinate and manage the implementation of solutions.  
 
Next to the moderating effects for these integration mechanisms, it also appears for both 
single-firm projects and alliance projects that problem-solving speed is generally highest if 
connectedness and project management influence are limited (see Figure 9.2). In terms of 
connectedness this indicates that meetings in general appear to delay the problem-solving 
process, which suggests that it is more important for team members to spend their time on 
figuring out the details of problems and on implementing solutions than to discuss 
problems with their peers. In terms of project manager influence, problems on average tend 
to be solved relatively fast in projects that are managed by a manager who enjoys limited 
freedom vis-à-vis the management of the sponsoring firm(s). Hence, although strong 
project management is more important in alliances than in single-firm projects, in general 
this appears to reduce problem-solving speed. A possible is that an influential project 
manager reduces the autonomy of team members to fully apply their expertise to solve 
problems quickly. Conversely, if unforeseen problems arise in projects that require the 
input from managers outside the project, i.e. if the influence of the project manager is 
limited, then project members might in the mean time take actions themselves to solve 
those problems. In sum, connectedness and project management influence both have a 
negative effect on problem-solving speed, but both contribute more to the speed of 
problem solving in multi-firm projects than in single-firm projects.  
 
In additional analyses we found that the two abovementioned moderating effects only hold 
for ownership integration in terms of the distinction between single-firm projects and 
multi-firm projects. These effects do not appear for ownership integration as judged by the 
number of investing firms. Hence, the decision to ‘make’ or to ‘ally’ for a NPD project is 
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an important determinant of the way that project-level factors contribute to proficient 
problem solving. This also indicates that the decision to ally or not has more profound 
implications for the effectiveness of project-level mechanisms than decisions about the 
number of partners to innovate with. 
 
Limitations and future research 
This study has several limitations. First of all, we used single respondents. Hence we did 
not obtain data from multiple respondents and we therefore did no capture the view from 
partner firms if these were present in the project. Secondly, our measures of ownership 
integration do not include information about the actual division of investments among the 
partners in multi-firm projects. Hence, we cannot control for the effect that different types 
of alliances may have, such as differences between fifty-fifty alliances and alliances with 
an unequal division of investments between the partners (e.g. 80%-20%). Fifty-fifty 
alliances might for instance require more project-level integration mechanisms to align 
partners than asymmetric alliances. In future research it would be valuable to take this 
division of investments into account.  
 
As another limitation, we did not investigate how our findings hold for different types of 
innovation. Future research is therefore needed first of all to replicate this finding and 
secondly to explore whether and how this finding is contingent upon other factors, such as 
the innovation’s novelty (e.g. Chapter 3) or the type of problem (e.g. Chapter 8). We 
suspect that integration between team-members from different firms contributes positively 
to the team’s overall problem-solving capability if these problems also affect members 
from these different firms (i.e. systemic problems across firm boundaries), but we expect it 
to hardly improve, if at all, the proficiency with which problems are solved that are 
autonomously related to team members from different firms. Future research is required in 
this regard.  
 
Furthermore, our multi-level analysis is limited in the sense that we did not take into 
account the other dimensions of integration as discussed in Chapter 5, i.e. task integration, 
knowledge integration, and coordination integration. Regarding task integration, one or 
both of the partners in an alliance project might actually perform project tasks (i.e. single 
participation or dual participation; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004), which is likely to have 
consequences for the project-level structuring of the NPD process. Besides partners, task 
integration might also involve suppliers that will be compensated for their efforts. In this 
analysis we only focused on partner firms that also invested in the project. Task integration 
is therefore a more complex organizational dimension than ownership integration: 
ownership integration involves the division of project investments among alliance partners 
only, whereas task integration involves the division of labor among both alliance partners 
and suppliers.  
 
Although we did not in this chapter include coordination integration as a separate variable, 
it is closely related to project-level integration mechanisms, such as free flow of 
information and connectedness. In the case of multi-firm projects, these project-level 
integration mechanisms contribute to the overall coordination integration between these 
partner firms to the extent that information exchange is between project members from the 
201
 191 
different firms rather than between members from the same firm. We lack the precise data 
however to indicate the extent of inter-firm information exchange. 
 
Multi-level research in innovation management has only recently gained more attention 
(Gupta et al., 2007; Tiwana, 2008). Future research in this area is needed to improve our 
understanding of the way that firms organize innovation processes and how this influences 
a firm’s (innovative) performance. This chapter has made a contribution to this field of 
research by showing how project-level integration mechanisms work differently in single-
firm projects than in alliance projects. These differential effects especially appear to hold 
for problem-solving proficiency, which suggests that it is more appropriate to focus on the 
performance of processes within projects than on the ultimate performance of projects. 
These latter, aggregate performance indicators (e.g. project cost efficiency, project 
timeliness, and innovation quality) are less suitable to reflect the performance effects of a 
project’s organizational form, because they are more likely to be influenced by factors that 
are outside of the scope of (project) managers.   
 
Managerial implications 
For managers, an interesting finding involves reach, i.e. the extent that project teams 
search for information in their environment. Alliances tend to use this more extensively 
than single-firm projects and rightly so. We find namely that extensive search for 
information contributes more to project speed in alliances than in single-firm projects. This 
suggests that Open Innovation in the development phase, if applied, needs to be applied 
extensively, i.e. firms should not only partner in NPD projects (at the firm level), but the 
NPD process within these alliance projects needs to be open as well (at the project level). 
 
This study also shows that a project’s firm-level organizational form and its project-level 
organizational form are especially complementary in their effect on problem-solving 
proficiency. Although limited integration on average appears to result in more proficient 
problem solving, once applied extensively it results in comparatively more proficient 
problem solving in alliances. Especially since extensive integration might be needed in 
alliances for other reasons than problem solving, such as task alignment, monitoring, etc., 
this is an important finding for managers. In addition, we found that the comparative 
benefit of integration mechanisms for problem solving in alliance projects does not depend 
on the number of partnering firms. Hence, a tentative conclusion is that the decisions of 
managers about how to structure and organize the NPD process should depend on whether 
the firm partners for the project or goes it alone.  
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10. Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes this thesis. We do not intend to repeat in detail the summaries and 
the discussions reported at the end of each individual chapter. Instead we address several 
overall concluding remarks, reflections and discussions. We also point to some generic 
limitations of the thesis and indicate opportunities for future research. Finally, several 
managerial insights are presented.  
 
10.2 Systemic innovation and systems integration 
The central subject of this thesis is the organization of systemic innovation. Systemic 
innovation refers to product development activities that involve the change of multiple 
interdependent components. Unlike autonomous innovation, which refers to components 
that change independently, systemic innovation is for many firms the norm rather than the 
exception. This is for instance the result of increased efforts to develop products from 
multiple (new) technologies, such as mobile phones. The systemic nature of innovation, 
combined with its inherent uncertainty, makes it a challenging task to organize and manage 
this process as well as possible. This is why this thesis developed and tested several 
theories to explain the performance of new product development (NPD) projects. Of main 
concern are the performance implications of a project’s organizational form. In addition, 
we have explicitly taken into account how these performance implications depend on the 
systemic nature of the innovation itself, which for instance depends on the innovation’s 
technological novelty and its degree of interface change (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Systemic innovation is especially prevalent in the development of (parts of) complex 
products, such as those in the converging and the technologically dynamic ICT industries 
(e.g. telecommunications systems and complex software products). These products consist 
of many components and subsystems that are typically highly interrelated. As a result, 
these components cannot be changed without requiring changes to other parts of the 
product. In this systemic context, it is a fundamental organizational challenge for 
innovating firms to develop, integrate, monitor, and renew product systems. Broadly 
defined, a firm’s organizational and managerial capability to deal with these issues of 
systemic innovation can be labelled ‘systems integration’. Chapter 3 pointed out that 
systems integrators, i.e. firms responsible for the coherent design and development of 
(complex) product systems, typically know more than they make to maintain deep 
architectural knowledge and strong coordination capabilities. We indicated that practices 
of Open Innovation help such firms to increase their knowledge boundaries, but at the 
same time we claimed that systems integrators need to be closed to integrate the various 
bodies of knowledge into deep architectural knowledge and to protect this knowledge. In 
this thesis we have addressed several aspects of the firm’s capability to organize NPD 
projects and to deal with its systemic characteristics. Our main findings and contributions 
are briefly outlined below. 
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10.3 Scientific contributions 
The main scientific contributions of this thesis are the following. First of all, Part 2 of this 
thesis adopts a configurational approach to the study of innovation management. More in 
particular, we investigate - mainly from the perspective of systems integrators - the 
organizational form of development projects. The organization of innovation is a 
multifaceted problem and many theories therefore relate to this topic. It can be no surprise 
therefore to find many studies that aim to integrate multiple bodies of literature (e.g. 
Brusoni et al., 2001; Hoetker, 2005; Hoetker, 2007; Tiwana and Keil, 2007; Tiwana, 2008; 
Wolter and Veloso, 2008), including transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, 
social network analysis, the alliance literature, organization theory, knowledge 
management, and product modularity. What characterizes most of these studies is the view 
that each explanatory concept (such as tie strength, modularity, coordination intensity, etc.) 
is expected to be related directly and in a linear way to the performance of firms or of the 
innovation effort itself. Hence, and as outlined in Chapter 2, it is as if these theories 
compete in terms of their individual explanatory power. Instead, Part 2 of this thesis adopts 
a configurational approach to the study of the organization of innovation, which considers 
the joint effect of multiple explanatory factors.  
 
More specifically, Part 2 focuses on the involvement of systems integrators in development 
projects. For instance, to what extent should they finance these projects themselves or with 
partners? To what extent should they perform these projects? To what extent should they 
aim to fully understand the technologies involved in these projects? We argue that the 
answers to questions such as these depend on the specific characteristics of the innovation, 
and that these questions should be dealt with jointly rather than one by one. To develop our 
model, we first of all identified in the literature four distinct but related organizational 
dimensions (Chapter 5): ownership integration, coordination integration, task integration, 
and knowledge integration. Although these four dimensions have been indentified in 
various existing studies, no studies have considered all four of them simultaneously. As a 
result we were able to more comprehensively conceptualize a firm’s organizational form 
for development projects. With these four dimensions as basic building blocks, we used 
existing theoretical arguments to propose a configurational model that outlines appropriate 
organizational forms for six different types of component development projects. These 
organizational configurations range from fully within the firm to fully external to the firm, 
with various specific organizational configurations in between. Subsequently, we refined 
this model based on a case study research for the cases that were analyzed quantitatively in 
Chapter 4. This resulted in the construction of tentative middle-range theories that explain 
multivariate fit (see Figure 5.5).   
 
These tentative configurations for instance suggest the existence of several equifinal 
organizational forms, which is logically impossible in the traditional bivariate 
conceptualization of fit. We also find support for several of the original theoretical 
arguments. For example, several replications showed the appropriateness to use external 
innovation for the development of incremental and modular innovations. Also, we 
contribute to the systems integration literature by showing in detail (based on the rich 
insights from within-case analyses) how system firms realize systems integration 
coordination (Brusoni et al., 2001). They appear to know more than they make as a result 
of project monitoring and the selectively execution of project tasks (such as basic design 
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and product testing). We also found that systems integrators tend to collaborate and tend to 
rely on external innovators more often than expected, but in many cases they appeared to 
maintain some degree of control based on their extensive knowledge integration.  
 
Furthermore, we found a ‘strong direct effect’ across the different types of innovation: 
interface problems typically occurred when limited coordination integration was employed 
under conditions of radical interface change. Hence, systems integrators need to 
extensively exchange information with component developers to effectively integrate 
component innovations when interfaces with these components are very new, i.e. when the 
innovation is systemic rather than autonomous. This replicates a central argument in the 
systems integration literature (Brusoni et al., 2001) and in organization theory and 
information-processing theory more in general (Thompson, 1967; Tushman and Nadler, 
1978). Furthermore, we found that loosely organized projects (i.e. limited coordination 
integration in the face of stable, possibly modular interfaces) can be either organized 
within the firm (high task and ownership integration) or completely external to the firm 
(low task and ownership integration). This supports the idea that modularity not 
necessarily coincides with loosely coupled networks, but that loose coupling can just as 
well reside within the firm (Hoetker, 2006).  
 
Chapter 6 (the final chapter in Part 2) focused on systems integration for the development 
of a very specific type of product system: inter-industry architectural innovations. These 
new product systems are created by the first-time combination of existing technologies that 
come from different industries. Here, the product system itself is the locus of change, 
which means that within the project multiple components have to be aligned to create a 
coherent product system. Just as Chapter 5, Chapter 6 resulted in the formulation of a 
tentative configurational model. Based on three within-case analyses Chapter 6 shows that 
close first-time collaboration between specialists helps to successfully combine and 
integrate technologies from different industries. Furthermore, to increase the likelihood of 
a successful development project, this is suggested to be complemented with for instance a 
leading shareholder or a dominant partner, because this simplifies collaboration as well as 
joint decision-making and problem solving. In most collaborative cases in Chapter 5 a 
mobile operator was present that acted as the dominant firm. Chapter 6 complements 
extant systems integration literature by showing how (i.e. in what kind of organizational 
configuration) systems integration can successfully proceed without the presence of an 
incumbent systems integrator with deep prior architectural knowledge about component 
interrelationships.  
 
As a second major contribution, once firms have decided on the organizational form of 
NPD projects (Part 2), we have investigated in Part 3 of this thesis the management and the 
organizational form within NPD projects. What type of manager should be in charge of the 
project? To what extent should team members have freedom to make decisions? To what 
extent should a team be open for the input from suppliers and customers? More in 
particular, we investigate how factors such as these influence the ability of project teams to 
solve technical problems proficiently (in terms of solution quality, problem-solving speed, 
and problem-solving cost-efficiency), which is - as we show - critical for the performance 
of (systemic) development projects. Using survey data obtained from project managers of 
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software development projects, we for instance find that it is very important for team 
members to communicate freely among each other.  
 
All in all, the findings from Part 3 of this thesis increases our understanding of the new 
product development process (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995) and particularly complements 
the scarce literature about problem-solving in NPD (Sheremata, 2003; Atuahene-Gima, 
2003; Gouel and Fixson, 2006). In terms of problem solving we extend Sheremata’s 
existing model with several important moderating variables (problem frequency and the 
extent that problems are systemic rather than autonomous). We for instance find that the 
type of problem matters. Systemic problems involve problems with multiple, interrelated 
components, whereas autonomous problems are related to individual components. We find 
that different organizational project characteristics, such as decentralization and the search 
for external information, contribute differently to a team's problem-solving proficiency to 
the extent that projects are confronted with one type of problem rather than the other. 
Systemic problems are for instance solved relatively fast in the presence of a powerful 
project leader. In terms of reach we found an interesting trade-off.  
 
Furthermore, our empirical study served as a replication of the first empirical test by 
Atuahene-Gima (2003), but for several variables it also involved the first empirical test 
(i.e. problem-solving proficiency and project cost efficiency). Furthermore, we showed the 
added value of checking for curvilinear effects using polynomial regression analysis 
(Edwards, 1993). This resulted in several interesting insights. For instance, if a project’s 
problems are mostly systemic in nature we found that a medium degree of reach (i.e. 
search for external information) results in optimal solution quality. By obtaining a medium 
degree of relevant knowledge from their environment teams prevent the negative 
consequences of over-search (Laursen and Salter, 2006). At the same time the limited 
effort to engage with their environment allows teams to assimilate and to integrate the 
external knowledge and their internal expertise into high-quality architectural knowledge. 
Effective systems integration therefore requires organizational forms that are 
simultaneously open and closed. This also supports the idea outlined in Chapter 3 that 
architectural knowledge is scarce and that internal integration of external component 
knowledge is required to generate high-quality architectural knowledge. The idea of 
medium reach (which expands the firm’s knowledge boundary) and the internal 
development of high-quality architectural knowledge is also in line with the notion of 
systems integrators as ‘firms that know more than they make’ (Brusoni et al., 2001). This 
also fits our finding in Chapter 5 that systems firms tend to know more than they make 
based on external project monitoring and selective task integration. 
  
A third contribution of this thesis involves our investigation of cross-level moderators. The 
organizational form of NPD projects is typically studied for single-firm projects, whereas 
NPD alliances are often studied in terms of the degree of vertical integration (e.g. 
contractual alliances, minority shareholdings, joint-ventures). Limited evidence exists 
about how different project organizations perform in different firm-level settings (Gerwin 
and Ferris, 2004; Tiwana, forthcoming). In Chapter 9 we are one of the first to study how 
the organization within NPD projects is more or less effective in single-firm projects than 
in alliance projects. We for instance find that firm-level differentiation (as a result of 
alliance projects) contributes more strongly to problem solving proficiency if it is 
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complemented by project-level integration mechanisms. This suggests that the 
differentiation potential of alliances is more likely to be realized if the actual collaboration 
process is organized to closely integrate and align partners. This is also the logic 
underlying the proposed organizational configuration for the development of inter-industry 
architectural innovations in Chapter 6. More in general, this finding suggests that it is 
important to consider the multiple levels of organizational forms in order to fully 
understand the complementarity of integration and differentiation, which is the goal of 
many studies (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Weick; 1976; Gulati 
et al., 2005; Sheremata, 2000; Brusoni et al., 2001).  
 
10.4 Limitations and opportunities for future research 
Some overall limitations and opportunities for future research are the following. First, the 
unit of analysis throughout this thesis has been individual new component or new product 
development projects. This means that we did not investigate how systems integrators 
organize simultaneously multiple development projects and how projects are for instance 
integrated in an overarching project. Chapter 5 does address how different component 
development projects require different organizational forms, but we did not investigate 
how systems integrators manage and organize portfolios of development projects. This 
would for instance address the question how systems integrators are able to meet 
simultaneously different organizational requirements, such as ambidexterity (Tushman and 
O’Reilly, 1997). Furthermore, we paid little attention to project management over time. 
Most projects were viewed as static in terms of their contingencies and their organizational 
forms, which means that we did not investigate processes of change to achieve and 
maintain fit during the development process. This would for instance allow us to 
investigate how teams deal with technical problems once they occur. 
 
Secondly, the particularities of our empirical settings (mobile application development and 
web application development) have to be kept in mind when interpreting the results 
reported in this thesis. Future research is needed not only to increase our confidence in our 
findings in this particular setting, but also to see whether and how they hold in other 
empirical settings. Furthermore, we should note that these ICT industries - at the time of 
our data collection - witnessed fast technological changes. Particularly the mobile 
telecommunications industry was in a state of flux. It was still very uncertain at the time 
whether and how mobile Internet services would take off. Many efforts were made to 
develop innovative applications to attract new users (Chapter 4 and 5), which for instance 
included initiatives to collaborate across traditional industry boundaries (Chapter 6). Also 
the sector of web application development (Chapters 7, 8, and 9) witnessed rapid 
technological change in the period of our study. Internet applications are becoming 
increasingly advanced and complex, with great demands to align and customize many 
different technologies and to integrate prior technologies and systems. Hence, systems 
integration was a critical challenge in both empirical settings.  
 
We can expect that different phases of the industry life cycle coincide with different 
involvement of systems integrators in the development of new components and 
complementary products. For instance, the incentives for operators to generate installed 
base are likely to be less in mature industries (Chapter 4). Furthermore, technologies might 
become more standardized and open over time (Chapter 3), thus resulting in more external 
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innovation and possibly in the emergence intermediary systems integrators, i.e. actors that 
take over systems integration activities from systems integrators (Chapter 5). It would for 
instance be interesting to investigate this phenomenon of intermediate systems integration 
in future research from the perspective of the vertical disintegration of markets (Jacobides, 
2005; Jaspers et al., 2007). 
 
Thirdly, in terms of measurement, it has to be acknowledged that subjective measures were 
used. Hence, common method bias might have influenced our results, although we have 
reasons to believe that this is limited (Chapter 9). We must also stress that our studies aim 
to explain the respondents’ personal satisfaction with how well projects met their 
objectives. These objectives might however vary from firm to firm and from project to 
project, and for individual projects these objectives might change over time. Furthermore, 
differences are likely to exist between project managers about how easily they are satisfied 
with the performance of teams. We did not control for this. A common assumption is that 
error in this regard is cancelled out over multiple projects, but we cannot rule out any 
particular bias in this regard. However, our within-case analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6 suffer less from this problem, because the qualitative insights allow us to better 
understand project outcomes.  
 
Fourthly, in this thesis we predominantly focused on the development phase of the 
innovation process. This means that we pay little attention to the commercialization and 
the marketing of new components and product systems, and to the market performance of 
innovations. However, we did take into account how several strategic considerations 
related to the commercialization phase can influence the organization of development 
projects. In Chapter 4 we for instance considered the urgency of mobile operators and 
external complementors to acquire an early group of users and how this influences the 
relative involvement of these actors in the development phase. In other chapters we found 
evidence as well that commercial and strategic issues influence the organizational form of 
development projects. Incumbents for instance turned down the opportunity to participate 
in the new product development initiative of a new entrant because of competitive reasons 
(Chapter 6), and for strategic reasons small, external firms were very willing to invest in 
development projects that were initiated by operators (Chapter 5). Future research on the 
organization of NPD projects could take into account more explicitly how organizational 
forms are influenced by market and strategic considerations.  
 
For instance, firms may purposefully develop systemic innovations to seek competitive 
advantage, such as by creating a proprietary, customized product system, or by 
repositioning its core technologies within a larger product system (e.g. Adner, 2006). In 
addition, collaborative development projects might be initiated for the sheer purpose to 
discover interdependencies and complementarities that were unknown before (Pisano, 
2006). It was not an explicit aim to incorporate these issues in our analyses. Neither did we  
 
Fifthly, the notion of multi-firm systems integration as presented in Chapter 6 is not only 
relevant for the development of inter-industry architectural innovations, as it also applies to 
the design and development of next-generation technologies and standards, such as the 
next-generation of DVD technologies. The competing Blu-ray and HD DVD technoligies 
have each been developed in a large consortium. Such highly complex and large-sized 
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projects were not included in our study, but we can expect that issues of joint decision-
making, coordination, and differentiation are crucially important in these settings. In 
addition, inter-firm relationships will be less cooperative as the many different participants 
have partly overlapping skills and intend to compete after the commercialization of their 
joint standard. Systems integration is therefore a particularly strategic, political, and 
complex challenge in such settings. It would be interesting to study these extreme projects 
from a systems integration perspective. A relevant stream of literature in this regard is 
social network analysis, which allows the investigation of different network structures in 
terms of the positions of network participants and the nature of their ties (e.g. Tiwana, 
2008). 
 
Sixthly, the chapters on problem solving (Chapter 7, 8, and 9) adopt the traditional 
bivariate approach to investigate fit. Using regression analyses we investigated several 
interaction effects, but we did not yet explore configurations of the different differentiation 
and integration mechanisms. A common approach would be to use cluster analysis to 
derive profiles of project structures within the subset of high-performing projects. Next, 
profile similarity indices (Chapter 2) can be used to investigate for the remaining projects 
whether deviation from high-performing project profiles reduces performance. Another 
approach would be to search for project configurations that are sufficient but not necessary 
for high project performance using Boolean algebra (e.g. Fiss, 2007). Both approaches 
offer ways to develop middle-range theories (see Chapter 2) for configurations of project-
level organizational mechanisms. This could help to generate a better understanding of the 
proposed complementarity between differentiation and integration mechanisms 
(Sheremata, 2000; Tiwana, forthcoming). This would also be of value to the systems 
integration literature, because this also heavily draws on this complementarity (e.g. 
Brusoni et al., 2001). Finally, a further way to refine the analyses in Chapter 8 and Chapter 
9 would be to investigate polynomial models of fit as the ones applied in Chapter 7. 
 
Finally, given the scarcity of multi-level research on the organization of innovation, many 
opportunities exist to pursue this type of studies in the future (Gupta et al., 2007). Chapter 
9 adopted an explicit multi-level perspective, but opportunities also exist to investigate 
how the four dimensions of integration relate to the various project-level organizational 
mechanisms. Other chapters implicitly addressed this to some extent. Chapter 6, for 
example, focused on project-level processes (such as coordination and architectural 
knowledge creation) for different firm-level settings in terms of ownership integration. 
Furthermore, Chapter 3 illustrated how various lower-level Open Innovation mechanisms 
contribute to higher-level organizational dimensions, such as knowledge integration. This 
is closely related to a recent study by Tiwana and Keil (2007), who have shown how the 
presence of peripheral knowledge, i.e. knowledge integration of outsourced activities, 
influences the performance of outsourcing relationships for different types of control. The 
application of peripheral knowledge by means of extensive process control reduces the 
autonomy and the incentives of external actors and therefore reduces performance. In 
contrast, extensive peripheral is particularly effective for output control, because this helps 
to specify and enforce prespecified outcomes, such as milestones. Building upon these 
findings, and complementing them with the studies in this thesis, future research could for 
instance address how the application of process control and output control differ for single-
firm projects and multi-firm projects. 
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10.5 Managerial implications 
This thesis provides insights that help managers to organize and manage new product 
development (NPD) projects. These projects often fail to meet quality, budget, and time 
objectives. This especially holds true for systemic innovation projects, i.e. projects that 
involve the change of numerous highly interrelated components. Two issues are of 
particular managerial concern. First of all, this concerns whether firms should be involved 
in NPD projects in the first place, and if so, to what extent and in what type of projects? To 
address this issue, this thesis presents a model that proposes, for different types of NPD 
projects, one or more organizational forms that contribute to project performance. This 
model helps to make integrative decisions about how to organize innovation projects in 
terms of legal ownership, active task involvement, coordination intensity, and knowledge 
management. Supported by case study evidence, this tentative model indicates that project 
performance benefits from organizational forms that carefully combine these 
organizational elements to match the project’s technical characteristics. 
 
Furthermore, the four organizational dimensions included in this model can be used for 
other purposes, such as the design of buyer-supplier relationships (Jaspers and Van den 
Ende, 2006). The four dimensions are also useful as a tool to assess a firm’s ongoing 
buyer-supplier relationships and NPD projects. It helps to ask questions such as: do we 
know enough of the technologies involved? If we invest in learning capabilities, does that 
allow us to rely more extensively on outside suppliers and partners? Should there be more 
knowledge overlap with our suppliers? Etc. 
 
Secondly, after a firm has decided to perform a development project, the question becomes 
how to organize and manage these projects. What type of manager should be in charge of 
the project? To what extent should team members have freedom to make decisions? To 
what extent should a team be open for the input from suppliers and customers? More in 
particular, this thesis shows how project-level factors such as these influence the ability of 
project teams to solve technical problems, which is - as we showed in Chapter 8 - critical 
for the performance of (systemic) development projects. For instance, in our empirical 
setting of small software development teams, free flow of information appeared to have a 
strong positive effect on problem-solving proficiency. In addition, we find that the 
frequency of problems and the type of problem matter. Namely, a different project 
organization is needed for teams that are confronted with problems that affect many of a 
product’s components (systemic problems) than for teams that mainly have to solve 
problems with individual components (autonomous problems). Systemic problems are for 
instance solved relatively fast in the presence of a powerful project leader.  
 
In addition, we found a strong trade-off for the extent that teams reach outside to collect 
information. Although reach helps to improve the quality of autonomous solutions, this is 
at the same time a very costly problem-solving tactic. Furthermore, especially medium 
levels of reach are helpful to generate high-quality solutions for systemic problems: 
extensive reliance on the firm’s environment appears to contribute less to the development 
of high-quality architectural knowledge than medium external search. Open Innovation 
therefore appears to have clear limits in the context of systemic innovation. Firms need to 
be somewhat open to collect new ideas and information, but at the same time they need to 
develop internally a detailed understanding of their own product architectures. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
 
 
 
 
Systemische innovatie betreft de ontwikkeling van producten waarbij meerdere 
componenten veranderen die onderling sterk samenhangen. In tegenstelling tot autonome 
innovatie, dat betrekking heeft op componenten die onafhankelijk van elkaar veranderen, is 
systemische innovatie voor veel bedrijven eerder regel dan uitzondering. Dit komt 
bijvoorbeeld door de toegenomen inspanningen om producten te ontwikkelen, zoals 
mobiele telefoons, die uit verschillende (nieuwe) technologieën bestaan.  
 
Het systemische karakter van innovatie, in combinatie met haar inherente onzekerheid, 
maakt het een grote uitdaging om dit proces zo goed mogelijk te organiseren en te 
managen. Dit proefschrift ontwikkelt en test daarom verschillende theorieën om de 
prestaties van productontwikkelingsprojecten te verklaren. Het belangrijkste aandachtspunt 
wordt hierbij gevormd door de manier waarop deze projecten zijn georganiseerd. Dit 
proefschrift presenteert en verfijnt bijvoorbeeld een configuratietheorie voor de integratie 
van componentontwikkelingsprojecten door systems integrators. Deze bedrijven zijn 
verantwoordelijk voor het coherent ontwerpen en ontwikkelen van (complexe) 
productsystemen, ofwel systeemintegratie. De theorie stelt dat systems integrators hun 
producten verbeteren door middel van zorgvuldige combinaties van projectinvesteringen, 
taakverdeling met leveranciers, kennismanagement en coördinatie-intensiteit.  
 
Dit proefschrift test ook de mate waarin de organisatie van ontwikkelingsprojecten 
bijdraagt aan het vermogen van productontwikkelingsteams om technische problemen op 
te lossen. De resultaten laten zien dat systemische problemen anders georganiseerde teams 
vereisen dan autonome problemen. Systemische problemen worden bijvoorbeeld relatief 
snel opgelost wanneer het project wordt aangestuurd door een sterke manager. Daarnaast 
vinden we dat voor systemische problemen kwalitatief hoogwaardigere oplossingen 
worden gevonden naarmate meer inspanningen worden verricht om extern informatie te 
verzamelen. Dit geldt echter maar tot op zekere hoogte: naarmate meer externe informatie 
wordt gezocht zwakt dit effect af en gaat het de kwaliteit van oplossingen zelfs negatief 
beïnvloeden.  
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Systemic innovation refers to product development activities that involve the change
of multiple interdependent components. Unlike autonomous innovation, which refers to
components that change independently, systemic innovation is for many firms the norm
rather than the exception. This is for instance the result of increased efforts to develop
products from multiple (new) technologies, such as mobile phones. The systemic nature of
innovation, combined with its inherent uncertainty, makes it a challenging task to organize
and manage this process as well as possible. This is why this thesis develops and tests
several theories to explain the performance of new product development (NPD) projects.
Of main concern are the performance implications of a project’s organizational form. 
This thesis, for instance, proposes and refines a configurational theory about the
integration of component development projects by systems integrators. These firms are
responsible for the coherent design and development of (complex) product systems, i.e.
systems integration. The theory predicts that systems integrators carefully combine project
ownership, supplier involvement, knowledge management, and coordination intensity to
improve their products. This thesis also tests to what extent the organization of NPD
projects contributes to the capability of NPD teams to solve technical problems. The results
indicate that systemic problems require differently organized teams than autonomous
problems. For instance, systemic problems are solved relatively fast in the presence of a
powerful project manager. In addition, we find that search for external information helps
to generate high-quality solutions for systemic problems, but only to a certain degree.
After that, this effect turns negative.
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